




CONFRONTING THE JANUS FACE: THE ARMED FORCES 




Nathaniel D.F. Allen 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 











© Nathaniel D.F. Allen 2018 
 





In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, scholars have given renewed attention to the 
role of the armed forces as an essential but ambivalent actor in the birth, life, and death of 
democracy. Despite this emergent literature, there is no consensus concerning the 
institutional dimensions, causal mechanisms, and regional differences that motivate why 
soldiers choose to support political reformers, side with dictators, or upend existing 
democratic regimes. This dissertation proposes a theory on the relationship between 
authoritarian civil-military relations, democratic transitions, and the duration of emerging 
democratic regimes in Africa. It argues that the continent has been characterized by three 
predominant forms of authoritarian civil-military relations, each with distinct 
democratization patterns: military regimes, ethnic civil-military relations, and 
representative civil-military relations.  
Military regimes occur when a country is ruled by a junta of military officers. 
Cleavages between praetorian and professional factions of the armed forces make 
democratic transitions likely, but democratic settlements brittle. Authoritarian regimes 
with ethnic civil-military relations are ruled by a civilian who attempts to recruit co-
ethnics into key positions in the army or other parallel military institutions. Patron-client 
relations between the authoritarian leaders and military institutions dominated by co-
ethnics impede democratic transition, but the absence of a politically dominant military 
results in more stable democracy than in military regimes. Authoritarian regimes with 
representative civil-military relations refrain from manipulating either the political or 
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ethnic loyalties of the armed forces. Marginalized from politics and free from ethnic 
allegiances, such regimes are most likely to transition to stable democratic rule.  
These theoretical claims are evaluated through cross-country regression analysis 
and case studies in Nigeria, Sudan and Tunisia. The cross-country analysis tests whether 
authoritarian military institutions affect the likelihood of democratic transition, as well as 
the duration of emerging democratic regimes. The case studies, which are supported by 
key informant interviews with military officials and politicians in Tunisia and Nigeria, 
trace the causal mechanisms that facilitate military action for or against democratization. 
  Primary Reader: Peter Lewis (advisor) 
 







The act of conducting scholarly research is at once a supremely solitary and 
supremely engaging endeavor.  Solitary, in the sense that the most of the time one spends 
as a researcher is on one’s own. Absorbing vast literatures, combing through archives, 
assembling and analyzing data, and working one’s way through chapter drafts are 
activities demanding little human interaction. Engaging, in the sense that I have found 
that never is the scholar truly alone. Only by constantly wrestling with the theories, 
methods, arguments and insights of others is new knowledge created. Moreover, the 
success or failure of a research project depends on accommodating participants, wise 
colleagues, and supportive loved ones.  The shortcomings of this dissertation are my 
responsibility, but to others I owe a great debt of gratitude.  
A number of colleagues and organizations were tremendously supportive of this 
project with their time and resources. My field research in Nigeria would not have been 
possible without the support of Colonel Julius Osifo, who graciously offered me 
accommodations in Nigeria and was crucial in setting me up with interviews with his 
military colleagues. Thanks is due also to Jackie Farris of the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua 
Foundation, whose boundless energy and generosity with her time were essential in 
securing some of this dissertation’s most insightful interviews. In Tunisia, this project 
would not have succeeded without the support of Sharan Grewal, Major Colonel 
Mohamed Mezhoughi of the Association of Retired Military Officers and Major Colonel 
Mohamed Ahmed of INSAF (Justice for Former Soldiers). I would also like to thank Elor 
Nkweurem, Matthew Page, Darren Kew, Chido Onumah, O’Seun Odwale, Mohamed 
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Haruna, John Dara, Max Siollun, and Oussama Ayara for speaking with me and 
connecting me with their friends and colleagues.  
This project has the beneficiary of the largess of several organizations and the 
dedicated people working for them. First, I’d like to thank the U.S. Institute of Peace, and 
in particular Elizabeth Cole and Tom Scherer, for deciding this project was worthy of 
financial support, offering me a platform in which to present findings, and offering 
insightful commentary. I’d also like to thank American University’s Bridging the Gap 
project, including Naz Barma and Rachel Whitlark, for a summer grant that helped 
support this dissertation’s fieldwork in Nigeria. Finally, I’d like to acknowledge the Johns 
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Ph.D. program, and in 
particular Jon Youngs, for providing financial support for field research in Tunisia and to 
present my research at various conferences. 
A number of colleagues have offered feedback that greatly improved the quality 
of this dissertation. Dissertation committee members Peter Lewis, Bruce Parrott and Eliot 
Cohen offered excellent advice when I presented my prospectus that sparked theoretical 
and empirical improvements in this project’s research design. Ambassador Princeton 
Lyman, who has been enormously generous with his time and on point with his 
commentary, has been both a source inspiration and advice. A 2016 panel at the 
International Studies Association, including Kimberly Marten, Lawrence Rubin, John-
Michael Arnold, Madison Schramm and Torrey Taussig provided helpful remarks on the 
academic paper version of this project. Additional thanks are owed to Bruce Parrott, Risa 
Brooks, Sharan Grewal, Travis Sharp, Brad Potter, Hilary Matfess and John Speed 
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Meyers, who offered wonderfully insightful comments on various chapters and drafts. I’d 
also like to thank my advisor, Peter Lewis, for his guidance, thoughtfulness, and 
unwavering support of my attempts to shape a research agenda and craft a career that is 
both academically meaningful and policy relevant.  
 Finally, I’d like to thank my parents, Leslie Feder and Michael Allen, for their 
support and for reading several of this project’s more painful early drafts. The biggest 
debt of gratitude of all, however, goes to my amazing wife, Sarah, whose love, patience, 
feedback and meticulous eye for detail helped make the writing of this dissertation a 
rather pleasant experience. Her unwavering encouragement kept the sleepless nights to a 
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The Janus-Faced Soldier and the African State 
 
Across Africa, armies often act as agents and instigators of authoritarian regimes. 
Most of Africa’s dictatorships have risen to the sound of martial music over the radio 
waves, the sight of armored vehicles in the streets, and promises to restore order made by 
men in black boots with lopsided berets. Continental Africa’s first coup began on July 23, 
1952, when members of Egypt’s Free Officers Movement overthrew King Farouk I, 
ending the monarchy and establishing a military dictatorship. The most recent coup was 
on November 14, 2017, when the military forced the resignation of Zimbabwean 
President Robert Mugabe after nearly 40 years in office.  
Soldiers in Africa kill citizens of their own countries more often than they fight 
foreign adversaries. Between 1990 and 2015, peaceful protestors have been violently 
repressed by pro-government forces no less than five hundred times.1 One of the worst 
such crackdowns occurred during the 2011 protests in Libya, when security forces shot, 
tortured or beat to death as many as one thousand civilians gathered to protest poor living 
conditions and to demand an end to the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Since 1946, 
African countries have fought no less than seventy internal wars, seven times the number 
                                                          
1 Calculated from Idean Salehyan, Cullen S. Hendrix, Jesse Hamner, Christina Case, Christopher 
Linebarger, Emily Stull, and Jennifer Williams, "Social Conflict in Africa: A New Database," International 
Interactions 38, no. 4 (2012), pp. 503-511. Peaceful protests include organized demonstrations, 




of armed conflicts that have been fought between African states.2 The hundreds of 
thousands killed in conflicts in Liberia, Sudan, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo are a direct product of the tendency of African armies to target civilians rather 
than other armed forces in wartime.3 
Nevertheless, the African soldier has played as important a role in electing 
democratic leaders as she has in supporting dictatorships. Military seizures of power are 
often followed by a quick, orderly return to the barracks and free, fair elections. Early 
scholars of comparative politics called such armies “guardian” or “moderator” types,4 
arguing that sometimes the military feels “obligated to ‘step in, to sort out the mess’ 
created by factious politicians, and after a period of ‘corrective government,’ to hand 
over to cleaned up civilian political system.”5 Early interventions in which the military 
appears to have been motivated, at least in part, by such aims include Sudan (1958), 
Sierra Leone (1962), the Republic of Congo (1963), Central African Republic (1965), 
Nigeria (1966), and Burundi (1966).6 One of the most recent such coups occurred in 2010 
                                                          
2 These estimates are derived from the Uppsala University’s Conflict Data Program. See Melander, Erik 
Melander, Therése Pettersson & Lotta Themnér, “Organized Violence, 1989-2015,” Journal of Peace 
Research 53, no. 5 (2016), pp. 727-742 and Lotta Harbom, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen. "Dyadic 
Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946—2007." Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 5 (2008), pp. 697-710. 
Interstate combatants include France and Tunisia (1961), Morocco and Algeria (1963), Ethiopia and 
Somalia (1964-1980), Uganda and Tanzania (1978), Chad and Nigeria (1983), Mali and Burkina Faso 
(1985), Chad and Libya (1987), Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000), Cameroon and Nigeria (1996), Djibouti 
and Eritrea (2008), Sudan and South Sudan (2012).  
3 See Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the 
End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010), pp. 
415-429 and Christopher Day and William Reno, "In Harm's Way: African Counter-Insurgency and 
Patronage Politics," Civil Wars 16, no. 2 (2014), pp. 105-126. 
4 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 219-237 
5 Christopher Clapham and George Philip, The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (Barnes and Noble, 
1985), p. 9. 
6 See Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d’état (Penguin Books, 




in Niger, when soldiers intervened in order to prevent President Mamadou Tandja from 
seeking a third term, then left power after organizing parliamentary and presidential 
elections in 2011.  
Still, despite a continent-wide reputation for abusive interactions with civilians, 
the will of military forces to repress is not always limitless. In Africa in the 21st century, 
orders to shoot civilian political protestors are rarely obeyed. For every case of violent 
crackdown, there are more than 10 cases in which peaceful protests are allowed to unfold 
unencumbered.7 The rise in peaceful protest in Africa has been accompanied by a marked 
decline in the instance and success of military coups. In the 1960s and 1970s, three-
quarters of African leaders who left power did so through a coup, violent overthrow, or 
assassination. Now, the ratio is reversed; between 2000 and 2005, the number of leaders 
who quit their office through violence dropped to less than 20 percent.8 
In some countries, the military has a history of supporting only autocrats. The 
Algerian regime has remained authoritarian since it won independence from France in 
1962; challenges to the regime have been ruthlessly repressed by a shadowy cabal of 
military officers who fought together in the Algerian War of Independence. Each of 
Chad’s three prior post-independence governments has ended either in an authoritarian 
military coup or in civil war. The current government under Idriss Deby is one of the 
most Africa’s most repressive, his rule undergirded by a large army supported by 
                                                          
7 Salehyan et al. "Social Conflict in Africa,” Op Cit.  The SCAD database records over 5,500 cases between 
1990 and 2015 in which no repression or non-lethal repression was used against peaceful demonstrators.   
8 Daniel Posner and Daniel J. Young, "The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa." Journal of 
Democracy 18, no. 3 (2007), p. 127. 
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generous funds from the United States, France, and other Western countries. The same 
can be said of countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Togo, and Uganda, each a nation 
where armies have intervened on multiple occasions to block or forestall attempts to 
liberalize.   
In other countries, men in uniform almost always support democrats, or remain 
passively on the sidelines. In Tunisia, Mali, and Malawi, the military played an 
instrumental role in overthrowing authoritarian regimes. In Malawi, for example, the 
middle ranks of the military did not wait for orders from their senior commanders before 
they attacked militia forces loyal to the dictator Hastings Banda. With the militia forces 
in disarray, Banda was forced to cede to calls for multi-party elections.9 By contrast, in 
Botswana, Senegal, and Tanzania, the military has never held much of a political role at 
all. The Senegalese army is one of the few armies on the African continent never to have 
attempted a coup. In fact, the army of Senegal has twice intervened at the invitation of 
political leaders to prevent military takeovers in neighboring Gambia.    
However, in most African countries, soldiers have supported both democrats or 
dictators at various times. Only 12 of Africa’s 54 nations have maintained either strictly 
democratic or strictly authoritarian governments since their founding.10 In most of these 
nations, either by intervening directly for or against a particular government, the military 
has played an open and decisive role in the democratization process. Some have 
                                                          
9 See Jonathan Newell, "An African Army Under Pressure: The Politicisation of the Malawi Army and 
‘Operation Bwezani’, 1992–93." Small Wars & Insurgencies 6, no. 2 (1995), pp. 159-182. 
10 According to the data collected for this study, which defines democratization as a Polity IV score greater 
than zero and only examines non-colonial regimes, these countries are: Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Togo, Gambia, Morocco, Swaziland, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa.  
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experienced periods of rapid alternation between authoritarian and democratic 
governments, where societal or inter-military divisions render soldiers unwilling or 
unable to make up their minds. General Arthur Ankrah overthrew Kwame Nkhrumah, 
Ghana’s first prime minister, in a coup d’état in 1966; General Ankrah was then replaced 
by Brigadier General Akwasi Afrifa, who returned the country to civilian rule under 
Kofia Busia in 1969. While on a trip to Great Britain for medical purposes, Busia was 
overthrown in 1972 by General Ignatius Acheampong, who was then executed by a firing 
squad in 1978 instigated by General Fred Akuffo, who was also executed by a firing 
squad instigated by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, who handed over power to the 
civilian president Hilla Liman in 1979. Unhappy with Liman’s performance in office, 
Rawlings again seized power in 1981 and ruled Ghana for the next twenty years, 
including service as the Fourth Republic’s first democratically elected head of state 
between 1993 and 2001.   
Like Janus, the Roman god of transition, change, beginnings and endings, the role 
of the armed forces in the politics of democratization is multifaceted and many-faced. At 
times, the military acts on behalf of democratic social forces, overthrowing corrupt, 
repressive dictators and organizing their replacement through freely contested elections. 
At other times, the army acts as an instrument of repression, removing democratically 
elected leaders before they ever have a chance to govern or instigating atrocities in order 
to cement an authoritarian strongman’s grip on power. Democracy-saving or -ending 
military interventions can be clustered closely together in time and space, or the army can 
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stand idly by in the face of the most abhorrent oppression or transformative social 
revolution, and simply do nothing at all.  
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to understand why the behavior of the 
armed forces towards their governments is so Janus-faced. Under what conditions will 
the military lend its support to democratic change? Are certain types of authoritarian 
regimes with certain types of civil-military relations more likely to be succeeded by 
stable democracies than others? Is escape from authoritarianism possible in countries 
where the armed forces consistently intervene to foreclose, interrupt, or forestall 
democracy?  
 
1.1: The Argument: Authoritarian Civil-Military Relations and Pathways to and 
From Democracy 
 
It is my contention that the role of the military in African regime change is neither 
as fickle nor as capricious as it may appear, but depends on how military institutions are 
structured in relation to civilian ones. To minimize the threat of a coup and maximize 
their control over their nation’s means of violence, authoritarian leaders must make 
choices concerning how to structure their armies. These choices lead to distinct patterns 
of civil-military relations, with different cleavages that emerge between authoritarian 
leaders and their armies, and within armies themselves. These cleavages, in turn, 
influence whether the military will act to preserve authoritarianism or allow a democratic 
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transition when confronted with pressure to liberalize. Moreover, the cleavages that 
existed within the army and its ties to the old regime elite usually persist after a 
transition, affecting a democracy's chances for survival. This theoretical framework, 
which begins with the choices of authoritarian leaders and ends with transitional 
outcomes, is illustrated in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1: Authoritarian Civil-Military Relations and Transitional Politics: A Causal Logic 
 
 
I argue that the choices of Africa's authoritarian leaders can be categorized into 
three types of authoritarian civil-military relations, each with distinct consequences for 
the conditions under which the army will allow a transition to lasting democracy to occur. 
One of these types is a military regime, where military officers choose to rule as a 
collective body. I argue that African military regimes are moderately likely to transition 
to democracy, but that democracies succeeding military regimes face dim prospects for 
survival, a pattern of democratic instability. The second civil-military relation type occurs 
when a civilian or personalist dictator rules a country and chooses to recruit co-ethnics 
into the officer corps or into parallel military institutions, creating an ethnic army. I argue 
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that countries with ethnic armies tend to block transitions to democracy, a pattern of 
democratic obstruction. The final civil-military relation type occurs when a civilian or 
personalist dictator rules but does not choose to ethnically stack the military, leading to 
representative armies. Dictatorships with representative armies tend to result in lasting 
democracy, a pattern of democratic stability.  
Below, I outline the previous literature and my argument concerning how each of 
these civil-military relation types tend to influence democratic outcomes. To illustrate the 
causal logic of my argument, I draw on this dissertation's three case studies in Nigeria, 
Sudan and Tunisia.  
 
1.1.1: Military Regimes and Democratic Instability  
 
The idea that military regimes have important consequences for democratization 
is not new, but it is controversial. For many scholars of African studies, the seizure of 
power by soldiers is synonymous with misrule. The period from the early 1960s, when 
Africa’s soldiers first seized power, to the 1990s, when many of the continent’s 
authoritarian regimes were forced out, was a period of immense political and economic 
decline. African military officers who served as rulers, such as the Central African 
Republic’s Jean-Bédel Bokassa, Uganda’s Idi Amin, and Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir 
presided over some of Africa’s worst dictatorships. In their landmark survey of African 
transitional politics between 1990 and 1994, Bratton and van de Walle note 12 of the 14 
relevant cases where a democratic transition was blocked were countries with previous 
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histories of coups or military rule. They observe that “an institutional legacy of military 
involvement in politics seemed to predispose security forces to intervene during 
transitions and to incline subsequent transition outcomes to fall short of democracy.”11 
This finding has been confirmed by the cross-national literature, which demonstrates that 
military seizures of power begets further military intervention.12  
Nevertheless, the proposition that military regimes are more likely to lead to 
democracy has never been systematically tested in Africa. In the literature on 
comparative politics, there is evidence that, on the contrary, military regimes are actually 
more likely to result in democracy than other forms of authoritarianism. According one 
recent study by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz, close to two-thirds of 
military regimes since 1945 have ended in democracy, compared to a 40 percent 
democratization rate for other regime types.13 These findings hinge upon a particular 
definition that distinguishes between military-ruled regimes and regimes simply ruled by 
a former military officer. As Geddes argues:  
A military regime, in contrast to a personalist dictatorship led by a military 
officer, is one in which a group of officers determines who will lead the 
country and has some influence on policy. In an institutionalized military 
                                                          
11 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in the 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 215.  
12 See Robert Jackman et al, “Explaining African Military Coups d’État, 1960-1982,” American Political 
Science Review 78, no. 3 (1983), pp. 1262-1275; Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer. "Toward a Structural 
Understanding of Coup Risk." Journal of Conflict Resolution 47.5 (2003), pp. 594-620; and Paul Collier 
and Anke Hoeffler, “Coup Traps: Why Does Africa Have so many Coups d’État?” Oxford University 
(2005).  
13 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A 




regime (many are not), senior officers have agreed on some formula for 
sharing or rotating power, and consultation is somewhat routinized.14 
This dissertation follows Geddes and her colleagues in defining military rule as a 
“government in which a group of military officers determines who leads the country and 
has policy influence,” and in arguing that the distinction between military and other 
forms of rule creates unique cleavages within the armed forces and distinct consequences 
for a regime’s prospects and opportunities for democracy. Yet it differs in its predictions, 
siding with scholars in the Africanist tradition by arguing that the transition from military 
rule to consolidated democracy is rarely smooth. 
 Why is this the case? The answer lies in recognizing that military regimes have 
unique institutional cleavages that impact the probability that a regime ends in democracy 
and that democracy’s chances of survival. In this dissertation’s analytical framework, the 
choice by military officers to rule collectively leads to distinct civil-military relations 
marked by cleavages between the praetorian officers who prefer power and the broader 
military who prefers the barracks,15 as Geddes and others have argued. The military’s 
status as ruler, competition within the ruling elite, and tensions between praetorian and 
traditional officers make military regimes highly vulnerable to coups and causes the 
armed forces to fracture when the regime is threatened by internal or external pressure.  
The lack of military cohesion results in a process of competition, bargaining, and conflict 
                                                          
14 Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" Annual Review of 
Political Science 2 (1999), p. 124. 
15 The use of the term “praetorian” to describe military intervention in politics was first popularized by 
early comparativists. In particular, see Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political 
Decay." World Politics 17, no. 3 (1965), pp. 386-430 and Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the 
Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-military Relations in Developing Polities." Comparative 
Politics 1, no. 3 (1969), pp. 382-404. 
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between factions that results in a reasonable, but not certain, chance of a transition to 
democracy. Most of the time, some or all of the praetorian officers remain in the military 
after a democratic transition. These officers often act to seize power at the first 
opportunity, meaning that military regimes face dim prospects for democratic survival. 
Thus, military regimes tend to follow paths of democratic instability because they are 
fairly likely to transition to but unlikely to sustain democracy.  
To evaluate the causal mechanisms behind the argument, this dissertation draws 
on both fieldwork and secondary sources from Nigeria, focusing in particular on the 
causes and consequences of Nigeria’s second period of military rule from 1983 to 1999. 
Dating back to the country’s first coup in 1966, the historical choice of Nigerian dictators 
has been institutionalized military rule. In each of Nigeria’s authoritarian regimes, the 
military effectively wielded veto power over whom to choose as a leader and maintained 
enormous influence in shaping policy. Not only was a military leader in charge, but 
military officers served as ministers, governed states, and the military itself was 
responsible for writing opinions on topics ranging from economic policy to a timeline for 
the country’s democratic transition.  
The result of Nigerian military rule was to create a series of cleavages between 
officers who wielded power and the broader military. Despite the Nigerian military’s 
control over the country’s political system, the Nigerian armed forces were never unified 
over whether and how long the army ought to remain in power. The officers in charge of 
governing the country never represented a majority of officers, and the outsized benefits 
the praetorian class of officers received rankled many of their colleagues in more 
12 
 
professional roles. For example, the 1983 coup that brought Nigeria's second military 
regime was a legacy of its first, which lasted from 1966 and 1979 and left in place a 
network of junior officers hungry to return to power. These officers, which one former 
general called Nigeria's "first tier of coup merchants," played a role in every successful 
coup in Nigerian history.16 President Ibrahim Babangida, one of Nigeria’s chief coup 
merchants and head of state from 1985 to 1983, was able to maintain power in part 
because he was a master at balancing the military's competing factions, promising a 
return to the barracks for those in the armed forces eager to leave while executing an 
endless series of delays to appease the hardliners. Babangida’s skills as the consummate 
manipulator earned him the moniker “Maradona,” after the soccer star known for his 
prodigious dribbling skills.  
These cleavages led the Nigerian military to fracture when Babangida's 
government came under pressure to liberalize in the lead-up to and aftermath of the 1993 
elections. Responding to exhortations from hardliners, Babangida annulled the results, 
only to lose support among much of the rest of Nigeria’s officer corps, the majority of 
whom at that point favored a return to the barracks. Nevertheless, the 1993 contest for 
Nigeria’s future was won by the praetorian class of officers, led by Sani Abacha, who 
briefly united officers around the common goal of removing his predecessor. After 
Abacha seized power, he was able to consolidate it in part by retiring or firing many of 
Nigeria’s remaining senior officers, and because many of the officers who were left 
                                                          
16 M. Chris Alli, The Federal Republic of the Nigerian Army: The Siege of a Nation (Malthouse Press, 
2001), p. 62. 
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refused to participate in coups or concern themselves with military politics of any kind. 
When Abacha died in 1998, however, senior officers made their preferences for a return 
to civilian rule by abruptly leaving power. They engineered the democratic election of 
Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired former general and head of state during Nigeria’s first 
military regime.  
The fracturing of Nigeria's armed forces in response to pressure to liberalize 
helped facilitate varying transitional outcomes. In 1993, the hardline faction of praetorian 
officers annulled the freest and fairest election Nigeria had ever had, arrested the 
candidate the majority of Nigerians had voted for, and violently cracked down on its 
opposition in order to continue military rule. After Abacha's death in 1998, the traditional 
faction of the Nigerian military seized power and ceded it to a democratically elected 
leader. The conflict and ambivalence within the Nigerian military, torn as it was between 
top officers who wanted to keep power, subalterns who wanted to replace them, and 
officers who believed that politics were not the military's concern, help to explain the 
country's lurches between authoritarianism and democracy. The Nigerian case therefore 
confirms this project’s argument that factionalism and competition resulting from 
military rule create inconsistent transition outcomes. 
Yet the influence of Nigeria's military regimes did not end with the country's 
democratic transition. The remarkable duration of Nigeria's current democratic regime, 
which, at 18 years and counting, has lasted longer than any previous Nigerian 
government, is a product of decisions made by current and former military leaders to 
break the cycle of military intervention.  These factors included the military pasts of 
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General Obasanjo and other senior politicians, the surprise retirement in 1999 of military 
officers with prior political experience, and better ethnic representation among Nigeria’s 
senior officers. So long as the cleavages between praetorian and professional officers 
persisted, democracy in Nigeria did not have good prospects for survival, which helps 
explain why democracy following the 1999 transition has lasted 19 years, where civilian 
rule following the 1979 transition lasted only four. 
The argument’s causal logic does not just provide insight concerning why 
Nigeria’s current democracy has survived where its previous one failed. By illustrating 
how both transitions to and from democracy are a product of cleavages between 
praetorian and professional officers, it reconciles previous theories of military rule by 
explaining why military regimes face both a reasonable likelihood of democratization and 
why democracies that succeed military rule face poor chances of survival. In addition to 
Nigeria, many other African military regimes, including those in Niger, Egypt, Ghana 
and Burundi, have followed a pattern of democratic instability.   
 
1.1.2: Ethnic Armies and Democratic Obstruction 
 
When the military chooses to hand over power to a single dictator, the outcome is 
very different. In such cases, I argue, the conditions under which the military will support 
democracy is determined by the extent to which authoritarian leaders choose to make co-
ethnicity the basis of military loyalty.  
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The cross-national evidence in support of ethnicity as a causal factor in driving 
the armed forces to support or oppose democratization is mixed. In most cross-national 
studies of military intervention, ethnicity is either measured as fractionalization, which 
denotes the overall number of ethnic groups in a country or ethnic dominance, which 
measures the percentage of the population of the largest ethnic group. Some studies have 
found ethnicity measured as such to be correlated with military involvement in politics.17 
Most studies, however, have found either no relationship or a negative relationship.18 
Collier and Hoeffler, for example, dismiss the negative relationship they find between 
ethnic dominance and coup plotting, arguing that Africa’s ethnic diversity makes it less 
characterized by ethnic dominance than other regions and concluding that predominantly 
economic and not social conditions cause coups.19 These studies suggest that, at the very 
least, that a country’s overall degree of ethnic diversity or ethnic fractionalization have 
little direct influence on military intervention outcomes.  
However, the idea that ethnic struggles within the armed forces influence 
transitional politics is a common theme in the case literature on Africa. Many African 
regimes inherited armed forces from colonial powers, with recruitment skewed towards 
various ethnic groups. The French, for example, deliberately recruited ethnic groups they 
considered to be more “warlike” into to the ranks of colonial armed forces, including 
                                                          
17 Augustine Kposowa, and J. Craig Jenkins. "The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Postcolonial 
Africa, 1957-1984." American Journal of Sociology (1993), pp. 126-163. 
18 Robert Jackman, “The Predictability of African Coups d’État” American Political Science Review 72, no. 
4 (1978), pp. 1262-1275; Johnson et al, “Explaining African Military Coups,”. and Collier and Hoeffler, 
“Coup Traps.” 




Berbers in Morocco, the Kabrai in Togo, the Malinke in Guinea, and the Fon in Dahomey 
(present-day Benin).20 African leaders commonly manipulated ethnic representation 
within their armed forces, either in response to previous imbalances or in order to shore 
up political support. In Dahomey, coups led by junior officers in 1967 and 1972 
dislodged the southern Fon hierarchy and promoted northern co-ethnic soldiers to top 
positions. Thus, while overall ethnic diversity or fractionalization has little effect on 
transitional politics, the choice by leaders to use ethnicity as a basis for military 
recruitment might.  
Recent empirical studies suggest there is something to this argument. Bratton and 
Van de Walle find that the military was least likely to countenance threats to institutional 
privilege if the incumbent political leader was an ethnic patron, noting that all cases of 
antidemocratic military intervention fit this pattern.21 In addition, ethnicity-based 
recruitment may shorten the lifespan of emerging democratic regimes. Kristen Harkness 
finds that in 75 percent of cases where an elected leader did not share the same ethnicity 
as top officers recruited by the previous ruler coups resulted within four years. Across all 
other cases, less than 20 percent of the time did a coup result within four years.22  
Following these scholars, I argue that African regimes that build co-ethnic armies 
face dim prospects for democratization. Unlike previous scholarship, however, I contend 
that the chances of a democratic transition and survival in regimes with ethnic armies are 
                                                          
20 See Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, 1985).  
21 Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, pp. 216-218. 
22 Kristen Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of 
Democratization in Africa.” 2016.  Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 4 (2016), p. 604. 
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different depending on whether or not the regime is military-led. This is because the 
central civil-military cleavage in civilian-led regimes with ethnically stacked armies is 
not between ruling and non-ruling officers, but between co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic 
soldiers and civilians.  
 In this dissertation’s analytical framework, the choice by authoritarian leaders to 
rule as a personalist or civilian dictator and to stack the officer corps or parallel military 
institutions with members of their own ethnic group creates ethnic armies. Ethnic armies 
are more focused than military regimes on the traditional military mission of maintaining 
order, and are reinforced by co-ethnic patronage relationships with civilian authoritarian 
leaders. As a result, the central cleavage in ethnic armies is between soldiers that share 
the ethnicity of the authoritarian leadership, and soldiers and civilians that do not. 
Lacking political expertise and dependent upon the dictator for their positions, and often, 
their access to resources, officers in ethnic armies face incentives to repress political 
opponents when pressured to liberalize. As a result, authoritarian regimes with ethnic 
armies tend to unite in support of authoritarian leaders to block or foreclose opportunities 
to transition to democracy. In the rare cases when regimes with ethnic armies do 
transition, the chances of democratic survival are reasonable so long as ethnic group that 
dominated under authoritarianism remains or shares in power. Thus, regimes with ethnic 
armies tend to follow paths of democratic obstruction because they are unlikely to 
transition but moderately likely to sustain democracy. 
This dissertation uses Sudan as the primary case through which it tests how ethnic 
armed forces block opportunities to democratize. For more than 27 years, Omar al-Bashir 
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has ruled Sudan, seizing power in a 1989 coup. Despite his status as an officer in Sudan’s 
military, Bashir does not preside at the head of a military regime. Instead, Bashir’s coup 
was instigated by a political party known as the National Islamist Front (NIF), and Bashir 
rules as the civilian head of party, through which he is responsible both for matters of 
state and chief of the armed forces. Outside of the security apparatus, few military 
officers in Sudan serve in high-level political capacities.  
To control Sudan’s armed forces, Bashir’s regime relies extensively on the 
recruitment of co-ethnic soldiers into key positions, a practice called ethnic stacking.23 
Arab officers, in particular officers from northern Arab ethnic groups, dominate Sudan at 
the top echelons of the regular army’s officer corps, as well as in numerous militia 
groups. As a result, the principle cleavages in the Sudanese armed forces have tended to 
fall along ethnic lines, between Arabs and non-Arabs in the regular army and between 
competing militia groups across the country, many of whom are composed exclusively 
from members of one ethnic group.  
Bashir’s policies of ethnic stacking have rendered Sudan’s security institutions 
resistant to pressures to liberalize. Early in Bashir’s regime, military support was crucial 
in allowing the leader to consolidate his control over the Sudanese state during a 
confrontation with NIF party members who were agitating for political representation 
beyond the traditional northern Arab elite. In addition, for decades both Sudan’s regular 
army and militia groups have been used as instruments of violence and oppression in 
                                                          
23 Ibid.  
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Sudan’s southern and western peripheries. In the south, a decades-long civil war with 
predominantly Christian ethnic groups led to the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 
2012. As the conflict with the south wound down, Sudan’s regular army coordinated a 
campaign with primarily Arab-aligned militia groups to maintain its hold over Darfur, 
committing acts of violence, ethnic cleansing and genocide. These events led to harsh 
international sanctions and Bashir’s indictment by the International Criminal Court for 
war crimes.  
Despite losing a third of the country and fierce international resistance to his rule, 
Bashir has become the longest serving leader in Sudan’s history. By recruiting co-ethnic 
soldiers, providing them with patronage, and using them to perpetrate violent conflict 
against members of other groups, Bashir keeps Sudan’s soldiers loyal to his regime. 
Ethnic stacking is a crucial part of the Sudanese government’s strategy of keeping the 
periphery in a constant state of violence in order to maintain the center’s hold on power. 
The argument advanced by this dissertation therefore helps to explain the persistence of 
authoritarianism in Sudan.  
Sudan is far from the only African country where dictators ruling a civilian 
capacity who recruit co-ethnics to control their armies prove resilient to popular pressure 
for democratic reform. Other African countries who have followed patterns similar to 






1.1.3: Representative Armies and Democratic Stability 
 
In a final class of cases, a single dictator rules but does not stack the regular army 
or parallel military institutions with co-ethnics. The reasons that dictators refrain from 
using ethnic stacking are varied, ranging from it simply not being an option due to a lack 
of ethnic diversity, or refraining out of fear that stoking ethnic tensions within the armed 
forces could prove destabilizing. It is these regimes, with neither ethnic nor political 
cleavages, that are most likely to result in stable democracy. 
In this dissertation’s analytical framework, the choice by authoritarian leaders to 
foster loyal military institutions by removing them from the political sphere completely 
or channeling their loyalty through non-ethnic political parties leads to representative 
armies. Political marginalization fosters cleavages between the army and the 
authoritarian elite, particularly if the elite invests heavily in the internal security 
apparatus or parallel military institutions and not the regular military to maintain order. 
These cleavages become most manifest when the dictatorship comes under pressure to 
liberalize, and the lack of ethnic ties or political patronage gives the armed forces little 
incentive to continue to support the dictatorship. As a result, representative armies 
usually choose to defect from an authoritarian regime and support a transition to 
democracy. Moreover, a lack of political experience or ethnic support of old elites makes 
representative armies unlikely to interfere in successor regimes, leading to high rates of 
democratic survival. Dictatorships with representative armies therefore tend to result in 
unusually long-lasting democracies, leading to a pattern of democratic stability.  
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This study uses Tunisia as its third and final case to examine how civilian 
dictators with representative armed forces tend to have the smoothest pathway to 
democracy. Tunisia’s army lacks ethnic cleavages, and the choice of both of Tunisia’s 
dictators, Habib al-Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, was to politically 
marginalize the Tunisian military in order to prevent a coup. Under both regimes, active-
duty officers rarely held political office, the military was overseen by a civilian defense 
minister, and officers were not allowed to vote nor become members of the ruling party. 
Instead, much of the responsibility for Tunisia’s national security policy fell to Tunisia’s 
Interior Ministry, whose central responsibilities included presidential security and 
maintaining internal order. 
As a result of the choice by Tunisia’s dictator, the central civil-military cleavage 
that emerged was between the regular army on one side, and the authoritarian elite and 
internal security apparatus on the other. The military’s marginalization meant that the 
Tunisia’s armed forces were rarely asked to repress civilians. In fact, Tunisia’s officers 
were themselves subject to strict monitoring and surveillance, and were at times 
sanctioned for political disloyalty by the Interior Ministry. The lack of involvement in 
Tunisia’s internal security apparatus and marginalization from the regime gave Tunisia’s 
officers a loyalty to the Tunisian state rather than the dictatorship, and led it to embrace a 
corporate ethos of political non-interference.  
For 50 years, the Tunisian army’s lack of interest or ability to conduct a coup led 
Tunisia to become one of the world’s most stable dictatorships. Yet it also led the 
military to refrain from supporting the regime during the mass protests of 2010 and 2011. 
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Unprecedented in their scale and their explicit calls for the end of Tunisia’s dictatorship, 
the military played an important role in Ben Ali’s ouster, not only abstaining from 
attacking civilian protestors, but also at times openly siding with protestors against 
intelligence, police, and paramilitary forces loyal to the regime. The Tunisian military’s 
lack of will to violently repress on the regime’s behalf was crucial in ending the 
dictatorship.  
In the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s flight, the military controlled most of the 
country and might have seized power for itself. Instead, it allowed a transitional council 
made up entirely of civilians to conduct elections and establish democracy. Democracy, 
rather than a continuation of authoritarian rule, served the Tunisian military’s interests for 
several reasons. The Tunisian officer corps was virtually devoid of political experience 
and had little interest in committing violence against Tunisian civilians. It had great 
interest, however, in leveraging its status as the guarantor of Tunisian democracy into 
increased budgets and institutional autonomy from the Interior Ministry. Democracy 
served, and continues to serve, both of these interests.  
Finally, it is the same lack of ethnic cleavages or political ties to the old regime 
that explain how the Tunisian military has contributed to the country’s democratic 
stability. Despite weak economic growth, heightened political instability, and an 
expanded security role, Tunisia’s armed forces have resisted further calls by civilians to 
intervene.  In no small part because of the military’s commitment to political neutrality, 
Tunisia remains the only Arab country to have consolidated democratic rule following 
the 2010 and 2011 Arab uprisings.  
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Though civilian dictatorships that refrain from ethnic stacking represent the 
smallest class of cases, Tunisia is far from alone. Other countries that have followed 
similar paths to Tunisia include Senegal, Ghana, and Malawi. 
 
1.1.4: Predicted Transition Paths 
This project’s argument concerning how authoritarian civil-military relations in 
Africa influence democratic transition paths are summarized in Table 1.1. The most 
important predictions of my argument can be condensed into three hypotheses with 
observable theoretical implications. They are: 1) democracies which succeed military rule 
are least likely to survive; 2) civilian-led authoritarian regimes with ethnic armies are 
least likely to transition not democracy; and 3) civilian-led authoritarian regimes with 
representative armies will be most likely to transition to stable democracy. The outcomes 










Table 1.1: Authoritarian Civil-Military Relations and Predicted Transition Paths 
 
 
1.2: The Evidence: Military Rule, Ethnic Armies, Representative Armies and 
Democratization in Africa 
 
The dissertation tests the proposed theory using a mixed-method analysis, 
providing empirical evidence in addition to the cases of Nigeria, Sudan and Tunisia. The 
empirical chapter of this dissertation employs descriptive statistics and cross-country 
regression analysis to test the effect of authoritarian civil-military relations on the 
probability of a democratic transition and on the duration of subsequent democracies. The 
study’s independent variables are authoritarian regimes with military rule, ethnic, and 
representative civil-military relations as outlined above. Likewise, the study’s dependent 
variables are both the probability that the regime ends in democracy and the duration of 
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the succeeding democratic regime.24 The study’s main theoretical propositions are tested 
using an original database of all African transitions to and from democracy between 1960 
and 2015. The data is compiled principally from Kristen Harkness’s dataset on African 
military ethnicity,25 Geddes, Frantz and Wright’s dataset on authoritarian transfers of 
power,26 and Polity IV’s dataset on democracy,27 and extended to 2015 using secondary 
sources.  
These descriptive statistics, which confirm the theory, are reproduced in Table 
1.2. In this study’s 35 cases of military rule, military leaders ceded power to democracies 
in 23 instances, or two-thirds of the time. On average, these democracies lasted eight 
years, markedly lower than democracies succeeding other regime types. By contrast, 
democracy has succeeded the 41 regimes with ethnic armies in only seven instances, or 
21 percent of the time; democracies succeeding authoritarian regimes with ethnic armed 
forces lasted the global average of 11 years. Finally, authoritarian regimes with 
representative armed forces were most likely to transition to and sustain democracy. 
Democracy resulted in 13 out of 16 such cases, or over four-fifths of the time. The 
                                                          
24 Chapters 3 and 4 offer more extensive insight concerning precisely how the concepts underlying the 
typology are constructed and operationalized, mostly from existing data. Suffice it to say that, as with most 
generalized concepts, the typologies outlined above are ideal types and there exist a number of borderline 
cases. As a brief example, consider a country such as Algeria, where the military is responsible for 
selecting the country’s leader but tends to remain aloof from all but the most consequential policy 
decisions. Most datasets, including the one used in this study, classify Algeria as military rule, though 
military’s lack of political involvement is more characteristic of countries ruled by civilian or personalist 
dictators. 
25 See Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State.” Dataset available at 
https://kristenharkness.com/home/cv-and-publications/ <accessed November 28, 2017>. 
26 See Geddes, Frantz and Wright “Autocratic Breakdowns.” Data available at http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/ 
<accessed November 28, 2017>. 
27 See Marshall, Monty., and Keith Jaggers. "Polity IV project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2002" University of Maryland (2002). Most recent version of the dataset is available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html <accessed November 28, 2017>. 
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average duration of democratic regimes following the collapse of authoritarian regimes 
with representative militaries was 16 years, more than twice the length of regimes 
experiencing military rule. This evidence is strongly supportive of the argument laid out 
in the previous section.  
In the quantitative chapter of this dissertation, I discuss in greater detail how I 
constructed this database, and employ rigorous quantitative tests to rule out potential 
sources of confounding variation, including economic factors, colonial legacies, oil 
wealth, military spending, ethnic demography, and previous political instability. Cross-
nationally, ordinary least squares, logistic regression and survival analysis are each used 
to test the effect of authoritarian civil-military relations on both the likelihood of a 
democratic transition and the duration of a democratic settlement. In virtually all the 
models presented, including various robustness checks, the quantitative evidence is 

































































The case studies in this dissertation are meant to do more than merely test the 
observable implications of this study’s quantitative analysis. They contextualize, 
challenge, examine causal mechanisms that are not possible to capture from the available 
quantitative data, and suggest avenues for further research. As discussed in the previous 
section, one case is selected according to each institutional type: Nigeria for military rule, 
Sudan for ethnic armed forces, and Tunisia for representative armed forces. In both 
Nigeria and Tunisia, key informant interviews with military officials, politicians and 
academics were conducted to add more information about potential causal processes.  
The analysis adopts a combination of cross-country comparison and inter-temporal 
congruence procedures, which strengthen my argument’s external validity and causal 









































































































    
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators and CIA World Factbook 
 
For Nigeria, the first case study, this project employs congruence, which makes 
use of spatial or temporal variation within a particular case to draw inferences. Nigeria’s 
particular history contains variation along both of my outcome variables of interest, 
which makes it ideally suited for congruence procedures. Nigeria’s first military regime, 
from 1966 to 1979, was followed by a period of democracy that lasted only four years. Its 
next military regime, which began in 1983, experienced a blocked transition to 
democracy in 1993 followed by a transition to the country’s current democratic regime in 
1999. This history allows for two series of comparisons: one between the military’s role 
in ending democracy in 1983 and its relative loyalty during the Fourth Republic, and 
another between the military’s dual decisions to block democracy in 1993 and then 
permit one in 1998. The inter-case variation on my dependent variable in Nigeria 
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eliminates variance resulting from cross-country differences. As a result, the congruence 
procedures I adopt provide a stronger test of the theory than comparative methods 
alone.28 As discussed in the preceding section, the results of this analysis of Nigeria 
confirm the central arguments laid out in the dissertation, and offer further insight into 
the conditions under which military regimes are most likely to cede power, as well as 
how to ensure the best chances for a lasting democratic settlement.  
The other two cases are more conventional, serving both as cross-country 
comparisons to Nigeria and for causal process tracing. Sudan, like Nigeria, is a large, 
diverse country with substantial oil wealth and significant ethnic and political divides 
between a predominantly Muslim north and Christian south. Unlike in Nigeria, however, 
the main instigator of Bashir’s coup was an Islamist political party, the National Islamist 
Front, and not the armed forces itself. Bashir went on to rule in as a personalist dictator 
and not at the head of a cabal of military officers. The evidence from the case suggests 
that Bashir’s status as a civilian dictator allowed him to cultivate co-ethnic armies in 
parallel military institutions and prevented the emergence of a praetorian, politically 
involved class of officers in Sudan’s regular army, two factors which help to explain his 
long tenure. To illustrate the continuity between the military’s role in democratization in 
northern and sub-Saharan Africa, the dissertation draws on Tunisia as its third and final 
case. Though distinct from both Nigeria and Sudan in its lack of ethnic diversity, 
                                                          
28 See Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Cornell University Press, 
1997), pp. 58-64 and Alexander George and Timothy McKeown. "Case Studies and Theories of 




evidence from a wealth of other cases in Africa, as well as the empirical section of the 
dissertation, suggest that ethnic stacking within the armed forces is a stronger predictor of 
democratization outcomes than ethnic diversity in the general population.  
 
1.3: Key Concepts: Democracy, Democratization, The Armed Forces 
 
In addition to military rule and ethnic stacking described above, several concepts 
are of crucial importance to the arguments developed in this dissertation.  
 
1.3.1: Defining Democracy  
 
Democracy is a contested concept. When practitioners discuss democracy, what 
they often refer to is electoral democracy, or the holding of free, frequent and fair 
elections. Electoral democracy is indeed an important concept, because, as Michael 
Bratton argues: “if nothing else, the convening of scheduled multi-party elections serves 
the minimal function of marking democracy's survival.”29 At times, however, democracy 
is taken to mean far more. For some analysts, a democratic country must not only have 
free frequent and fair elections, but also guarantee civil and political liberties; regimes 
that meet these qualities are often referred to as liberal democracies.30 In addition to civil 
and political liberties, other scholars have called on the definition of democracy to 
                                                          
29 Michael Bratton, “Second Elections in Africa,” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 (1998), p. 52. 
30 See, for example, Fareed Zakaria. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." Foreign Affairs (1997), pp. 22-43. 
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include economic rights typically guaranteed by modern welfare states. Amartya Sen 
argues “the intensity of economic needs adds to – rather than subtracts from, the urgency 
of political freedoms.”31 
Following the Polity IV project, I define democracy more minimally as “the 
presence of institutions and procedures which constrain executive action and through 
which citizens can express effective policy preferences.”32 Polity IV’s definition was 
chosen for several reasons. First, employing the Polity IV definition allows for a 
straightforward operationalization of democratic transition and collapse in the 
quantitative section of this study. In using mixed-method forms of analysis, this type of 
consideration is far from the least important. Second, the Polity IV project offers the most 
historically comprehensive database of democracy available, allowing complete coverage 
of the 1960 to 2015 period considered by this study and the potential for future 
comparative work to go back even further in time. Finally, given this project’s focus in 
Africa, a more minimalist definition of democracy is preferable because many African 
countries that scholars call “democracies” are not liberal democracies and nearly all fail 
to provide the kinds of economic rights provided in a typical welfare state. The chosen 
definition therefore provides for a considerable amount of variation on the dependent 
variable, also an important consideration in quantitative analysis.  
1.3.2: Measuring Democratization  
 
                                                          
31 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Anchor Books, 1999), p. 148. 
32 See Monty Marshall, Ted Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, “Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual,” (Center 
for Systemic Peace, 2016). 
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What is meant by a democratic transition? Though the term “transition” may 
seem by its nature ambiguous, conditions governing transitions between authoritarian and 
democratic regimes are fairly easy to identify and broadly agreed upon, at least in much 
of the quantitative literature. In most cases, an authoritarian regime transitions to 
democracy after a brief interim period during which it conducts elections and, if 
successful, completes a transfer of power. In some cases, electoral authoritarian regimes 
slowly adopt procedures that better constrain the executive and offer voters more choices 
in terms of their leaders. The Polity IV dataset measures democratic characteristics on a 
positive scale, authoritarian characteristics on a negative scale, and codes transition 
periods as missing. This allows me to adopt simple coding procedures to account for both 
of transition types. In most cases, I code a “democratic transition” as occurring when a 
country in the Polity IV dataset goes from negative to positive, usually but not always 
after an interim period.33 In the quantitative section, I further rely on several alternative 
specifications of “democracy” and “democratic transition” to test the robustness of my 
argument.   
Determining when a blocked transition occurs poses more of a challenge. In 
essence, one must attempt to determine when potential transitions to democracy were 
prevented from occurring. Fortunately, cases of blocked transition are also common, 
largely mirror the cases of transition, and the use of coding procedures from pre-existing 
data obviates the need for excessive reliance on subjective hypotheticals. First, I consider 
a transition to be “blocked” when an authoritarian regime enters an interregnum and then 
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reverts back to authoritarianism. Second, I consider a transition to be “blocked” when one 
authoritarian regime succeeds another, under the assumption that the change of power 
between authoritarian leadership groups also provided a potential opportunity for a 
transfer of power to a democracy.34 To determine when one authoritarian regime 
succeeds another, I rely on the work of Barbara Frantz and Joseph Wright, whose dataset 
is among the first of its kind to measure such types of transitions.35  
 
1.3.3: The Armed Forces 
 
For the purposes of this project, the armed forces refer to a country’s military and 
paramilitary institutions, including militia forces and presidential guards, whose primarily 
responsibility is external defense and the conduct of warfare. The reason for including 
militia forces and presidential guards in my definition of the armed forces is that in 
Africa, such forces are often powerfully armed and usurp many of the functions of the 
regular army. Moreover, defining the armed forces as such distinguishes it from 
intelligence, secret services, or police, who under authoritarian regimes have roles more 
concerned with information gathering and the internal maintenance of authoritarian rule. I 
use the term military and at times army interchangeably with the armed forces.  
 
                                                          
34 In a small number of additional cases, an authoritarian regime was overthrown by an insurgency; these 
were also considered “blocked.”  
35 See Geddes, Frantz and Wright, “Autocratic Breakdowns.”  
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1.4: Contributions and Qualifications 
 
The insights contained in this project are intended to provide insight to a variety 
of academic and policy audiences. This dissertation ought to be of interest to scholars of 
democratization, who have generally overlooked and undertheorized the role of the 
coercive apparatus in giving rise to and ending democratic regimes. Most theories of 
democratization do not take the military into account. Other factors, including economic 
prosperity, crisis, inequality, diffusion, international influence, and bargaining between 
elites and non-elites, are far more widely accepted causes of democratization and 
democratic collapse. In past scholarship, the armed forces have factored into the 
democracy equation only rarely, usually as part of approaches that emphasize bargaining 
between elites and non-elites. Yet even the scholars of democratization who acknowledge 
the military’s importance often devote little attention to explaining the conditions and 
factors that prompt the armed forces to support or to overthrow authoritarian regimes.36  
This dissertation can be considered one among a recent, emerging scholarship 
intended to fill this gap. The principal goal of this project is to explain the conditions 
under which the armed forces are likely to support democracy, a subtle but crucial 
difference from explaining democratization itself. My aim with this dissertation is not to 
disabuse readers of the notion that the many factors highlighted by scholars in the 
                                                          
36 The two most important examples are Bratton and van de Walle, “Democratic Experiments in Africa” 
and Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (JHU Press, 1986/2013). Both are considered authoritative 
works on transitional politics in authoritarian regimes, acknowledge the military’s importance, but spend 
little time systematically analyzing how institutional differences within the military might lead to varying 
responses in the face of pressure to liberalize.  
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previous paragraph are important. Rather, with the army’s unique status as an elite actor 
that maintains an overwhelming monopoly on violence, my aim here is to convince the 
reader that the consent of the armed forces is best viewed as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for democratization to occur, to illuminate the contexts in which winning that 
consent is most likely, and to consider how to prevent the army from acting as a spoiler 
when it is most likely to pose a threat.  
These objectives ought to make this project of interest to contemporary scholars 
of comparative authoritarianism, military intervention, and military loyalty, whose work 
this dissertation is indebted to and draws upon. The Arab uprisings, in which the armed 
forces played an enormous and unanticipated role in shaping the political trajectories of 
many Middle Eastern countries, generated renewed academic interest in authoritarian 
civil-military relations.37 As a result, scholars increasingly acknowledge that the 
monopoly on violence wielded by the armed forces makes it a particularly crucial actor 
within the authoritarian elite, and have begun to debate how civil-military relations 
influence military decisions about whether to intervene in politics.38 A consensus that has 
emerged from this literature is that mass, popular, non-violent protests provide an 
important incentive for military defection from authoritarian regimes by raising the costs 
of repression.39 Yet not all armed forces possess an equal will to repress, and, while the 
                                                          
37 See, for example, Gregory Gause, III. “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of 
Authoritarian Stability.” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011), pp. 83-84. 
38 Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the 
Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (January 1, 2012) and Zoltan Barany, “The Role of the 
Military,” Journal of Democracy 22, vol. 4 (2012), pp. 24–35. 
39 See Bellin, Op Cit. See also Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The 




current scholarship recognizes the importance of the internal character of the military, the 
extent to which generalized theory is possible and no consensus exists concerning which 
factors are most important.40   
This project makes at least two important contributions to this literature. First, it is 
one of the few recent studies that examines how civil-military relations influence 
transitional politics in Africa. Though there is nothing inherent in the argument presented 
limiting its scope just to the African continent, this project makes an argument for a more 
cautious approach to generalization than some of the extant scholarship.41 It draws 
heavily on a long line of Africanist scholarship on patrimonialism, militarism and ethnic 
politics, and builds on the work of several scholars who apply quantitative or mixed-
methods to this vast qualitative literature.42 Generally speaking, African countries are on 
average less wealthy, more ethnically diverse, and less densely populated than countries 
in other regions of the world. More importantly for the purposes of this study, the armies 
                                                          
40 See Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and the Americas (Princeton University Press, 2012). Where Barany rejects the idea of a more 
generalized theory, recent scholarship has begun to use cross-national data in an attempt to draw more 
universal conclusions. See Ore Koren, "Military Structure, Civil Disobedience, and Military 
Violence." Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014), pp. 688-712 and Erica De Bruin. "Preventing 
Coups d’État: How Counterbalancing Works," Journal of Conflict Resolution (2017), 0022002717692652.  
41 For example, Terrence Lee argues that the four cases he chooses in Asia are a “useful heuristic to explain 
the variance in outcomes in the recent North Africa and Middle East uprisings.” He maintains that the wide 
variation in regime types, his book’s focus on most similar-cases, and his use of process tracing methods to 
test causal mechanisms provide strong evidence in favor of his book’s argument and compensates for a lack 
of regional variation. Lee’s core contention is that the military’s defection in the face of mass protest 
depends on whether authoritarian institutions are personalistic, which increases the likelihood defection by 
disaffected elements of the authoritarian elite, or power sharing, which decreases the likelihood of 
defection. See Terrence Lee, Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian 
Asia (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), p. 6.   
42 This dissertation is particularly indebted to the work of Michael Bratton, Nicolas van de Walle, and 
Kristen Harkness, whose methodological approaches and intellectual insights were crucial to formulating 
the approach used here. See Bratton and Van De Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa and Harkness, 
“The Ethnic Army and the State.”  See also Kristen Harkness, The Origins of African Civil-Military 
Relations (Princeton University Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 2012).  
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of Africa have a very different institutional history than those in other parts of the world. 
Almost all of Africa’s armies were inherited directly from the colonial regimes that 
controlled them. For these colonial powers, Africa’s armies were not benign instruments 
of external self-defense, but forces of internal oppression and social control. European 
powers deliberately ignored promoting national identity, and instead recruited soldiers 
from either dominant, or more often, peripheral and minority ethnic groups to form the 
basis of colonial armies. This colonial legacy has played an important role in making 
African armies what they are today. Compared to armies in most other places of the 
world, Africa’s armies are on the whole more ethnically divided, less well equipped, and 
guided more by informal patronage relationships than by professional service ethics.  
They oppress civilians, contain rebellions, and fight against one another far more than 
they participate in interstate wars. Many armies in other regions of the world do share 
many of these characteristics, but no other region is dominated by the same central 
tendencies. By limiting the regional focus on the analysis, the dissertation employs 
middle range theory to relax assumptions of unit heterogeneity that characterizes much 
early cross-national work while providing for more nuanced generalizations in a smaller 
array of cases. 
Second, the project contributes to active debates on the causal mechanisms 
through which authoritarian civil-military relations impact regime change. The argument 
that the factionalism within military regimes both facilitates and hinders democratization 
is a synthesis of earlier work. Likewise, the finding that ethnic stacking has different 
consequences depending on whether or not the regime is civilian or military-led 
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demonstrates the importance of intervening cleavages and interaction effects. The causal 
framework advanced here, which begins with the choices of authoritarian leaders and 
ends with democratization outcomes, offers a more contingent, path dependent 
framework for thinking about the processes through which civil-military relations 
influence transitional politics.   
Finally, this dissertation is intended to provide insight to policymakers interested 
in maintaining political stability, encouraging democracy and fostering more meritocratic 
security institutions in Africa. For those concerned with predicting the military’s role in 
future political transitions in Africa, it suggests that two pieces of information—the 
ethnic stacking within the military, and whether or not the military rules as an 
institution—are particularly crucial. More broadly, it suggests that policymakers ought to 
adopt a variety of contingent strategies to encourage liberalization and military 
transformation depending on an authoritarian regime’s type of civil-military relations. 
Authoritarian regimes with civil-military regimes or experiencing military rule are both 
vulnerable to mass popular protest, but democracies succeeding military rule do not 
generally last long unless officers are given strong incentives to refrain from continued 
political intervention. For authoritarian regimes with ethnic armies, mass popular protests 
are most likely to be repressed, and policymakers should consider alternative strategies to 





1.5: The Chapters to Come 
 
The rest of this project is divided into seven additional chapters. Chapter 2 offers 
a brief review of the literatures on democratization and military intervention, paying 
particular attention to two key issues in the literature. First, the chapter contextualizes the 
role of the military in the overall literature on democratization, establishing the consent of 
the military as a necessary but not sufficient condition in order for democratization to 
occur. Second, it summarizes the existing debate concerning how the internal character of 
the armed forces might or might not cause the armed forces to defect from authoritarian 
regimes or upend emerging democracies. Factors that past and present scholars argue 
might shape affect the internal character in ways that might have consequences for 
democratization include: professionalism, capabilities, patrimonialism, authoritarian 
regime type, military rule, and ethnic politics.  
Chapter 3 advances this project’s argument, drawing upon literatures on military 
rule and ethnic politics to develop a theory of authoritarian civil-military relations and 
democratization in Africa. I argue that choices by African authoritarian leaders have led 
to three different types of authoritarian civil-military relations, each with distinct 
cleavages that affect an army’s support for regime changes. Like scholars of comparative 
authoritarianism, I argue that the cleavages between officers who govern and those who 
do not distinguishes military rule from other civil-military relations types, and that these 
tensions help explain why the result of military rule is often democracy. However, I side 
with scholars in the Africanist tradition in arguing that military regimes rarely lay the 
foundation for stable democracy, instead often leading to further cycles of intervention. 
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Drawing on the arguments of those who study military ethnicity, I argue that civilian 
dictatorships with ethnically-stacked armed forces are most resistant to pressures to 
democratize, albeit less likely to interfere in an emerging democracy due to the lack of a 
politicized officer corps and expansive corporate interests that tend to characterize 
military rule. It is therefore in civilian-led authoritarian regimes without ethnically 
stacked militaries that the military is most likely to support a transition to stable 
democratic rule.  
Chapter 4 employs descriptive statistics and cross-country regression analysis to 
test the observable implications of this project’s theory. The first section discusses how 
the data were collected and how the dissertation’s key concepts were operationalized to 
render them suitable for statistical analysis. The second section examines descriptive 
statistics along the study’s independent and dependent variables, and conducts medium-n 
statistical analysis to link individual countries within this dissertation’s typology to the 
hypothesized outcomes. The final section of the chapter uses ordinary least squares, 
logistic regression and survival analysis with a fully specified set of control variables. 
The preponderance of evidence in this section confirms the study’s argument that 
associates military regimes with democratic instability, authoritarian regimes with ethnic 
armies to democratic obstruction, and authoritarian regimes with representative armies to 
stable democracy.  
Chapter 5 begins the case portion of the dissertation by analyzing the military’s 
role in transitional politics under Nigerian military rule. The chapter employs congruence 
procedures to examine the role of the military in African democratization at four critical 
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junctures with divergent outcomes on the project's dependent variables. Comparing 
Nigeria's aborted attempt at democracy from 1979 to 1983 and the blocked transition in 
1993 to the successful transition to the Fourth Republic in 1999, the chapter validates the 
dissertation's argument on how tensions between praetorian and professionalized officers 
affect the transitional politics of military rule. The analysis presented in the chapter 
suggests that the incorporation of formerly politicized officers into Nigeria's political 
elite, mass retirements of remaining politicized officers, and better ethnic balance within 
the top echelons of Nigeria's armed forces were crucial to ensuring the stability of 
Nigeria's democracy.  
Chapter 6 examines the military’s role in sustaining authoritarianism in Sudan, 
where Omar al-Bashir rules as a civilian dictator with military institutions dominated by a 
northern, Arab elite. The case supports the project's contention that civilian dictators with 
ethnic armies are particularly likely to prevent opportunities to democratize. In his 
capacity as a civilian dictator, Bashir was able both to stack the regular army, popular 
defense forces, and militia groups with Arab co-ethnics. The case suggests that these 
decisions both generated considerable willingness among Sudan's armed forces to be 
used as an instrument of repression and diminished the military's ability to enact a 
successful coup to topple the regime. 
Chapter 7 discusses the military’s role in sustaining democracy in an ethnically 
homogenous Tunisia, which was ruled for over 50 years by civilian dictators who did 
their best to remove the armed forces from politics. As in Sudan, a strong police 
apparatus and parallel security institutions helped discourage a military coup. Unlike in 
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Sudan or Nigeria, however, the Tunisian armed forces were rarely used to repress 
civilians or fight internal wars. The evidence from the case suggests that the military’s 
decisions to defect from the regime in 2011 was a product both of its lack of will to 
repress mass protestors as well as institutional concerns motivated by the desire of the 
army to improve its standing vis-à-vis other security forces. Without notable ethnic or 
political divisions, the Tunisian army has also refrained from intervening in Tunisia’s 
democracy. The findings validate this project’s contention that representative armies are 
most likely to result in stable democracy.  
Chapter 8 concludes by offering a brief comparative analysis of all three cases, 
listing a series of policy recommendations, and suggesting avenues for further research. 
The comparative analysis summarizes the differences in civil-military relations under 
authoritarianism in Nigeria, Sudan and Tunisia, and then illustrates how those differences 
facilitated diverging reactions at critical junctures crucial to the democratization process 
in each nation. The second section uses insight from this project to list a series of policy 
recommendations aimed at Nigerian statesman, democracy activists, and the international 
community considering how they might best promote democracy while maintaining 
political stability. The final section considers the study’s limitations and offers 
suggestions and ideas for follow-up research. 
Though the topic of the armed forces was once among the most studied subjects 
in Africanist literature, in recent years it has been neglected in favor of the study of 
insurgencies, rebel groups, and social movements.  As the following pages hope to 
illustrate, a grasp of African military institutions and their relationships to the regimes 
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they serve can provide equally illuminating insight into the politics of transition, 





Civil-Military Relations, Authoritarianism and Democracy in 
Africa: Debating the Mechanisms 
 
Despite a widespread recognition of the armed forces as a key veto player in 
transitional politics, the role of the army is frequently ignored by scholars of 
democratization. Other factors, such as economic growth, crisis, inequality, diffusion, 
international influence, and bargaining between elites and non-elites are much more well-
established causes of democratic transition and democratic failure. Most often, the role of 
the military is discussed as a factor in transitional politics in state-centric theories of 
democratization, which more closely examine the mechanisms through which bargaining 
between the authoritarian elite, protestors, and outside actors lead to regime change. Yet 
even this literature often fails to consider the military as an actor independent of the 
authoritarian elite. Among the scholarship that does pay more careful attention to the role 
of civil-military relations in transitional politics, which has experienced a renaissance in 
the aftermath of the Arab Spring, there exist a host of plausible explanations, but little 
consensus, particularly on the causal mechanisms linking pre-existing civil-military 
relations to future political transitions.  
This chapter summarizes the extant literature and places the contributions of this 
project within it. In the next section, I briefly summarize non-state-centric approaches to 
democratization, in which the armed forces are generally considered a non-factor. In the 
third section, I summarize state-centric approaches to democratization, in which the army 
45 
 
is at times considered important but where few scholars have conducted rigorous inquiry 
of the military’s motivations and how it might differ from other state or elite actors. In 
the fourth section, I draw on the broader literature on militarism and military 
intervention, as well as more recent scholarship on military loyalty and defection, to 
weigh the merits of several factors that might influence the military’s support of 
democratization. These factors include: professionalism, capabilities, patrimonialism, 
authoritarian regime type, military rule, and military ethnicity. A final section offers a 
brief summary of the current gaps in the literature.   
 
2.1: Non-State-Centric Approaches to Democratization 
 
The oldest and most empirically established theories on the causes of 
democratization can be generally categorized as non-state-centric. In non-state-centric 
approaches, state structures and state institutions play little role in democratization 
processes. Instead, transitions to and from democracy are influenced by domestic and 
international social forces. Though the non-state-centric literature is vast and empirically 
rich, it is poorly integrated and offers little insight into the causal mechanisms that lead to 
concrete political change. The absence of any emphasis on the role of state institutions in 
democratization means that the potential role of military institutions is altogether ignored.  
One of the most robust empirical findings in the social sciences is the link 
between economic development and democratization, a core tenet of modernization 
theory. In 1959, Seymour Martin Lipsett first observed that factors such as wealth, 
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industrialization, urbanization and education levels are far higher in democratic 
countries.43 Since Lipsett’s time, numerous other studies have confirmed the relationship 
between development and democratization, though precisely how and why development 
causes democratization remains the subject of significant debate. Where early 
modernization theorists tended to argue that wealth, education, modernization and 
democratization were inextricably linked,44 later scholars have found that the correlation 
between modernization and democratization is most robust with respect to GDP growth 
and per capita energy consumption.45 In a landmark article published in 1997, Adam 
Przeworki and Fernando Limongi argued that economic development did not cause 
democracy directly, but prevented relapses into authoritarianism after transitions 
occurred.46 Though Przeworski and Limongi’s argument is the subject of empirical 
controversy, 47 the basic overall correlation between economic development and 
democratization remains one of the most widely accepted findings in the field of 
comparative politics.  
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Other theories of democratization focus less on development itself, but on the 
social forces behind it. In addition to economic development more generally, both 
economic crisis48 and social mobilization in the form of mass protests have been found to 
correlate with transitions to democratic rule.49 Recent scholarship has found that Muslim 
countries are less democratic, though scholars debate whether the correlation is due to 
gender inequality,50 oil wealth,51 or simply a characteristic of the Arab world rather than 
an issue with Islam more generally.52 More controversial social forces that have been 
proposed as explanations for democratization include ethnolinguistic diversity,53 
Christianity,54 and colonial legacies.55  
Finally, scholars have stressed an array of systemic or systems level factors that 
influence democratization. Dependency theorists once argued that the concentration of 
global power and wealth in Western countries impeded the democratic development of 
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the global periphery,56 findings that are echoed in some contemporary studies of 
globalization and trade.57 Other scholars argue that pressure from international donors or 
the ascendance of Western liberal order helped facilitate democratization after the end of 
the Cold War.58 Related arguments, for which there exists significant empirical support, 
stress the importance of “snowball” effects or the “diffusion” of ideas from neighboring 
countries or regional organizations in facilitating democratic transition and ensuring 
democratic survival.59  
Though there is not a complete consensus on the precise mix of non-state-centric 
factors that influence democratization, the vast scholarship and strong empirical evidence 
highlights their importance. Perhaps the most comprehensive cross-national study, 
conducted in 2010 by Jan Teorrell, finds that economic crisis, diffusion, regional 
organizations, peaceful demonstrations, Muslim populations, size, and economic 
modernization each trigger, prevent, sustain, or impede democratization in various 
respects.60 Michael Coppedge, who conducted a comprehensive review of a wide array of 
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methodological approaches to democratization, is more circumspect, concluding that the 
most robust predictors of democracy are per capita income and diffusion from 
neighboring countries.61  
Non-state-centric factors are important causes of democratization, yet they are 
limited in at least two crucial respects. First, because most of the data supporting them is 
at the cross-national level, they provide poor insight on the causal mechanisms linking 
international and domestic factors to political change. One reason that scholars cannot 
agree on which non-state-centric factors are most crucial to democratization is because, 
as Coppedge argues, “quantification encourages the use of thin concepts and theories, 
which widen the gap between theories and evidence.”62 Without the development of more 
complex, theoretically integrated concepts—which are more difficult to measure—it 
becomes difficult to rule out an increasing number of plausible explanations. The 
problem is compounded by the fact that, as quantitative approaches have proliferated, the 
combinations of dependent and independent variables, concepts, samples, and models 
tend to lead to increasingly overdetermined analytical approaches with few conclusive 
findings. Even more than fifty years after Lipsett’s findings were first reported, Coppedge 
himself admits: “we know that democracy and income are associated, but we do not 
know why.”63   
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Second, while non-state-centric factors may be necessary conditions for 
democratization to occur, they are not sufficient. Non-state-centric factors can apply 
considerable pressure on state actors to enact transitional change, but a transition’s 
success or failure of a transition is ultimately determined by the state itself. As Bratton 
and van de Walle argue: “A complete theory of political agency would also attend to the 
endeavors of ordinary citizens, the interplay between elite and mass actions, and the 
unintended as well as the planned consequences of political events.”64 In order to 
formulate a more robust, integrated theory of democratization, one must account for 
contingency. This requires combining the influence of non-state-centric factors with an 
understanding of how regimes and the political actors within them conceptualize their 
interests and respond to pressures for transitional change.  
 
2.2: State-Centric Approaches 
 
In contrast to non-state-centric approaches, state-centric approaches conceive of 
democratic transition and consolidation as contests between the elite, state actors and 
other interests such as the poor, protesters or the international community. The power to 
determine democratization outcomes usually rests with the elite, which is constrained by 
a variety of factors in considering whether to repress movements towards democratic 
change. Such factors include capital specificity and the level of economic inequality, the 
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need to extract rent in order to provide for the protection of territory, and institutional or 
political barriers to collective action. Some state-centric approaches consider the armed 
forces a crucial actor whose interests may or may not differ from other state actors or 
those in the authoritarian elite. Most, however, simply assume that the authoritarian elite 
controls the coercive apparatus, and that the armed forces share the same interests as the 
elite. This is an oversight that scholars are increasingly coming to recognize.  
Perhaps the earliest example of a state-centric approach to explaining 
democratization can be found in the work of Barrington Moore, originally published in 
1966. He conceived of democratization as a contest between monarchs, aristocrats, 
peasants, and the urban bourgeoisie.65 For Moore, the emergence of democracy in the 
United States, England and France is explained by the existence of a powerful urban 
bourgeois, who circumvented a landed aristocracy and peasants en route to establishing 
liberal democracy. Another example is the related theories of state formation advanced 
by Charles Tilly and Jeffrey Herbst, who each argue that modern states in Europe and 
Africa, respectively, are driven by elites who extract rent in order to control territory.66  
Perhaps the most enduring and most influential example of the state-centric 
approach is the so-called “transitions” or “positional” paradigm advanced by Guillermo 
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. In a comprehensive, four-volume examination of 
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transition from authoritarianism to democracy across a broad range of countries, 
O’Donnell and Schmitter conceive of transitions to democracy as caused by bargaining 
and competition between regime hard-liners and soft-liners responding to intense political 
pressure from opposition groups and protestors.67 Subsequent variants of the transitional 
school use formal modeling,68 assume a multitude of actors,69 or examine the transitional 
politics of particular countries or regions.70 In Bratton and van de Walle’s Democratic 
Experiments in Africa, which remains one of the definitive works on African 
democratization, transitions to democracy are conceived of as a three-stage process, 
beginning with mass protests, continuing with liberalization reforms, and finally resulting 
in democratization, with domestic political factors and inter-regime dynamics playing a 
particularly crucial role.71 
A final variant state-centric approach is to conceive of democratization in 
economic terms, using a combination of formal models and game theory. For these 
theorists, democratization comes about as a result of bargaining between the elite and the 
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poor over how to redistribute public goods.72 One of the most influential works in this 
tradition is that of Carles Boix, who argues that economic inequality and capital mobility 
promote democracy by affecting the incentives of the poor to protest and the wealthy to 
repress.73 Boix combines formal modeling with empirical evidence that includes three 
different samples covering the periods from 1816 to 1992, as well as case studies in 
Switzerland and the United States. In an equally influential work, Daron Acemoglu and 
James Robinson propose a slightly more complex theory of democratization, elaborating 
how democratic transition and consolidation occur not just as a result of economic 
inequality or economic structure, but also civil-society strength, economic and political 
crisis, and the structure of a country’s political institutions.74  
State-centric theories, in particular more contemporary approaches, are 
theoretically integrated, consistently supported by cross-country empirical evidence, and 
consider the strategic logic and causal linkages between structural conditions and choices 
by individual agents and actors. Yet, as this brief survey illustrates, these approaches vary 
considerably in how they conceptualize the state and assess the interests of the actors who 
compose it. In most state-centric theories, the state or, at times, an “elite” are 
conceptualized as one actor with a coherent set of interests, or further disaggregated into 
“hard-liners” who favor continued authoritarian rule and “soft-liners” who oppose it. This 
characterizes both the work of earlier theorists such as Moore and Tilly, but also more 
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recent ones such as Boix, Acemoglu and Robinson. Only sporadically is the military 
considered as an agent with interests that potentially diverge from the rest of authoritarian 
elite. Even more rarely are these interests given comprehensive treatment, but it is clear 
from scholars that do explicitly examine the armed forces that it is considered a 
particularly consequential veto player of democratization from within the state.  
Take, for example, the work of O’Donnell and Schmitter. They argue that the 
defining feature of political transition is uncertainty, where “standard actors … are 
divided about their ideals and interests, and hence, incapable of coherent collective 
action.”75 Amidst this seeming chaos, the fear of a coup hangs “like a sword of 
Damocles” above a polity on the brink of potential institutional change.76 In their 
formulation, this fear causes the military to act as a “swingman” between soft-line elites 
acting in solidarity with protesters and hard-liners seeking to repress them.77 Yet they 
make little effort to consider in which direction the military will “swing,” saying only 
that in order for a transition to democracy to occur the military must “be made to accept 
normal institutional status; modify messianic self-image, given an honorable role in 
accomplishing national goals, and made impervious to enticement of civilians who turn 
to them when frustrated by democratic means.”78 
 Bratton and van de Walle fare somewhat better. They call the connection 
between the armed forces and democratic transition trajectories “among the most striking 
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revealed by [their] study.”79 Their observation that legacies of past military intervention 
and ethnic patronage relationships between soldiers and regime elite are potential causes 
of blocked democratic transitions are significant departure points for this dissertation. 
Despite this observation, the seven pages Bratton and van de Walle devote to the subject, 
which covers a brief period from 1990 to 1994, remains one of the only cross-national 
comparative analyses of the armed forces in African democracy of the past quarter 
century.  
No doubt, the armed forces are a key veto player within the regime elite, and an 
understanding of the military’s incentives, motivations and interests for supporting 
transitions to and from democracy is a potentially important component of any broader 
state-centric theory. As Samuel Finer argues, the combination of size, specialization and 
firepower give the armed forces “overwhelming superiority in the means of applying 
force.”80 The monopoly on violence means the armed forces possess unique leverage 
among elite actors to determine the outcome of political transitions. It is ironic that, 
despite the fact that the coup d’état is the most prominent form of irregular regime 
change in the world,81 and that it is responsible for 75 percent of all failures of 
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democratic governments,82 most state-centric theories of democratization simply fail to 
take the military into account.   
More recently, a lack of adequate theory on the role of the military in democratic 
transitions was one of the key reasons that Middle East scholars failed to understand or 
foresee the divergent trajectories that many countries would take in the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring. Most scholars simply assumed that that the political and institutional history 
of the region meant that soldiers in Arab countries would inevitably side with the regime 
in face of mass uprisings. Instead, the role of the military in quelling popular discontent 
varied dramatically, with soldiers in Egypt and Tunisia initially offering their support to 
protestors, the Libyan and Yemenese armies fracturing, and the armies of Syria and 
Bahrain siding with the regime.83 As Gregory Gause writes, one of the main reasons 
scholars missed the Arab Spring was most “assumed that no daylight existed between the 
ruling regimes… an assumption that obviously proved incorrect.”84  
This dissertation contributes to an emerging scholarship on the politics of military 
defection that has emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in considering civil-
military relations a variable of crucial consequence to democratization. The point of 
departure for the analysis is, due to their effective monopoly on the means of violence, 
the armed forces are the consummate veto players in processes of democratization. It 
assumes that significant analytical leverage to understand the opportunities, pathways, 
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and outcomes of political transitions can be gained through a deeper understanding of 
what motivates the armed forces. It is informed by recent scholarship, but also by an 
older generation of literature on militarism and military intervention. This scholarship 
rarely investigated democratization as an explicit outcome variable, but provides some 
basis with which it is possible to begin a broader discussion on how the military 
influences African transitional politics.  
 
2.3: Civil-Military Relations and Democratization 
 
Until recently, how civil-military relations influence processes of democratic 
transition and consolidation was a topic neglected by scholars. Nevertheless, other 
outcome variables, including the military itself, has been a subject of considerable 
scholarly inquiry. Vast literatures exist which examine the logic and causes of military 
coups, which interrogate the phenomenon of military rule, and which debate military 
professionalism, intervention and effectiveness.  
More recently, a number of scholars have taken up the call by Gause to pay closer 
attention to how the coercive apparatus affects transitional politics. Most of these studies 
examine military defection in the face of popular opposition and focus on the Middle 
East,85 though several use broader cross-country analysis or comparisons from other 
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regions of the world.86 Only a few examine the role of the armed forces in the 
consolidation of emerging democracies,87 though more work exists here on Africa.88 
Echoing the general democratization literature, a general consensus has emerged 
regarding the importance of large, non-violent protests in encourage military defection, at 
times leading to democracy.89 As Bellin observes, “to use lethal force against hundreds or 
thousands of peaceful protestors carries the whiff of a massacre. And this poses a series 
threat to the image and prestige of the military and may very well undermine morale and 
discipline within the corps.”90 The larger the demonstration, the higher the cost of 
repression. 
Large peaceful protests may be important in encouraging military defection, but 
the consensus is that they are not enough. During the Arab Spring, for example, Tunisia’s 
armed forces showed next to no appetite for repressing mass peaceful protestors, while 
the capacity for brutality among Syria’s armed forces was nearly limitless, and those of 
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Egypt somewhere in between. Africa’s armies show similar variation: the armed forces of 
Niger, for example, balked at being asked to crack down on civilians in the early 1990s, 
whereas the army of neighboring Chad continued to commit human rights abuses as 
Idriss Déby first postponed and then held flawed elections that rubber-stamped his rule.91   
There is therefore also agreement that the “internal structure of the military” is also an 
important determining factor in hardening the military’s will to repress, and perhaps even 
shaping opportunities for political mobilization in the first place.92 Here scholars differ 
significantly in their selection, analysis and definition of which factors matter most.  
 Drawing upon both more recent scholarship as well as much of the older 
literature in comparative politics, African politics, and civil-military relations, I group 
existing explanations into six categories that encapsulate much of the current debate: 
explanations centered around professionalism;  those centered around military capacity; 
those centered around neo-patrimonial relationships between authoritarian and military 
leaders; those centered around variation in authoritarian forms of rule more generally; 
those centered around military rule specifically; and, finally, debates on the influence of 
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2.3.1: Military Professionalism and Democratization 
 
Among the earliest attempt to grapple with the question of military obedience to 
democratic civil authority can be found in the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, 
pioneered by Samuel Huntington. During the nineteenth century, the industrial 
revolution, the growth of the nation-state, and the rise of democratic ideals led to the slow 
but steady replacement of aristocratic and mercenary-led armies with sophisticated 
bureaucracies who conceived of war as a science. Huntington argues that the creation of a 
professionalized military bureaucracy is essential to ensuring the soldier obeys the 
statesman.93  
For Huntington, there are three central aspects of military professionalism. First, a 
professional soldier cultivates specialized expertise in the management of violence. For 
Huntington, the “direction, operation and control of a human organization whose primary 
function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer… It distinguishes 
the military officer qua military officer from other specialists which exist in the modern 
armed services.”94 The second aspect of the professional soldier is a sense of 
responsibility to the society in which the soldier serves. Like a doctor or lawyer, the 
professional soldier is motivated by the technical love of his craft that provides a 
specialized function in modern society, his behavior “governed by a complex mass of 
regulations.”95 The final aspect is the corporate character of officership, or the existence 
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of the officer corps as an autonomous legal and social unit, one that includes not “just the 
official bureaucracy, but also societies, associations, schools, journals, customs and 
traditions.”96 The fact that the professional soldier spends much of his life embedded in 
these norms and traditions further isolates the soldier from the society he serves.  
No doubt, Huntington’s concept of professionalism is intuitively appealing. The 
Soldier and the State is required reading for military cadets and students of strategic 
studies across the world, and considered by many to be the seminal work in the field 
civil-military relations. Huntington’s combination of expertise, service ethic, and 
corporate integrity still represents the embodiment of what most professional officers 
aspire to be.  
In addition, the notion of officers as competent professionals is part of what led 
many early scholars to believe that the military was an inherently modernizing force. In 
one of the first-ever studies on the role of the military in the process of modernization, 
Lucian Pye observes: “[T]he good soldier is also to some degree a modernized man. Thus 
it is that the armies in the newly emergent countries come to play key roles in the process 
by which traditional ways give way to more Westernized ideas.”97 In Political Order in 
Changing Societies, Huntington agrees: “In the early stages of political modernization, 
the military plays a highly modernizing and progressive role… The middle class makes 
its debut on the political scene not in the frock of the merchant but in the epaulettes of a 
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colonel.”98 As the world decolonized and militaries, particularly in Africa, began to take 
on a greater political role, it was thought that the military’s advantages in organization 
and Western-orientation would enable it to govern benevolently.99 
 Yet many scholars find Huntington’s concept of professionalism and its 
implications for the military’s role in political development and modernization 
problematic. Some reject Huntington’s notion of corporateness, arguing that a degree of 
civilian interference in military affairs may be both inevitable and desirable. Morris 
Janowitz argues that the need for logistic, engineering and administrative skills makes 
modern military institutions more bureaucratic, representative of civil society, and full of 
politically aware leaders.100 In his analysis of Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-
Gurion, Eliot Cohen argues that the most astute civilian leaders act with more strategic 
foresight and tactical awareness than the generals that serve them. During the Battle of 
Britain, for example, Churchill once brought in a 29-year-old junior analyst to make the 
case that the Germans were likely using radio signals to help target their bombs and 
persuade his War Cabinet to adjust tactics accordingly.101 
Others dispute the idea that either expertise in violence or a professional service 
ethic leads to soldiers to become obedient or public-minded civil servants. There was 
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perhaps no critic of Huntington more strident than Samuel Finer, who argued that aspects 
of military professionalism can lead to military intervention in politics. Military expertise 
in violence, for example, can erode civilian control if military leaders feel as if they alone 
are competent to judge military requirements.102 In addition, soldiers may feel a sense of 
loyalty more to an abstract notion of the state than to any particular civilian government. 
Finer cites the German conception of the Reich, as well as Douglas MacArthur’s open 
criticism of Harry Truman, which sparked a major crisis in America’s civil-military 
relations, to emphasize that major military leaders have at times only questionable loyalty 
to the civilians they serve. Pointing out that the majority of states in existence have 
experienced coups, Finer questions whether it is even “natural”’ for the armed forces to 
obey civilian power, given the military’s superior organization and arms compared to 
civilian groups.103  
Finally, and particularly problematic for this study, scholars argue that 
Huntington’s notion of professionalism is overly influenced by experience of the United 
States and Western countries, and not on an understanding of military institutions as they 
function across the rest of the world. Though they held a monopoly on violence, the 
armies that African nations inherited from the British and French were used primarily as 
instruments of internal social control rather than to defend external borders, making them 
far from Huntington’s abstract ideal of military professionalism.104 Robin Luckham 
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maintains “[i]n Africa states and military establishments were initially externally 
imposed, offering little scope for ‘internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers 
and ruled;’ as in Europe (Tilly 1985, 84). Hence, in retrospect, the ideas that democracy 
and civilian control could be engineered, interconnected with development, and could be 
assured by military professionalism seem more than a little naïve.”105 Contrary to what 
early theorists of civil-military relations believed, the military’s strengths in organization, 
discipline and technological sophistication did not make the military itself a natural 
vehicle for modernization. In the decades following independence, militaries across 
Africa seized power, but failed to realize substantive gains in either democracy or 
development.  By the early 1980s, all but a handful of Africa’s governments were 
repressively authoritarian, more than half of these governments were military in origin, 
and coups or coup plots had occurred in nine out of ten African states.106 
These critiques illustrate that expertness, social responsibility, and corporate 
components of professionalism are in fact distinct concepts, and it is possible to make 
varying arguments for and against the relative weight of each. The critiques of Janowitz 
and Cohen, for example, question the extent to which the military ought to exist 
autonomously from society, whereas those of Finer focus on whether military expertise 
and values really do prevent the military from political interference. In a widely cited 
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1999 review article, Peter Feaver argues that future research “should focus on teasing out 
the explanatory force of different component factors of what has been called 
professionalism and leave the synthetic concept at the rhetorical level, where it 
belongs.”107 Following Feaver’s call, this project considers more discrete factors and how 
they might impact the military’s role in transitional politics. Fortunately, there are no 
dearth of factors to choose from.  
 
2.3.2: Military Capacity and Democratization 
 
Some scholars have cast off the broad idea of military professionalism in favor of 
a narrower one focused on the first element of Huntington’s definition: whether or not 
military expertise in the management of violence begets democratization. For 
Huntington, only when “the functions of an officer become distinct from those of the 
politician and policeman” does the soldier become relieved of the desire or the capacity 
to interfere in politics.108 Leaders in emerging democracies seeking to foster the loyalty 
of the armed forces ought to “[g]ive them toys. That is, provide them with new and fancy 
tanks, planes, armored cars, artillery and sophisticated electronic equipment… New 
equipment will make them happy and keep them busy trying to learn how to operate 
it.”109 
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The idea that investments in operational capabilities render soldiers loyal to 
democratic institutions are perhaps most enthusiastically supported by members of the 
armed forces themselves. In numerous interviews with military officials conducted for 
this project, military officials expressed their conviction that investments in training, 
equipment, and improvements in the technological sophistication of the armed forces 
were crucial in keeping soldiers content, professional, and committed to democratic 
governance. The belief in the intrinsic benefits of increasing the operational capacities of 
partner militaries is evident in U.S. military’s engagement with Africa. According to a 
U.S. Africa Command’s [AFRICOM] 2016 posture statement, the first among a long list 
of key objectives is “strengthening democratic institutions,” which is to be achieved by 
employing “security force assistance and exercises as decisive efforts to build partner 
capacity.”110  This is not empty rhetoric. Between 2006 and 2013, military assistance to 
Africa doubled, from less than $300 million to more than $600 million. Though the U.S. 
only has one official base on the continent, it maintains as many as 60 smaller facilities 
spread across 34 countries, from which it conducts drone strikes, joint special force 
operations, and a multitude of other security cooperation activities.111  
Though intuitively appealing, the idea that military capabilities beget armed 
forces that respect democratic norms and principals of civilian control is as controversial 
as the notion of professionalism itself. I have already mentioned how Samuel Finer 
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critiqued Huntington’s argument by drawing upon the examples of Japan and particularly 
Germany in World War II, both of whom had very sophisticated armies and were 
nevertheless very repressive regimes. Other more contemporary examples, from Soviet 
Russia to an increasingly competent China, also provide cases contradicting the notion 
that capable armed forces are inherently democratic ones. In a prominent 2015 work, 
Caitlin Talmadge argues that in fact there exists significant variation in battlefield 
performance among authoritarian regimes, and that much of this variation can be 
explained by whether the regime faces internal or external threats.112  
Africanist scholars likewise observe that military capabilities in Africa appear to 
vary widely between both the continent’s democratic and autocratic regimes.113 Ghana, 
Tunisia and South Africa, for example, are each democracies with highly capable armed 
forces. Yet the armies of Sierra Leone and Namibia are among the most poorly equipped 
and underfunded on the continent, and the army of Botswana is virtually non-existent. 
Authoritarian armies show similar variation; Algeria and Ethiopia possess some of the 
strongest armies in Africa, while Zimbabwe and Mauritania are among the weakest. At 
the very least, armed forces with considerable operational capabilities appear possible in 
both authoritarian and democratic contexts, falsifying Huntington’s contention that 
military expertise begets civilian control.  
                                                          
112 Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictators Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Cornell 
University Press, 2015). 
113 See Samuel Decalo, "Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa," The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 27, no. 4 (1989), pp. 547-578; Kristen Harkness, The Origins of African Civil-Military Relations: 
Ethnic Armies and the Development of Coup Traps, (Unpublished Princeton University Doctoral 
Dissertation, 2012).  
68 
 
Empirical studies of the importance of the role of the size and strength of the 
military in causing soldiers to intervene in politics likewise offer a mixed assessment. 
Studies which draw most of their data from cases post-1960, or which focus exclusively 
on Africa, suggest either no relation or a positive relationship between military size, 
spending as a percentage of the national budget, and spending per soldier on military 
coups.114 Collier and Hoeffler suggest the mild positive correlation they find could be due 
to a protection racket, where regimes faced with a military predisposed to intervention 
will attempt to buy the military off in a fruitless attempt to maintain loyalty.115 Thus, 
spending may help ensure that the armed forces refrain from intervening on material 
grounds, but with the unintended consequence of increasing the capacity and desire of the 
military to intervene.  
The fact that numerous cases falsify Huntington’s contention and that the 
empirical evidence is inconclusive suggests that there is little obvious relationship 
between military capabilities and democratization as commonly understood and 
measured by most analysts. The most likely explanation is that a military’s ability to fight 
a war simply has no effect on its support for democracy. It is also possible, as contended 
by Collier and Hoeffler, that military spending has effects that cancel one another out. A 
final possibility is, as with the concept of professionalism, the concept of “military 
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capabilities” will have to be further disaggregated if scholars are to tease out any 
compelling influences. Commonly used measures of military capabilities such as size and 
funding (either on an absolute, per capita, or per soldier basis) do not capture all the 
variables relevant to military effectiveness, such as technological sophistication or 
combat experience. Some aspects of military capabilities—such as equipment, training, 
or salaries and benefits—might be more influential than others. Few studies have 
examined these differences in great detail, in part because of a lack of available data. 116   
Given the prominence of professionalism and military capabilities in the existing 
literature, this study follows the existing scholarship by proxying for military size and 
influence in the quantitative analysis. Its findings generally concur with scholars who 
argue that military capabilities exert no obvious relationship to transitions to and from 
democracy. Further attempts to define and measure the concept of “military capability” 
would require a considerable amount of additional theorizing and effort to find and code 
observable data. Though an admirable undertaking, a more detailed examination of 
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2.3.3. Patrimonial Armies 
Following the Arab Spring, scholars of Middle Eastern politics offered another 
explanation for military defection from authoritarian regimes: the existence of 
patrimonial relationships between authoritarian elites and the armed forces. In contrast to 
approaches that emphasize capabilities, here the argument is that non-merit-based 
recruitment practices foster loyalty to authoritarian elite based on patronage relationships 
between soldiers and dictators. In Eva Bellin’s formulation: “where the military is 
organized along patrimonial lines, where military leaders are linked to regime elites 
through bonds of blood or ethnicity or sect, where career advancement is governed by 
cronyism and political loyalty rather than merit, where the distinction between public and 
private is blurred and, consequently, where economic corruption, cronyism, and predation 
is pervasive, then the fate and interests of the military’s leadership become intrinsically 
linked to the date longevity of the regime.”117 Echoing both Huntington and Weber, the 
opposite of patrimonialism is referred to as an army’s level of institutionalization, or the 
extent to which the armed forces is governed by a clear set of rules, established career 
paths, and merit-based promotion.118 
As maintained by Belin, the patrimonialism / institutionalization duality does 
appear to explain a substantial amount of the variation in the behavior of the armed forces 
towards popular protestors during the Arab Spring. In Tunisia, the army was small, 
practiced meritocratic recruitment, and removed from politics, which encouraged it to 
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defect from the regime. In Egypt, the army practiced merit-based recruitment but was the 
beneficiary of a substantial amount of economic largess from the regime, which made the 
calculation concerning whether or not to defect more ambivalent. In other Arab 
militaries, in particular those of Libya, Bahrain, and Syria, the armed forces were 
patrimonially linked to the regime, which explains the decision to defect.  
To what extent might the level of patrimonialism explain the variation in military 
choices to defect from authoritarian regimes across the rest of Africa? On the one hand, 
the Africanist literature is rife with arguments about how the patrimonial relationships 
that pervade Africa inhibit political development. Jean Francois Bayart famously 
described patron-client relationships in Africa as “politics of the belly,” referring to the 
tendency of Africa’s elite to use public resources for private consumption among cronies 
and kinship networks.119 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz attribute the violence and 
underdevelopment in Africa compared to the rest of the world to system of 
patrimonialism defined by “lack of governmental and administrative efficiency, 
institutionalization, disregard for formal political and economic rules, and universal resort 
to personal gratification and vertical solutions to societal problems.”120 Bratton and Van 
de Walle maintain that patrimonialism is “the core feature of politics in Africa,” and 
observe that virtually all authoritarian states in Africa combine absolute power in the 
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hands of one ruler or strong man, the extensive use of patron-client relationships, and the 
use of state resources for political legitimation.121  
However, the pervasiveness of patrimonial institutions in Africa, both within the 
armed forces and in African governments themselves, means that analyses with a sole 
focus on whether there exist patrimonial relationships between authoritarian leaders and 
African armies have limited explanatory power. Bratton and van de Walle are sensitive to 
this issue. They qualify their argument that most of Africa’s regimes are patrimonial with 
the observation: “That virtually all of African regimes could be viewed as neo-
patrimonial should not obscure the significant variation in political institutions that 
evolved across different states in the region.”122 As they observe, very few, if any, 
African armies escape patrimonial relations altogether. Even in authoritarian regimes 
with armies that were widely considered to be free from political influence, such as those 
in Tunisia or Zambia, patronage-client relationships were common between authoritarian 
elite and top military officers. Moreover, patrimonial relationships pervade armies in both 
democratic and authoritarian contexts.  From democracies in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire to 
dictatorships in the Congo and Mauritania, a persistent source of military mutiny in 
Africa is due to neglected pay, poor barracks conditions, and a lack of investment in 
operational capabilities by elites who use the funds intended for such purposes for private 
ends.  
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Equally as important, the concept of patrimonialism as it is used to explain 
variation in military support for democratic institutions is overstretched. In his definition, 
Middle East scholar Derek Lutterbeck lists four factors that characterize a “low level” of 
institutionalization within the armed forces: security forces based on tribal or family ties 
to the regime, ideological security forces, politicized security forces, and favoritism and 
corruption in security forces.123 Yet is it not likely that each of these forms of 
patrimonialism operate through distinct causal mechanisms, each of which might have 
different implications for the circumstances under which an army might choose to 
support or undermine an authoritarian regime? Like Huntington’s notion of 
professionalism, patrimonialism is an intuitively appealing but misleading idea because it 
encompasses several distinct but related concepts.  
To explain the stance of the African armies towards democratization requires a 
more nuanced understanding of continental civil-military relations than is provided by the 
patrimonialism. Because the characterization of “patrimonial” could be used to apply to 
virtually every African army, the presence of patrimonialism itself is not enough to 
explain the wide variation in support for regime change. Moreover, because the term 
“patrimonial” encompasses multiple, related concepts, more refined concepts should 
yield more specific insight that is easier to operationalize. This dissertation will thus 
consider other factors with more direct causal mechanisms linking authoritarian civil-
military relations to democratization outcomes.  
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2.3.4: Authoritarian Regime Type  
 
It is possible that the differences in the armed forces’ support for democracy are 
due to differences in the structure of the authoritarian regimes under which they serve. 
Since the early 1950s, scholars have interrogated what authoritarian regimes are, the 
differences between them, and how these differences affect their ability to persist. Initial 
studies focused their inquiries on the nature of totalitarianism as a form of dictatorship 
where the regime dominated all aspects of human life.124 Realizing that totalitarianism 
represented more of an absolutist form of dictatorship than an explanation of the 
distinction between dictatorships of various kinds, later scholars propose more varied 
typologies.125 Though some permutations exist, contemporary scholarship tends to 
classify authoritarian regimes into four basic categories: monarchies, who rely on their 
family and heredity kinship networks to maintain power; military dictatorships, where the 
armed forces rules the country; single or dominant party dictatorships, where power rests 
in the hands of civilian-dominated single-party; and personalist dictatorships, where a 
single individual controls the state apparatus.126  
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Despite the shared understanding that the continent is dominated by patrimonial 
rule, Africanists too have historically devoted much ink to explaining distinctions 
between varying types of authoritarian regimes. The variations here are enormous, but 
most classifications loosely follow the distinctions made in the comparative literature, 
with different subcategories added and subtracted by various scholars. For Ruth Collier, 
post-independence African regimes are classified into military regimes and one-party 
rule.127 Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg argued that authoritarianism in Africa was 
principally personalist, and offered the typology of prince, autocrat, prophet and tyrant to 
explain distinctions in authoritarian leadership styles.128 Bratton and van de Walle 
identified four basic types of authoritarian regimes in Africa: settler oligarchies, military 
oligarchies, competitive one-party systems, and plebiscitary one-party systems.129 For 
Naomi Chazan, Peter Lewis and their colleagues, the relevant types of authoritarian 
regimes are administrative hegemonic, party-mobilizing, party centralist, personal-
coercive, and populist.130  
In the broader literature, there is strong empirical evidence that differences in the 
nature of the authoritarian regime influence both the circumstances of a transition and the 
length and stability of an emerging democracy. Military regimes result in democracy 62 
percent of the time, compared to 45 percent of single-party regimes, 36 percent of 
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personalist regimes, and 13 percent of monarchies.131 About one third of transitions from 
military rule since 1945 have resulted in stable democracy, compared to only 16 percent 
of personalist regimes.132 Much of this evidence, particularly on the influence of 
authoritarian regime type on the length of democracy, is descriptive and has not been 
subject to more rigorous empirical testing. In Africa, the effect of authoritarian regime 
type on the probability of a democratic transition and democratic duration has yet to be 
systematically examined.  
There are, however, at least two problems with using authoritarian regime type as 
the unit of analysis through which to analyze the impact of authoritarian civil-military 
relations on transitional politics. First, the existence of so many typologies makes it 
difficult to justify and select a particular one. Given the descriptive evidence, a logical 
starting point would be to use the military rule, single-party, personalist and monarchy 
typology advanced by Barbara Geddes and her colleagues. However, a number of 
scholars, including Bratton and van de Walle, reject the use of “personalism” as an 
analytical category, noting that virtually all authoritarian regimes contain some aspects of 
personalism.133 Indeed, the transition and survival rates of personalist and single-party 
regimes appear to be similar, and may have limited utility in explaining democratization 
outcomes in Africa. For example, Benin, Togo, Libya, and Malawi each experienced 
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authoritarian rule classified as “personalist” by the Geddes and Wright dataset in the 
early 1990s, but only Malawi and Benin ultimately transitioned to democracy.   
Monarchies, too, are a problematic category. Though transition patterns in 
monarchies may be different than other types of authoritarian regimes, there are few 
remaining monarchies left in the world. Monarchies have experienced only eight 
transitions since World War II, one of which resulted in democracy.134 In Africa, there 
are two remaining monarchies out of 54 countries: Swaziland and Morocco. Such a 
limited sample size makes it difficult to draw general conclusions. Selecting an 
authoritarian typology among the many that have been advanced by Africanist scholars 
would pose even more of a challenge due to their nearly limitless permutations. Is there 
any reason to suspect that party-centralist and party-mobilizing regimes lead to different 
democratization outcomes? What about between “princes” and “autocrats?”  
Second, and more importantly, it is likely that different classifications of 
authoritarian regime types simply mask deeper institutional factors that foster transitional 
change. One of these factors is likely to be the structure of civil-military relations. Given 
that the goal of this project is explain the role of the military in democratization in Africa, 
a better approach might be to look much more specifically at different modalities of 
authoritarian civil-military relations themselves, rather than starting with more general 
differences based on the comparative literature. This allows a potential theory to develop 
a more direct and convincing causal logic linking authoritarian civil-military relations to 
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democratization outcomes. Here, the literature on comparative authoritarianism does give 
us one potentially fruitful avenue of inquiry: the distinction between military-led and 
civilian-led authoritarian regimes.  
 
2.3.5: Legacies of Military Rule 
 
There is overwhelming evidence, at least in the general literature, that military 
regimes experience different transition outcomes than other authoritarian regimes. As 
already mentioned, close to two-thirds of military regimes since 1945 have ended in 
democracy, compared to a 40 percent democratization rate for other regime types.135 
There are at least two competing explanations for this disparity. In one view, military rule 
tends to give way to democracy more frequently than other forms of autocracy because 
the absence of political parties, legislatures or other forms of institutions makes them less 
able to credibly commit to power sharing deals with loyalist friends, who might otherwise 
act to overthrow the regime. By “giving up his absolute powers to select members of the 
ruling clique into government positions, the dictator can more credibly guarantee a share 
of power and the spoils of office over the long run to those who invest in the existing 
institutions rather than subversive coalitions.” 136 Military rulers can solve this 
commitment problem by instituting single-party rule or initiating a democratic transition.  
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The absence of effective tools for sharing power may help explain why military 
regimes tend to be so unstable compared to other forms of authoritarian rule, as well as 
their decline in recent years compared to single-party or hybrid authoritarian regimes.137 
What the theory does not explain is why military regimes result in democracy in some 
cases but not in others. Presumably, military dictators often face a choice between 
attempting to transmute themselves into a single party or whether to assent to free, fair 
and competitive elections in which they face a greater risk of losing power. Why military 
rulers appear to opt more often for multiparty elections rather than cling on to power, the 
central concern of this dissertation, is unaccounted for. 
 In another well-established view, the more frequent democratization rate for 
military regimes stems from divisions within the armed forces generated as a result of 
military rule. Armies are institutions that above all else tend to prefer corporate unity, but 
an army in power is also army divided. In any military regime, only a small percentage of 
officers serve in political roles, while the vast majority of officers remain in traditional 
military functions like commanding infantry units, maintaining supplies and equipment, 
or training for potential combat engagements.138 The process of governing a country can 
be damaging to a military’s morale, particularly if the challenges of maintaining power 
cause coups, arrests, or other purges within the army. 
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Fortunately, the armed forces have the option to return to the barracks, unlike 
other authoritarian leaders.139 A number of scholars of the armed forces observe that the 
military will often decide to preserve corporate unity by retreating to the barracks rather 
than risk a costly intra-military conflict that could devolve into civil war.140 Moreover, 
the regime’s monopoly on violence and control over the political system could allow it to 
negotiate an exit on more favorable terms than in situations in which it simply serves as a 
client to an authoritarian leader. For lower ranking officers, leaving power might be 
especially appealing because they can often continue with their military careers.141 And 
even military leaders might prefer a return to democracy over a continuation of 
authoritarian rule, where they might face a higher risk of being violently ousted by other 
officers and face post-tenure punishment.142  
  Barbara Geddes models the consensus that emerges within the armed forces over 
whether or not to interfere in politics in terms of game theory.143 Assume two factions 
within the military: a minority faction of officers who covet power, and a majority who 
prefers the barracks. Despite these different preferences, each would prefer to act 
together. The minority would prefer to intervene, but would be far worse off without 
support from the majority, because the intervention would face a lower probability of 
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success and failure could mean retirement, discharge, or even execution for treason. The 
majority would prefer not to intervene, but could face the same costs as the unsuccessful 
conspirators in the event of a failed coup attempt, and face sanction from the conspirators 
if a coup is successful and the majority did not support it. This is known as a 
“coordination” or “battle of the sexes” game: once the military is either in or out of 
power, neither faction can improve its preferred outcome without the other’s consent.144   
However, this relatively benign view of military rule does not square with much 
of the Africanist scholarship. At one extreme, many scholars do not give much credence 
to the idea that the effects of military rule in Africa have been systematically different 
than other forms of authoritarianism. Luckham argues that Africa’s civilian autocracies 
are just as oppressive as the continent’s military ones and points out that there appear to 
be wide variations in the nature of military rule itself. He concludes that “existing 
typologies tell us little about what soldiers actually do with their power: how they govern, 
on behalf of whom, through which instruments of governance, and with what 
consequences for those they govern.”145  
The more dominant view is one that associates military rule with factionalism, 
political violence, and inhibited democratization. In 1970, Ruth First observed a pattern 
whereby army intervention into politics established old boys’ networks among African 
militaries that led to coups and counter-coups with “increasingly political aims.”146 In 
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addition, military officers have presided over some of Africa’s most destructive and 
repressive dictatorships. Of Uganda’s Idi Amin, whose regime killed hundreds of 
thousands, Samuel Decalo writes that the dictator’s “colossal brutalities defy cataloguing 
and need no review. As crimes against humanity they are at the same rank as Nazi 
Germany’s.”147 In Nigeria, the 1966 seizure of power by General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi 
led to a counter-coup that killed Ironsi, followed by the defection of numerous officers, 
and ended in a fratricidal civil conflict which killed millions. Writing in 1996, Seth 
Kandeh observed, “most instances of military withdrawal from direct political 
involvement have been abrupt and short-lived.”148 Reinforcing Kandeh’s point, African 
history is littered with examples of cases where the army retreated from politics only to 
seize power several years later, including Ghana (1979 and 1981), Niger (1992 and 
1996), Comoros (1996 and 1999), and Burundi (1994 and 1997). At the very least, the 
idea that the military will always withdraw from politics in order to preserve corporate 
unity is falsified: at times, the armed forces is divided over whether or not to stay in or 
leave power, and these divisions lead to retirements, purges, executions, defections, and 
even civil war.  
The view of military regimes as divided, pre-disposed to violent conflict, and 
obstacles to democratization also has a measure of empirical support. In their survey of 
African transitional politics between 1990 and 1994, Bratton and van de Walle note 12 of 
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the 14 relevant cases where a democratic transition was blocked occurred in countries 
with previous histories of coups or military rule. They observe that “an institutional 
legacy of military involvement in politics seemed to predispose security forces to 
intervene during transitions and to incline subsequent transition outcomes to fall short of 
democracy.”149 Bratton and van de Walle’s assertion is backed by a broader empirical 
literature, which finds coups tend to be clustered together in time and space, and that 
military intervention tends to create institutional and network-based incentives for further 
coups or other forms of military interference in politics.150 More recent work by Rollin 
Tusalem from a sample of 44 countries likewise provides evidence that the politicization 
of the military is associated with declines in the quality of subsequent democratic rule.151  
In part, these conflicting interpretations may be due to differences in how scholars 
use the concept of military rule. The more recent literature distinguishes between rule by 
a military regime, in which a group of military officers chooses the country’s leader and 
maintain significant influence over policy; and a personalist military dictatorship, in 
which a serving or former military officer serves as dictator but the military’s political 
role is marginalized.152 The finding that military rule is overall more likely to 
democratize is strongest with respect to military regimes. The distinction between 
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personalist and military regimes is usually not made in the Africanist literature, and 
whether these two sorts of regimes experience different democratization outcomes has 
never been empirically verified.  
The literature on military rule thus presents an intriguing puzzle. On the one hand, 
there is evidence that in some respects, military regimes are more likely than other forms 
of authoritarianism to result in democracy. On the other, military regimes are frequently 
characterized as prone to factionalism, political instability, and forestalled attempts at 
democracy, particularly in Africa. Are the findings of comparativists about the more 
benign nature of institutionalized military rule applicable to Africa? Are democratic 
regimes that succeed military rule more likely to last or more likely to be cut short as a 
result of a legacy of previous military governance?  
These questions and the causal logic behind them are further investigated in this 
dissertation. This study’s empirical section draws on the data of Geddes, Frantz and 
Wright to investigate whether military regimes are more likely to end in democracy, and 
whether military regimes affect the prospects for survival of democracies that may 
succeed them. In addition, this study’s Nigerian case study section more closely examines 
the causal processes at work to see if they are more reflective of the arguments made by 
those who view military rule as detrimental to democracy or those who are more 
favorable. So far as the author is aware, this study is the first to empirically test the 
influence of military rule on both democratic transition and consolidation outcomes in 
Africa. Ultimately, as I will elaborate on in further detail in the next chapter, I offer a 
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theoretical synthesis between scholars who disagree on whether the legacy of military 
rule has been favorable or unfavorable to democratization.  
 
2.3.6: Military Ethnicity 
 
The cross-national literature historically finds very little evidence that ethnicity, 
broadly defined, influences military intervention, either in Africa or otherwise. In most 
cross-national studies of military intervention, ethnicity is either specified as 
fractionalization, which measures the overall number of ethnic groups in a country, or 
ethnic dominance, which measures the percentage of the population of the largest ethnic 
group. Some studies have found ethnicity measured as such to be correlated with military 
involvement in politics.153 Most studies, however, have found either no relationship or a 
negative relationship.154  
The lack of consistent empirical findings has meant that until recently, the 
prevailing wisdom among scholars was that military intervention in politics was best 
explained by economic or political opportunity structures. Collier and Hoeffler, for 
example, dismiss the negative relationship they find between ethnic dominance and coup 
plotting, arguing that Africa’s ethnic diversity makes it less characterized by ethnic 
dominance than other reasons and concluding that predominantly economic and not 
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social conditions cause coups.155 In their landmark article on the causes of civil war, 
James Fearon and David Laitin sum up the logic behind this consensus by arguing that 
ethnic antagonisms and nationalist sentiments are too common to reliably distinguish the 
small number of cases where war breaks out.156 
Nevertheless, the idea that ethnic divides, particularly within the military, 
profoundly influence transitions is a common theme in the literature on African politics. 
Many African regimes inherited armed forces from colonial powers with recruitment 
skewed towards various ethnic groups, and have many times since independence changed 
recruitment policies to favor one group or another. The French, for example, deliberately 
recruited ethnic groups they considered to be more warlike into to the ranks of colonial 
armed forces, including Berbers in Morocco, the Kabré in Togo, and the Malinké in 
Guinea.157 The skewed representation directly presaged further patterns of political 
instability. In 1963, Sylvanus Olympio became the first ever African head of state killed 
in office, a victim of a coup masterminded mainly by Kabré army officers who were 
incensed at Olympio’s refusal to incorporate their demobilized co-ethnics from the 
French army into the country’s incipient military institutions.   
African leaders have also commonly manipulated ethnic representation within 
their armies, either in response to previous imbalances or in order to shore up political 
support. In Liberia, a coup attempt by General Thomas Quiwonkpa led then-president 
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Samuel Doe to expel soldiers of Quiwonpka’s Gio and Mandingo ethnic groups and to 
recruit his armed forces strictly from Doe’s own Krahn ethnicity. This act of exclusion 
allowed Quiwompka’s protégé Charles Taylor and other rebel leaders to recruit their 
forces from the Gio and Mandingo, resulting in 15 years of intermittent civil war, during 
which up to a fifth of the nation’s population was killed.158  
These observations are backed by more recent empirical evidence using data more 
closely aligned with the kinds of processes observed by earlier scholars. For Daniel 
Posner, to capture the contribution that ethnic heterogeneity makes to policymaking 
requires “an index of fractionalization that reflects the groups that are actually doing the 
competing over policy, not the ones that an ethnographer happens to identify as 
representing distinct cultural units.”159 Posner constructs an index of politically relevant 
ethnic groups and finds that African countries with more such groups have experienced 
poorer economic growth outcomes than others. Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer 
and Brian Min extend Posner’s logic into the study of political violence, showing how the 
more ethnic groups are excluded from state power, the more likely conflict is to erupt.160  
These more recent works suggest that the role of ethnicity is likely much more 
complicated than suggested by simple statistical models of fractionalization or 
dominance. As Kristen Harkness argues: 
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The ethnic composition of the military is thus not a reflection of society at 
large, but the result of a series of political decisions and tactics which may 
or may not be a consequence of underlying social diversity. Thus, even if a 
clear relationship existed between the ethnic composition of the military and 
coups…we would not necessarily expect that relationship to hold when 
examining the overarching relationship between nation-wide ethnic and 
cultural diversity and coups. We would also expect the mechanisms linking 
ethnic politics, via their operation within military institutions, to political 
instability to be far more complex than currently theorized.161  
In Harkness’s view, military intervention is not a direct product of ethnic divisions within 
society, but of explicit decisions by political leaders to structure their armed forces along 
ethnic lines. It could be that ethnic divides affect a military’s support for dictatorship or 
democracy only when the military itself becomes a product of ethnic contestation.  
Several more recent works, both in the broader literature and in African studies, 
suggest there is something to this observation. Writing in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring, Gregory Gause pointed out that the Syrian, Bahraini, Saudi Arabian and 
Jordanian armies may have remained loyal to their governments because “the regime 
represents an ethnic, sectarian or regional minority and has built an officer corps 
dominated by that overrepresented minority.”162 Using a database of 97 civil 
disobedience campaigns between 1972 and 2012, Ore Koren’s work shows that militaries 
that discriminate against the recruitment of certain groups are far more likely to be 
involved in violent crackdowns and mass killings of protestors.163  
In Africa, there is evidence that armies fragmented along ethnic lines are both 
more likely to block democratization attempts and to end emerging democratic regimes. 
                                                          
161 Kristen Harkness, The Origins of African Civil-Military Relations, p. 18.  
162 Gause, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring,” p. 84 
163 Koren, “Military Structure.” 
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During the 1990s, Hutu-dominated militaries in Rwanda, Kabré-dominated armies in 
Togo, and the Arab-dominated armies of Sudan each acted to block or forestall a 
democratic transition. In their study, Bratton and Van de Walle find that the military was 
least likely to countenance threats to institutional privilege if the incumbent political 
leader was an ethnic patron, noting that all cases of antidemocratic military intervention 
fit this pattern.164 Using a unique dataset put together from consulting archives in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Senegal, and Kenya, Harkness shows that 
where new democracies with armies dominated by one ethnic group experienced the 
election of a leader from a different ethnic group, coups resulted within four years in 75 
percent of cases.165 Across all other cases, coups resulted within four years less than 20 
percent of the time.  
Thus, the evidence appears to be turning against the consensus of earlier 
generations of empirical scholars. Crude measures of ethnicity have little effect on 
political outcomes, but other measures, such as politically relevant ethnic groups or 
ethnic exclusion, do appear to be deeply related to processes of political violence and 
political change. The new generation of empirical scholars and older generation of 
scholars of African politics can agree: in no institution do choices by authoritarian leaders 
to politicize ethnicity appear to have more profound consequences for democratization 
than in the military.   
                                                          
164 Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, p. 216 
165 Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State.”  
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This dissertation follows in the tradition of the more recent scholarship in 
empirically investigating the impact on military ethnicity on transitional politics. 
Drawing upon the work of Africanists such as Van de Walle and Harkness, the 
dissertation investigates the effect of ethnic stacking on both democratic transition and 
consolidation outcomes. As will be further elaborated upon, the findings mostly concur 
with the latest scholarship that ethnicity-based recruitment policies are harmful to 
democratization. Yet it, in part because ethnicity-based recruitment practices are so 
widespread in Africa, I find that that the effects of such policies are more salient in non-




There is little doubt that authoritarian civil-military relations do have important 
consequences for future patterns of democratization. However, there exists far less 
consensus on which types of civil-military configurations matter most, their impact on 
democratization, and how to operationalize them. Of the six factors discussed, this review 
suggests that most either have little impact, or are conceptually stretched to the point of 
having limited analytic utility. Military professionalism endures as an abstract ideal for 
fostering the loyalty of soldiers to civilian institutions, but is composed of several distinct 
concepts with questionable causal logic linking them to support for or against democracy. 
A case in point is with respect to military capabilities, one aspect of Huntington’s 
definition of professionalism, which empirical scholars have tested numerous times and 
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found possesses no consistent relationship to the military’s role in transitional politics. 
The causal logic linking patrimonialism to the undermining of the military’s support for 
democratic institutions is more convincing, but encompasses a wide variety of civil-
military relations, many of which are common to virtually every military in Africa. 
Numerous scholars in both the broader comparative literature and in the Africanist 
literature have argued that distinctions between various forms of authoritarianism have 
important consequences for both civil-military relations and democratic outcomes. Yet 
the dizzying array of typologies, and the fact that some of the more prominent ones 
appear to experience similar outcomes, merits a more direct focus on civil-military 
relations themselves.  
 One particular kind of authoritarian rule—military rule—contains both a 
compelling causal logic and considerable empirical evidence of democratization patterns 
different from other forms of authoritarianism. Yet the argument made by comparativists 
that military rule is more likely to result in durable democracy for the sake of corporate 
unity is undermined by the claims of Africanist scholars and empirical evidence that 
associates military intervention and rule with blocked transitions and political instability. 
Though it is possible that these differences may be reconciled by distinguishing between 
regimes controlled by military juntas and those controlled by military strongmen, the 
effect of military rule on future patterns of democratization has never been empirically 
tested in Africa. 
 Most evidence exists in favor of the idea that ethnicity, and in particular skewed 
ethnic recruitment within the armed forces, undermines democracy. Though earlier 
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empirical scholarship found little relationship between ethnicity and military intervention, 
more recent cross-national studies and a vast qualitative literature in Africa calls into 
question these earlier findings. By recruiting co-ethnics into their armies, African 
autocrats create powerful constituencies with incentives to remain loyal and block 
opportunities for democratization.   
In the next section, I draw upon both the scholarship on military rule and military 
ethnicity to develop a theory of African civil-military relations that explains a 
considerable amount of the variation in transitional outcomes in Africa. My argument 
draws on a theoretical framework that traces the causal mechanisms through which 
military rule and ethnicity-based recruitment cause soldiers to support or oppose changes 
in regime. These theoretical propositions are then tested quantitatively, through cross-






Authoritarian Armies and Transitional Pathways 
 
I contend that patterns of authoritarian civil-military relations are essential to 
understanding future democratization patterns. Specifically, I argue that the role of 
authoritarian civil-military relations in African transitional politics is rooted in the 
choices of authoritarian leaders concerning how to manage their armies. In Africa, two of 
the most important choices that authoritarian leaders have faced historically is whether or 
not the military should govern the country as an institution, and whether or not to recruit 
co-ethnics into their armies. I argue that these choices have empirically given rise to three 
different types of authoritarian civil-military relations. Each of these three kinds of 
authoritarian civil-military relations are defined by different cleavages within the armed 
forces and between the armed forces and the regime. These cleavages influence two key 
outcomes considered in this dissertation. First, by affecting how the army reacts when the 
regime is threatened, the cleavages affect the probability that the regime will end in 
democracy. Second, because the cleavages usually persist even after the dictatorship’s 
demise, they influence the chances of democratic survival.  
The first type of authoritarian civil-military relation is a military regime, which 
occurs whenever a junta or group of military officers chooses to rule. Military regimes 
concentrate a country’s means of violence and political power, yet they are also uniquely 
polarized between soldiers who serve in ruling roles and those who do not. The 
concentration of coercive power in one, highly factionalized institution leads the army to 
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fracture when the regime is threatened from internal or external sources of opposition. 
The fractious nature and competing interests between soldiers who seek power and those 
who prefer the barracks means that military regimes sometimes result in democracy. 
However, because a network of officers with previous access to political power tend to 
remain in the military even after a transition, democracies that succeed military regimes 
face dim prospects of survival. 
The second type of authoritarian civil-military relation occurs when civilian-led 
dictatorships choose to stack the armed forces with co-ethnic officers, an arrangement I 
also refer to as ethnic civil-military relations or dictatorships with ethnic armies.  
Regimes with ethnic civil-military relations divide more predictably along co-ethnic 
lines, between officers who are ethnic patrons of the dominant faction of the authoritarian 
elite, and non-co-ethnic soldiers and civil servants. Because opposition to authoritarian 
rule is most often perceived as a threat to the privileged status of co-ethnic officers, 
soldiers in regimes with ethnic civil-military relations tend to unify in favor of a hardline 
response to pressure to liberalize. Soldiers in ethnic armies are therefore more likely to 
block opportunities for democratization by siding with those who favor the continuation 
of authoritarian rule and repressing the political opposition. The army’s status as client 
rather than ruler, however, does make the few democracies that succeed dictatorships 
with ethnic armies more likely to survive. 
The third type of authoritarian civil-military relation I identify is civilian-led 
dictatorships that do not ethnically stack their armies, which I refer to as representative 
civil-military relations or dictatorships with representative armies. Regimes with 
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representative civil-military relations are divided neither along ethnic nor political lines. 
Lacking political or co-ethnic ties to the regime, and often marginalized from it, 
representative armies face incentives either to remain neutral or to defect from the regime 
when it comes under pressure to liberalize. The result is that regimes with representative 
civil-military relations are very likely to end in a transition to democracy. Moreover, a 
lack of either political ambition or ethnic ties to the authoritarian elite within the officer 
corps tends to make democracies with representative armies unusually stable.  
This dissertation makes two central contributions that further knowledge of how 
civil-military relations impact transitional politics. First, the theoretical framework 
offered here illuminates the conditions and the mechanisms through which authoritarian 
civil-military institutions cause soldiers to support transitions to and from democracy. It 
shows how decisions by micro-level actors, such as authoritarian leaders and army 
officers, have persistent effects on the structures, incentives and social relations 
governing civil-military relations. These effects, in turn, condition the response of 
militaries to macro-level social forces most commonly associated with regime change in 
the literature, forces such as international pressure, mass protest, and economic crisis. 
The understanding of the role of authoritarian civil-military relations in transitional 
politics advanced in this dissertation is thus more path-dependent, theoretically 
integrated, and less over-determined than most previous approaches.  
These outcomes and the causal logic associated with them offers a second 
contribution to ongoing debates surrounding the importance of military rule and ethnic 
stacking in shaping transitional politics. By showing that the same cleavages that make 
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military regimes likely to end in democracy also bode ill for democratic survival, I 
synthesize existing arguments about the nature of military rule. Moreover, because 
virtually all military governments in Africa have historically practiced ethnic stacking, I 
show that the impact of the decision to recruit co-ethnics into the army is to a degree 
context dependent. Because the military is in one case a client and in another case a ruler, 
I demonstrate that the impact of ethnic stacking can vary based on a regime’s institutional 
type.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five additional sections. In the first 
section, I elaborate in further detail on the theoretical framework underpinning my 
argument and how it relates to existing debates in the literature on democratization. The 
following three sections elaborates on how transitional politics in military regimes, 
civilian-led dictatorships with ethnically stacked armies, and civilian-led dictatorships 
with representative armies follow the theoretical framework advanced here and derives 
hypotheses for each type. The final section briefly summarizes the argument and lays out 
the observable implications to be tested in the next chapter.  
 
3.1: From Dictators Choices to Democratic Outcomes: A Theoretical Framework 
 
Every dictator must make choices concerning how to manage their armies. 
Though not all dictatorships in Africa have historically been subject to the same 
constraints, these choices are meaningful. For example, some African leaders have come 
into power as a result of military coups, at the head of rebellions, and are supported 
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clients of an outside power. Others were elected or served as a leader in their country’s 
nationalist movement, had only marginally powerful militaries, and little support from 
outside powers. These constraints are important, and, as other scholarship has shown, 
undoubtedly have impacted both civil-military relations and transitional politics in their 
countries.166 Nevertheless, it must be remembered that authoritarian leaders, particularly 
when they are in the process of attempting to consolidate power, have tremendous 
discretion in managing their armies. It is the dictator, after all, that formally controls top 
military appointments, determines how officers will be recruited, how they will be paid, 
whether and when they will fight, and to what extent the army will be involved in 
politics. 
My theoretical framework begins with the argument that two choices are 
particularly meaningful in determining how African dictatorships have managed their 
armies. The first of these choices concerns whether the armed forces will seize power 
and, after having done so, govern as a collective, through a junta of officers that controls 
top political and military promotions. The second choice is whether or not the 
authoritarian leaders chooses to recruit co-ethnics into the regular army or other parallel 
military institutions, a practice called ethnic stacking.167 These choices are meaningful 
because a relatively small group of officers and authoritarian elite is charged with making 
them, and because, in both instances, significant variation exists. The military has chosen 
                                                          
166 See, for example, Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d’état 
(Penguin Books, 1970) and Kristen Harkness, “The Origins of African Civil-Military Relations: Ethnic 
Armies and the Development of Coup Traps,” PhD Dissertation (Princeton University, 2012), pp. 46-75.  
167 See Kristen Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of 
Democratization in Africa,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 4 (2016), pp. 587-616. See also Cynthia 
Enloe, “The Military Uses of Ethnicity," Millennium 4, no.3 (1975), pp. 220-233. 
98 
 
to rule as a junta in some but not all of Africa’s dictatorships, and most but not all of 
Africa’s authoritarian regimes have recruited co-ethnics into their armies.  
These choices also have lasting consequences on the types of civil-military 
relations that characterize the dictatorship. In more theoretical terms, we can view the 
choices that authoritarian leaders make in managing their armies as the beginning of a 
causal chain of path dependence.168 As maintained by James Mahoney, path dependent 
arguments are defined by the analysis of contingent choices that cannot easily be 
explained by past events and which give rise to deterministic causal processes.169 The 
contingent choices in my argument are ethnic stacking and military rule, and I argue that 
their interaction gives rise to “sticky” informal and formal social and institutional 
relationships that impact the military’s role in transitional politics.  Throughout this 
dissertation, I refer to these relationships as authoritarian civil-military relations.  
In particular, I argue that the interaction between military government and ethnic 
stacking has given rise to three predominant forms of authoritarian civil-military relations 
in Africa. The first of these is the military regime, which is a product of the choice by the 
military to rule as a collective. The second civil-military relation type occurs when the 
military chooses not to govern as a collective, but a civilian or personalist dictator stacks 
the armed forces with his or her co-ethnics. The final type is when a civilian or 
                                                          
168 For important works on path dependence in the social sciences, see Douglass North 
"Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (1991), pp. 97-112; W.B. Arthur. Increasing 
Returns and Path dependence in the Economy (University of Michigan Press, 1994); James Mahoney. 
"Path Dependence in Historical Sociology." Theory and Society 29, no. 4 (2000), pp. 507-548; and Paul 
Pierson. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." American Political Science 
Review 94, no. 2 (2000), pp. 251-267. 
169 Mahoney, “Path Dependence,” p. 510-511.  
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personalist dictator does not stack the armed forces with co-ethnics, instead choosing 
recruitment practices that are representative of society. Though it is possible that 
systematic differences exist between military regimes who do and do not practice ethnic 
stacking, in practice, virtually all military regimes in Africa have also practiced ethnic 
stacking. Figure 3.1 below depicts how the choices of military rule and ethnic stacking 
give rise to the three types of authoritarian civil-military relations central to this project’s 
argument. 
 




What are the persistent aspects of these forms of civil-military relations, and how 
do each these of types of civil-military lead to varying democratization outcomes? First, I 
posit that each civil-military type is characterized by a different series of cleavages. The 
cleavages can be internal to the military itself, arising from differences in how soldiers 
are recruited, promoted, or interact with the political sphere. They can also be external, 
arising from how soldiers differ in the goals and allegiances with the broader 
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authoritarian elite. These cleavages are important because they are the most crucial 
feature distinguishing each civil-military relation type and because they tend to endure. 
Once induced as a matter of policy or practice, the cleavages continue to affect military’s 
institutional and service culture even if the formal policies that gave rise to them are 
repealed. In more path dependent terms, the inter-and intra-military cleavages in this 
dissertation’s causal framework are a source of inertia, facilitating the “reactive 
sequences” through which authoritarian civil-military relations impact democratization 
outcomes.170  
Second, I posit that the effects of these cleavages are most pronounced at critical 
junctures, when the regime is under significant pressure to reform. As discussed in the 
literature review, it is these kinds of non-state centric factors that are the most empirically 
established causes of democratic transitions. In the face of an economic downtown or 
crisis, the loss of support from a key international patron or superpower, or in the face of 
mass popular protests, states become more likely to democratize. Yet, as argued by the 
scholarship on the politics of military defection, it is also during these critical junctures 
that soldiers, because of their monopoly on violence, tend to have the most influence on 
transition outcomes. By understanding the nature of a regime’s main civil-military 
cleavages when the dictatorship comes under threat, we gain insight into the degree of its 
support of the authoritarian regime.   
                                                          
170 Ibid. p. 109.  
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Ultimately, the actions of soldiers, conditional on pre-existing cleavages, lead to 
either authoritarian persistence or a democratic transition through a variety of 
mechanisms. Soldiers can show their unwavering support for the dictator by cracking 
down on the political opposition, precluding any kind of transfer of power, and leaving 
the dictatorship intact. They can also block a democratic transition through a military 
coup, either replacing the leader but leaving the authoritarian leadership group largely 
intact or giving rise to a new regime entirely.171 If they are followed by free and fair 
elections and a peaceful transfer of power, military coups can also be mechanism of 
democratic change. Lastly, soldiers can choose to remain neutral instead of cracking 
down on the political opposition or to defect from the authoritarian regime by actively 
supporting protestors, a choice which almost always forces the dictator to resign and 
leads to democracy. As I will seek to demonstrate in subsequent sections, soldiers serving 
in authoritarian regimes in each civil-military type are not equally likely to support the 
dictatorship in the face of pressure to reform or liberalize. As a result, each civil-military 
relation type is associated with sharply divergent transition outcomes.   
                                                          
171 This project follows Geddes, Frantz and Wright in classifying the regime by the leadership group, 
meaning “the small group that actually makes the most important decisions.” This definition allows for an 
analysis not just of transitions between authoritarianism and democracy, but between different kinds of 
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Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” Perspectives on Politics 12 (2014), p. 315; Susan 
Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (University of California Press, 1993); Philip 
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Just as crucially, the cleavages associated with each civil-military relation type do 
not typically end with the authoritarian regime, but outlast it. After a transition to 
democracy, rarely does the armed forces undergo wholesale reform. Even instances when 
reforms to integrate the army or induce civilian rule are made, the central civil-military 
cleavages, and the relationships, norms, customs, and interests associated with them, tend 
to persist. So long as politically experienced and ambitious soldiers remain in the military 
or share ties of ethnic patronage with the previous authoritarian elite, the threat of a coup 
hangs heavy over an emerging democracy. As a result, the choices that authoritarian 
leaders make in managing their armies has implications for the survival of any 
democracy that succeeds authoritarian rule.  
Figure 3.2 below summarizes this dissertation’s theoretical framework. It 
illustrates on a conceptual level how choices by authoritarian leaders in Africa have led to 
distinct types of civil-military relations, with different cleavages that impact the 
conditions under which armies will support or oppose regime change. In the next three 
sections, I discuss in greater detail each pathway from leadership choice to 
democratization outcome. For each type of authoritarian civil-military relation, the casual 
processes linking authoritarian choices to transitional outcomes is further outlined, the 
argument’s contributions to previous literature is discussed, and testable hypotheses to be 













3.2 The First Pathway: The Military Regime and Democratic Instability 
 
Wherever the military seizes power, the armed forces must choose whether to 
govern directly, whether to hand over power to a civilian dictator, or whether to organize 
elections. The choice to govern directly creates a military regime, the first major type of 
civil-military configuration under authoritarianism discussed in this dissertation. In 
military regimes, the head of state is chosen from a cabal or junta of military officers, 
who have significant influence over policy decisions. The fact that it is the military and 
not civilians who are in charge of running the country has unique implications for how 
and when the armed forces will support democratic transitions. Compared to other forms 
of authoritarian civil-military relations, military rule is unusually divisive, and, while 
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these divisions often lead military leaders to choose to leave power, they also make for 
short-lived democracies. I refer to the pathway that military regimes typically take as one 
of democratic instability.  
Like the scholars of comparative politics, my argument hinges on the insight that 
there are fundamental differences in the nature of civil-military relations when the 
military rules as an institution versus when power is concentrated into the hands of a 
civilian political party or single autocrat, even one with a military background.172 As 
Barbara Geddes argues:  
A military regime, in contrast to a personalist dictatorship led by a military 
officer, is one in which a group of officers determines who will lead the 
country and has some influence on policy. In an institutionalized military 
regime (many are not), senior officers have agreed on some formula for 
sharing or rotating power, and consultation is somewhat routinized. 
Military hierarchy is respected, perhaps as an initial purge of supporters of 
the previous government.173 
Like Geddes and others, I define the military regime, which is also known as collegial 
military rule, as “a group of officers that determines who will lead the country and has 
some influence on policy.” 174  I argue that the military regime is distinct from other 
forms of authoritarian civil-military relations, with unique implications for the 
                                                          
172 Barbara Geddes, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright, “Military Rule,” Annual Review of Political Science 
17, no. 1 (2014), p. 152-155. See also Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-
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174 Geddes et al, “Military Rule,” Op Cit. See also Nam Kim, and Alex Kroeger. “Regime and Leader 
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circumstances under which soldiers within military regimes will support or oppose 
regime change.  
 The first crucial difference between the military regime and other forms of 
authoritarian civil-military relations lies in the nature of the cleavages that characterize 
them. Though the choice to rule as an institution concentrates political and coercive 
power within the armed forces, it also leads to unique inter-military cleavages, between 
soldiers who serve in political roles and soldiers that do not. From the moment the army 
seizes power, military leaders must divide their attention between governing the country 
and defending it. To govern the country, officers who have demonstrated their loyalty to 
the junta are rewarded with political roles or sensitive strategic positions. The promotion 
of officers based on political loyalty rather than battlefield performance, seniority or 
merit divides the military between praetorian officers who focus on seeking and wielding 
power, and traditional officers devoted to the traditional mission of maintaining order and 
defense.175 The number of political positions compared to the overall number of 
traditional military roles is few, so the majority of the armed forces is left on the outside 
and can become resentful of the privileged clique of soldiers. This argument is consistent 
with the broader scholarship on military rule, which argues that military regimes are 
                                                          
175 According to Perlmutter, among the first to popularize the term, praetorian states are those in which “the 
political processes of the state favor the development of the military as the core group and the growth of its 
expectation as a ruling class” (1969, p. 383). Here, I use the word praetorian at times to refer to the group 
of military officers responsible for governing in a military regime. See Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian 
State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing 
Polities," Comparative Politics 1, no. 3 (1969), p. 383. See also Samuel Huntington, "Political 




characterized by unique divisions between soldiers who rule and those in more traditional 
military roles.176  
Yet members of the cabal of officers with political power struggle not only 
against the traditional military establishment, but also against one another. As officers 
who seize power by force seek to maintain it, they retire, imprison or even execute those 
in the military they suspect of being disloyal. If given the opportunity, soldiers seeking to 
improve their position will not hesitate to turn their knowledge of the art of the military 
coup against those they helped bring into power. And soldiers outside of the junta and 
those immediately associated with it will attempt to harness their personal, professional 
and political grievances into plots of their own. In addition, in most cases, disagreements 
over who ought to govern the military and thus the state falls not just along personal, but 
also along ethnic lines. In a typical African military regime, the ruling clique of soldiers 
also recruits co-ethnics into top military positions in order to assure their loyalty. Usually, 
officers and soldiers of other ethnic groups become alienated from the ruling clique. The 
arguments concerning the personal and ethnic divisions that characterize military regimes 
is more consistent with the Africanist literature.177 
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This polarization over wielding power and along ethnic lines makes military 
regimes uniquely divided and factionalized forms of civil-military relations. The result is 
that the armed forces tend to fracture at critical junctures when military regimes comes 
under internal or external pressure to liberalize. In such circumstances, the traditional 
faction of the military, concerned above all with preserving the military’s corporate 
integrity, tends to prefer to leave power, as argued by Geddes, Nordlinger, and others.178 
They are opposed by many of the senior group of praetorian officers, who prefer to 
remain in power. The preferences of more junior officers in the praetorian clique is more 
ambiguous; they may remain loyal to their seniors, but they also might seek power for 
themselves, either by a coup or by forcing the resignation of the military leadership. 
Similar divisions exist among officers whose ethnicities are not shared with the ruling 
class; many prefer to leave power to preserve the military’s institutional interests, but 
some may organize plots in an attempt to seize power for themselves.    
The existence of so many factions, each with competing and potentially 
contradictory assessments of their interests, makes democratic transition following 
military rule a contingent and uncertain process. At times, fearful that military rule will 
negatively impact internal discipline, the military will follow the wishes of the traditional 
faction and come to a consensus to leave power. This is particularly true in cases where 
the armed forces briefly intervene to resolve civilian disputes and then exits before the 
ruling group of soldiers becomes accustomed to the accoutrements of office, the so-called 
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“moderator” or “guardian” types of military regimes.179 In Dahomey (present-day Benin), 
for example, the military under General Christophe Soglo assumed power in October 
1963 amidst a political crisis generated by the arrest of trade union leaders, and left after 
being assured that the country had averted the threat of civil war in 1964.  
However, the decision to withdraw from power is not always a strictly consensus 
driven-affair in which officers in power agree to put the corporate interests of the military 
above personal self-interest. In other instances, democratic transitions in military regimes 
are achieved only through struggle, after politically ambitious military officers and their 
supporters are assassinated or overthrown. In Cote D’Ivoire, a non-commissioned officer 
by the name of Tuo Fozié led the country’s first coup, ending a democratic government in 
1999. Refusing to step down, he lasted just days before he was overthrown by another 
coup. To guide the country back to democracy, former army commander Robert Guéï 
was called back from retirement. He organized and then proceeded to run in elections, 
which he lost to Laurent Gbagbo in the year 2000. Guéï, however, refused to concede and 
was forced to flee to a remote region of the country. He eventually recognized the 
election result, but was killed under mysterious circumstances in 2002.180   
Finally, at least some members of the praetorian class of officers often stands to 
benefit from a transition to democracy, either because a return to the barracks allows 
current or former officers to run for political office, or because it presents a future 
                                                          
179 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 193-263; 
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opportunity for officers who remain in the army to benefit by seizing power. Both factors 
were present in Niger’s democratic transition, when the military-led National Movement 
of the Development of Society (MNSD) transmuted itself into a civilian political party 
that narrowly lost elections in 1993. When the MNSD and opposition parties could not 
reach a compromise to share power in 1996, the military used the opportunity to strike.181 
The man responsible for the coup was Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, who had served 
as chief of staff to the country’s previous military dictator and held various 
ambassadorships before being promoted to the sensitive position of army chief in Niger’s 
young democracy.  
Thus, transition periods in military regimes are fraught both with opportunity and 
danger. Opportunity, in the sense that a retreat to the barracks can allow the traditional 
faction within the army to orchestrate a transition to democracy while allowing their 
praetorian colleagues to keep their jobs. Danger, in the sense that corporate disunity in 
the military combined with social unrest provide good opportunities for disaffected 
factions within the army to seize power and continue to rule. The praetorian, traditional 
and ethnic cleavages that characterize military regimes make a democratic transition a 
likely, but far from certain outcome. Whether or not a military regime ends in democracy 
depends to a large degree on the size of various factions, the degree of their control over 
the political system, and their assessment of their interests.   
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Unfortunately, the same cleavages that make military regimes likely to result in 
democracy also give democracies that succeed military rule poor chances of survival. The 
distinguishing feature of military regimes compared to other forms of authoritarian civil-
military relations is the existence of a robust praetorian class of officers accustomed to 
ruling and experienced in the art of coup-making. It is the persistence of these politically-
minded officers within the military after returning to the barracks that explains why 
democracies that succeed military rule rarely last. Following military rule, soldiers are 
likely to re-enter politics through a variety of mechanisms that are less common in other 
regimes. 
First, previous military heads of state can re-seize power after retreating to the 
barracks. As the ruler and not a client, the military has tremendous leverage in 
determining the course of a future transition. Often, the price of a democratic transition is 
that officers who serve as heads of military regimes and may harbor continuing political 
ambitions remain, like Soglo did in Benin’s army after the 1964 transition. In fact, 
Dahomey is a case in point: Benin’s democracy only lasted another year before Soglo 
intervened again, seizing power in 1965. Similar cycles of military intervention, 
disengagement, and re-intervention have occurred across the continent, including Sudan 
in the 1960s, Ghana in the 1970s and 1980s, Niger in the 1990s, and the Central African 
Republic in the 2000s. 
The retreat and re-entry option may be even more appealing for junior officers 
with praetorian inclinations. By allowing a democratic transition, junior officers can force 
the retirement of more senior colleagues and mentors without having to resort to a coup. 
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Instead, they bide their time, wait several years, and launch a coup against the civilian 
regime, often with more seniority and a greater likelihood of success.182 Such was the 
case with Colonel Ignatius Acheampong of Ghana, who served as chairman of the 
committee governing Ghana’s Western region when the military left power in 1969. 
Three years later, he used his position as an infantry brigade commander to instigate a 
coup that toppled the civilian government of Kofia Busia.183  
Finally, military regimes in emerging democracies tend to possess more 
expansive corporate interests and a greater capacity to intervene. When the military rules, 
it controls not only policy, but also access to state resources, contracts, and other forms of 
wealth. A pre-condition for democratic change can be that the military gets to retain some 
of those sources of wealth and a privileged political position.  In Egypt, the military 
insisted on being granted significant autonomy in shaping the country’s defense and 
national security policy after the 2011 revolution and retained a vast stake in the 
country’s economy. The 2013 coup which ended Egypt’s emerging democracy was due 
in part to attempts by elected leaders to curtail the military’s power and influence.184   
The ability to retreat to the barracks that makes a democratic transition a probable 
outcome is also the same mechanism through which democracies that succeed military 
rule die prematurely. More often than not, the military dictates the terms of the political 
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transition, and ambitious, privileged networks of officers remain within the armed forces, 
awaiting further opportunities to intervene.  
This argument makes an important contribution to the academic literature on 
military rule because it helps to reconcile the differences between the scholars who 
observe that military regimes are more likely to transition to democracy with those that 
argue that the legacy of militarism in Africa is one diametrically opposed to 
democratization. Like more recent comparative scholars, I argue that the divisions 
created within the military as a result of collegial military rule makes such regimes fairly 
likely to democratize. I differ from these scholars, however, in maintaining that the 
praetorian officers who govern and serve in political roles do not just permit 
democratization out of fear of a civil war or because they care for the army’s corporate 
well-being. Rather, democratization is often in the political interest of the praetorian 
faction as well, because it provides opportunities for officers to try their hand at civilian 
politics and can allow the next generation of politically-minded officers a future 
opportunity to rule.  
Figure 3.3 illustrates how military regimes fit into this dissertation’s theoretical 
framework. The choice by the armed forces to rule collectively is what defines a military 
regime. The principal cleavage in military regimes is between traditional soldiers who 
value the military’s institutional interests and praetorian soldiers who govern and seek 
power, a cleavage that is not shared in other forms of authoritarian civil-military 
relations. When a dictatorship comes under pressure to liberalize, the armed forces 
fracture, making a democratic transition a possible but uncertain outcome. However, the 
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persistence of praetorian officers within the armed forces after a transition means that 
emerging democracies face poor prospects for survival. The moderate transition but 
unlikely survival prospects mean that military regimes are most likely to follow a 
transition path of democratic instability.   
 




From this framework, I derive two hypotheses with observable theoretical 
implications to further investigate in this dissertation’s empirical chapter. My argument 
indicates that military regimes have a probable but not certain chance of transitioning to 
114 
 
democracy, but that any democracy that follows military rule should have poor prospects 
of survival. Stated more formally, this implies: 
H1A: Military regimes will have an approximately average chance of 
transitioning to democracy.  
H1B:  Democracies that succeed institutionalized military rule are less likely to 
survive than other types of democracies. 
 
3.3: The Second Pathway: Ethnic Civil-Military Relations and Democratic 
Obstruction 
 
In some authoritarian regimes, the military chooses not to rule as an institution, 
but hands over power to a civilian or military officer who rules at the head of a 
personalist or single party regime. In such cases, I argue it is the ethnic composition of 
the armed forces and how they are manipulated by the ruling elite that determines the 
conditions under which the military will support democracy. Most of the time, 
authoritarian elites recruit co-ethnics to serve as top officers in their armies and or in 
other parallel military institutions, a practice referred to as ethnic stacking.185  Civilian-
led dictatorships that ethnically stack their armies define ethnic civil-military relations, 
the second authoritarian civil-military relation type considered in this dissertation. 
Armies in such regimes are most likely to block attempts to democratize, but in the rare 
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cases that they do transition, emerging democracies face moderate prospects for survival. 
I refer to the likely transition path of civilian-led dictatorships with ethnic armies as one 
of democratic obstruction.  
It is important to specify precisely what is meant by a “civilian” regime. I adopt a 
broad definition of a civilian-led dictatorship, referring to any authoritarian regime that is 
not collectively ruled by a group of military officers. In contrast to military-led regimes, 
the armed forces in civilian-led regimes do not select or control the ruler and do not have 
an extensive role in making and implementing non-national-security-related policy. 
Civilian led dictatorships, therefore, can be led by a single current or former military 
officer, so long as they are unconstrained by their military colleagues.   A brief example, 
drawn from the work of Geddes, Frantz and Wright, can help clarify how this distinction 
is made. In a 1982 coup, the officers responsible for the putsch chose Captain Thomas 
Sankara as their leader, but remained heavily involved in government and retained 
considerable control over top political appointments. In 1987, Sankara was assassinated 
and replaced by another military officer, Blaise Campoaré, who marginalized the 
military’s political influence in politics by creating a broader, more inclusive 
government.186 Under Geddes, Frantz and Wright’s schema, which is adopted by this 
dissertation, Burkina Faso under Sankara is considered a military regime, but Campoaré a 
personalist dictatorship.187 
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 Next, it is important to specify precisely what ethnic stacking is and how it is 
practiced. Following the work of Kristen Harkness, I associate ethnic stacking with two 
non-mutually exclusive strategies.188 First, dictators recruit officers into the regular army 
on the basis of ethnicity rather than merit, seeking to shore up the loyalty of the armed 
forces by privileging co-ethnics and placing them in sensitive or strategic positions.  
Second, they recruit co-ethnics into parallel military institutions such as presidential 
guards and militias that usurp some of the traditional functions of the army. An example 
of the former strategy occurred in Togo in 1963. Immediately following the assassination 
of head of state Sylvanus Olympio, the Togolese army expanded from 250 to 1,200 
soldiers, 80 percent of whom were recruited from Kabré and other northern ethnic 
groups, where less a quarter of the country’s population resides.189 An example of the 
latter occurred during the 1972-1991 dictatorship of Mathier Kerekou in Benin, where the 
dictator’s presidential guard was recruited nearly exclusively from the northern elite and 
comprised the country’s most highly trained and best equipped military force.190  
The combination of civilian rule and ethnic stacking leads to different civil-
military cleavages than those that are found in other authoritarian regimes. In such 
regimes, the principal cleavages fall along ethnic lines. As a matter of tautology, there are 
inherent cleavages between officers who are co-ethnics of the authoritarian elite and 
officers who are not. In regular armies and parallel military institutions that are at all 
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multi-ethnic, officers that share co-ethnicity with the elite form the privileged class, and 
are rewarded with more rapid promotion, better jobs, and access to additional benefits not 
available to the typical soldier of a different ethnicity. In some armed forces, and 
particularly in parallel military institutions, soldiers from other ethnicities can be barred 
from service altogether. Moreover, if the regime is not exclusively controlled by the 
ethnic groups that dominate the army, officers will tend to favor the policies and establish 
patron-client relations with members of their own ethnic group.  
I argue that the ethnic nature of the cleavages in civilian dictatorships with 
ethnically stacked armies makes the armed forces more likely unite in support of 
hardliners when the regime is faced with pressure to liberalize. Because ethnic identity 
becomes the army’s principal means of access to patronage, promotions and career 
advancement, the institutional interests of top military officers are more directly tied to 
the fate of the regime. Already in the barracks, the army cannot simply negotiate its way 
back and keep its institutional privileges intact. In addition, officers in ethnic armies 
usually stand to lose exclusive access to state patronage as a result of a transition. At 
worst, officers could lose their jobs, be forced into rebellion, or executed if forces from a 
rival ethnic group seize power or are elected into office. Finally, the dictatorship’s 
civilianized status makes the military more of a client, allowing authoritarian leaders 
more leverage over policy, top appointments, and greater leeway to shape security 
institutions in ways that secure their rule.   
As a result, soldiers in ethnic armies favor action to block or foreclose transitions 
to democracy. Perhaps the most common mechanism through which such armies 
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demonstrate their support of the dictator is through repression, either precluding any form 
of political resistance entirely or allowing authoritarian leaders to give themselves an 
impossible electoral advantage. In Chad, President Déby‘s Republican Guard composed 
exclusively of Zaghawa co-ethnics committed “intermittent massacres” in the country’s 
south at the same time that the country’s 1993 constitutional conference was taking 
place.191 With full control over the country’s means of coercive violence, Déby ensured 
himself victory during 1996 presidential elections in a vote that was neither free nor fair, 
and has since become the longest serving dictator in Chad’s history. 
In addition, the military's role as a client rather than a ruler in civilian 
dictatorships makes authoritarianism more resilient by lessening the probability of a 
successful coup. In dictatorships with ethnic civil-military relations, fewer officers than 
in military regimes are able to form connections and build coalitions with civilian elites, 
making coup plots less likely to succeed. In addition, civilian dictators may have an 
easier time building powerful parallel military institutions than leaders in military 
regimes, where officers are wary of the concentration of power in the hands of a single 
individual or institutional rivals. As recent scholarship by Erica De Bruin argues, parallel 
military institutions (especially ethnic ones) increase the loyalty of the armed forces to 
the authoritarian regime by ensuring that at least some members of the security sector 
will rally to the leader’s defense in the event of a possible coup, making them less likely 
                                                          




to succeed.192 That Chad's Republican Guard was the unit responsible for the massacres 
during Chad's elections, for example, illustrates the degree to which parallel military 
institutions composed exclusively of a dictator's co-ethnics are willing remain loyal at 
extreme cost.  
Finally, when coups against civilian dictators with ethnically stacked armies are 
successful, I posit that the most likely outcome is simply that one ethnically-stacked 
dictatorship gets replaced by another. In cases where the authoritarian leadership is 
divided, the armed forces are more likely to favor the hardline faction because of the risks 
associated with liberalization. In Rwanda, for example, the Hutu-dominated regular army 
is rumored to have brought down the plane of then-president Juvenal Habyarimana 
precisely because the president was on the verge of implementing the Arusha accords, a 
power sharing agreement that sought to end a civil war through free and fair elections. 193 
Instead, after Habyarimana's death, the Rwanda army infamously organized and 
collaborated closely with co-ethnic interhawame militias to perpetrate the 1994 genocide, 
resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi civilians and sympathizers.  
Thus, civilian-led dictatorships with ethnically stacked armies tend to go to great 
lengths to prevent political liberalization. More than in other regimes, the armed forces 
are willing to obey orders by authoritarian elites to commit violence against protestors 
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and other members of the opposition. Authoritarian leaders have greater latitude than in 
military regimes to manipulate the army to its liking, preventing soldiers from forging the 
kind of political connections they would need to organize a coup and creating powerful 
parallel military institutions likely to support them in the event of a crisis. When coups 
against authoritarian elites do succeed, the result is usually not liberalization, but the 
continuation of the same regime with a new leader or the rise of another authoritarian 
regime more willing to preserve the status quo.  
In the cases where authoritarian regimes with ethnic armies do transition, what 
might the consequences for the political settlement be? I argue that democratic 
settlements following regimes with ethnic military institutions are moderately likely to 
last. In part, this may be because fewer democratic settlements emerge following 
dictatorships with ethnic civil-military relations, and those that do tend to preserve the 
previous ethnic balance of power. Moreover, ethnic armies have fewer soldiers with 
previous political experience, less institutional knowledge of how to enact a coup, and are 
more divided between the regular army and parallel military institutions than soldiers 
following military regimes. These are each likely to be somewhat stabilizing factors.   
Rather, as argued by Harkness, the greatest threat to emergent democratic regimes 
following dictatorships with ethnic civil-military relations comes when the founding 
authoritarian leader is replaced by another a leader from a different party or ethnic group 
or over attempts to re-integrate the military.194 For example, when Cameroonian 
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president Ahmadou Ahijdo left power in 1982, he left in place an army that was largely 
composed of his Peul and Fulani co-ethnics.  In 1984 Ahijdo’s successor, Paul Biya, 
attempted to move against soldiers loyal to the former regime by transferring top soldiers 
from the Fulani/Peul dominated Republican Guard, triggering a coup attempt that had to 
be violently put down. Biya presides as dictator of Cameroon until this day, and the 
Cameroonian army is now dominated mostly by the Bulu and Beti ethnic groups, each of 
which have close to ties to Biya.195 This example illustrates that we might expect 
democratic stability to result following dictatorships with ethnic civil-military relations so 
long as the army’s ethnic basis remains little changed or if co-ethnic politicians retain 
considerable power.  
In terms of the contribution to the overall literature, this project follows some of 
the more recent scholarship by Bratton and van de Walle, Harkness and others in arguing 
that ethnic stacking makes the armed forces more likely to block a democratic transition. 
Yet it differs in arguing that a crucial distinction is to be made between military regimes, 
which in Africa have tended to be riven by professional, political and ethnic cleavages, 
and civilian-led dictatorships, where the principal cleavage in the armed forces tends to 
fall along ethnic lines alone. With the regime as its patron, officers in ethnic armies have 
little to gain and everything to lose from a democratic transition, instilling in them a high 
tolerance for being used as instruments of repressive violence. Moreover, the existence of 
powerful parallel military institutions and the lack of a political role makes revolt against 
authoritarian leaders risky, further strengthening the bonds of co-ethnic loyalty and 
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reinforcing patron-client relationships. Compared to other types of armed forces, ethnic 
militaries are more willing to commit violence in order to ensure the regime remains in 
power and their institutional privileges unthreatened. Under these conditions, peaceful 
democratic change is supremely challenging.  
Figure 3.4 illustrates how civilian dictatorships with ethnically stacked armies 
follow this dissertation’s theoretical framework. Ethnic civil-military relations occur 
when the military chooses to remain out of power and when the authoritarian leaders 
privilege the recruitment of soldiers from one or several ethnic groups. The principal 
cleavage in ethnic civil-military relations is between ethnically privileged soldiers and 
between soldiers or authoritarian elite from non-privileged groups. When the dictatorship 
comes under pressure to liberalize, the co-ethnic soldiers will unite in their support of the 
regime or hardline factions within it. As a result, opportunities to democratize tend to get 
blocked by intimidation, repressive violence, or, in some cases, military coups. Though 
transitions to democracy are rare, the military’s status as a client rather than a former 
ruler makes emerging democracy moderately likely to last. The poor transition but 
moderate survival prospects means that military regimes are most likely to follow a 












From this framework, I draw two further observable hypotheses with testable 
implications. I argue that dictatorships with ethnic civil-military relations face poor 
democratic transition prospects, but democracies that succeed such dictatorships face 
moderate survival chances. Stated more formally, this implies:   
H2A:  Authoritarian regimes with ethnic military institutions are less likely than 
other authoritarian regimes to transition to democracy  
H2B: Democracies that succeed authoritarian regimes with ethnic military 
institutions will have an approximately average chance of survival. 
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3.4: The Third Pathway: Representative Civil-Military Relations and Democratic 
Stability 
 
A relatively small number of authoritarian regimes in Africa have managed to 
keep the armed forces out of power and refrain from stacking their armies with co-ethnic 
soldiers. These dictatorships possess what I call representative civil-military relations. 
The most notable feature about representative militaries is their absence of either ethnic 
stacking or experience with military rule. Without either a core of officers who seek 
power or maintain ethnic privilege, representative armed forces tend to avoid political 
interference. As a result, I argue, authoritarian regimes with representative military 
institutions are far more likely than other regimes to transition to democracy, which is 
more likely to survive. 
Despite the fact that the defining feature of representative civil-military relations 
is an absence of military rule or ethnic stacking, the choice to cultivate armies that are 
representative of society is often a deliberate one. By ethnically stacking their armies or 
drawing them into politics, authoritarian leaders fear that they will stoke divisions within 
their armed forces, and thus seek alternative means to cultivate military loyalty.  In some 
cases, such as the single-party authoritarian regimes that existed in Senegal and Tanzania, 
the regime seeks to cultivate military loyalty by taking measures to incorporate and 
subordinate the military into the regime’s ruling structure. In Tanzania, for example, 
though the army was nationally representative, it was also tightly integrated into the 
machinery of the ruling Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). All of Tanzania’s 
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soldiers were required to be party members, and the structure of the military was 
modelled off of the structure of the party.196   
In other cases, the mixing of the military and of politics is banned altogether, a 
product of a more deliberate attempt by authoritarian leaders to marginalize the military 
out of fear of a regime-ending coup. Like other civilian-led regimes, dictatorships with 
representative armies will often invest heavily in the intelligence, police or parallel 
military institutions to counterbalance the regular army. These institutions are often used 
to monitor military officers and serve as the regime’s primary mechanism of internal 
coercion and maintaining order. In Zambia, for example, a centralized intelligence 
apparatus operated undercover at the Ministry of Defense and was crucial in identifying 
and neutralizing anti-party activity.197 In Malawi, a youth militia known as the Malawi 
Youth Pioneers (MYP) recruited from regime loyalists counterbalanced the regular army 
and was the primary institution responsible for defending dictator Hastings Banda from 
his political enemies.198 
The civil-military cleavages that exist in dictatorships with representative armies 
are also distinct from other forms of authoritarian civil-military relations. On the one 
hand, the marginalization from political power and lack of ethnic divisions fosters armies 
that are unusually cohesive and unconcerned with the political sphere. Because officers 
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neither seek political power nor are ethnic patrons of the regime, they tend to have little 
active interest in overthrowing it. Moreover, counterbalancing institutions can and often 
do serve as a deterrent to military intervention. Therefore, most regimes with civil 
militaries tend to be relatively stable and less coup prone than average. Some of Africa’s 
longest-standing dictatorships, such as those in Morocco and Angola, have cultivated 
representative civil-military relations. 
On the other hand, because the army tends to remain free of divisions, when 
cleavages do occur it is usually between the armed forces and the authoritarian 
leadership. The army’s marginal political role and status as a representative institution 
can lead it to identify more with opposition groups than as part of the coercive apparatus. 
Less likely than armies of other authoritarian regimes to be used as an instrument of 
authoritarian repression, soldiers in representative military institutions are more sensitive 
to the regime’s excesses. In addition, the regular army can come to view the police, 
intelligence and parallel security institutions that are charged with maintaining order as 
institutional rivals and become resentful of the perks they receive.  If the internal security 
apparatus is used to monitor and repress soldiers, the armed forces is likely to further 
develop a corporate identity that defines itself in opposition to the regime.  
Therefore, the armed forces cannot be reliably counted on to side with the regime 
in cases where it comes under significant pressure to liberalize, particularly from 
domestic opposition groups. Without political or ethnic patronage, soldiers in 
representative armies are more likely to be indifferent to whether or not the regime 
remains in power. Because the army is not called on as often to maintain internal order, 
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representative armies will at the very least prefer to remain neutral in the face of mass 
protest. And if the army possesses significant institutional or personal grievances against 
the authoritarian regime, it may see some benefit in acting to oppose it.  
The result is that, when authoritarian regimes with representative civil-military 
relations do transition, they become democracies. In some cases, democracy results less 
because of military intervention, and more because the military has no preference with 
respect to who rules and no reason to oppose moves by authoritarian leaders to liberalize. 
This characterizes the military’s role in the transitions to democracy of both Cape Verde 
and Senegal, which were drawn out, mostly peaceful affairs in which the military had 
very little role.  
In other cases, the representative armies have a much clearer preferences in favor 
of democratic change. For some countries, representative armies do not support or choose 
to defect in cases where their participation in mass violence against the political 
opposition would save the regime. This was clearly the case in Mali, when elements of 
the army balked at being used to repress violent protests in which one hundred were 
killed and seven hundred injured in 1991. Days after the confrontation, security forces 
took over the country, arrested the president, and presided over a transition to electoral 
democracy. These actions greatly enhanced the prestige and status of the military in the 
eyes of Malian civilians, paving the way for the future political career of the paratroop 
commander who led the takeover, Amadou Toumani Touré.199 For other countries, 
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military defection is motivated by a clearer sense of institutional grievance against 
parallel military institutions. Such grievances were a significant factor in Malawi’s 
transition to democracy. There, the army acted to prevent political intimidation by the 
MYP movement by attacking the movement’s headquarters and burning the houses of its 
members. When it became clear that the military did not support Banda’s continued rule, 
the dictator was forced to step down and hold free and fair elections.200  
In sum, the bargain that authoritarian leaders strike in fostering representative 
civil-military relations over the long run results in democracy. The lack of factionalism or 
exposure to politics tends to lessen the desire and ability of officers to attempt a regime-
ending coup, leading to relatively stable authoritarian regimes. Yet, if the regime ever 
faces significant pressure for popular reform, the military’s loyalty cannot be counted on. 
When mass popular protests overwhelm the ability of domestic security institutions to 
effectively control them, representative armed forces will usually side with the protestors 
against the authoritarian regime. In essence, authoritarian leaders can ensure relatively 
stable rule, but only by significantly lessening the willingness of the armed forces to 
repress.  The result is usually a transition to democracy.  
And what might be expected concerning the duration of democracies that emerge 
from authoritarian regimes with civil-military institutions? If the duration of Ghanaian, 
Malawian, Tanzanian, Zambian and Malian democracies are any indication, democratic 
regimes that emerge in the aftermath of authoritarian regimes with representative civil-
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military relations are quite stable. The democratic stability that characterizes democracies 
with representative militaries is caused by the same mechanisms that lead representative 
armies to support democratization.  The lack of extensive experience in politics like 
soldiers in military regimes and a lack of ethnic patronage makes soldiers in 
representative armies less likely to cultivate power for themselves and less likely to be 
aligned with a particular political party. Unlike military regimes, representative armies 
lack networks of ambitious, politically experienced soldiers plotting to seize power 
through extra-constitutional means. And unlike ethnic armies, they lack co-ethnic 
allegiances to deposed autocratic rulers. Without the same political or ethnic motivations 
for seizing power, coups are less frequent, and when they do occur, tend to be for other 
reasons. The coup that ended Mali’s democracy in 2012, though it might appear to 
contradict the argument, is actually a case in point. The soldiers who launched the coup 
did not actively seek power, and they did not act on behalf of a particular ethnic group. 
Instead, they were furious over the Malian regime’s inability to supply and equip them 
properly in their fight against northern separatists and al-Qaeda affiliated insurgents. 
They decided to mutiny in protest of poor condition of the army, and the mutiny turned 
into a coup only when Touré and his entourage decided to flee.201   
Moreover, in the cases where the military played an active role in fostering 
democratization, the army can benefit from democratic rule. The benefits can be in terms 
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of prestige, if opposition groups and civil society view the army as a national savior as a 
result of refusing to go along with the dictatorship. In Malawi, the army’s refusal to 
assume total political control during the political transition won it widespread popularity 
within the country, as well as international recognition.202 If the transition involved the 
marginalization or dismantlement of a power internal security apparatus, then the military 
stands to gain more direct corporate and institutional benefits through higher funding or a 
more high-profile role in the security sector. Not only did the Malawian military achieve 
recognition through its role in the country’s democratization, it also saw the complete 
demobilization and disarmament of the Malawian military’s chief institutional rival: the 
MYP. A return to military rule or other forms of dictatorship would likely jeopardize the 
high regard in which Malawians place the military, as well as the institutional benefits the 
military has reaped from democratic rule. 
There are no direct parallels to dictatorships with representative civil-military 
relations as I have conceptualized them here in the academic literature. Nevertheless, 
some of the arguments made here are implicit in the works of other scholars. In his 
notable analysis of the politics of transition from military rule in Brazil, for example, 
Alfred Stepan argued that similar institutional grievances between the internal security 
apparatus and the regular armed forces were a crucial factor in leading the army to 
support the transition.203 Moreover, other scholars have highlighted the importance of 
                                                          
202 Mandiza, “Civil-Military Relations in Malawi,” p. 128. 




fostering ethnically integrated institutions204 or liberal political narratives205 in preventing 
political instability and violence.  
Figure 3.5 illustrates how civilian dictatorships with representative armies follow 
this dissertation’s theoretical framework. Representative civil-military relations occur 
when the military chooses to remain out of power and when the authoritarian leaders 
decide to adopt meritocratic recruitment processes in the armed forces. Though soldiers 
in regimes with representative civil-military relations have little incentive actively seek to 
overthrow the dictatorship, the most common cleavage in such regimes is between the 
armed forces and authoritarian elite. When the dictatorship comes under pressure to 
liberalize, soldiers in representative armies will remain neutral or defect from the 
authoritarian regime by refusing to participate in the repression of opposition groups. As 
a result, dictatorships with representative civil-military relations tend to end with 
transitions to democracies that are quite resilient. The good prospects for democratic 
transition and survival transition means that dictatorships with representative civil-






                                                          
204 Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State.” 
205 Ibid; see also Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in modern 
Africa (Cornell University Press, 2015). 
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The observable implications of my argument are that dictatorships with 
representative militaries are more likely to transition to stable democratic than other kinds 
of regimes. Formally, my hypotheses are:  
H3A:  Authoritarian regimes with representative military institutions are more 
likely than other authoritarian regimes to transition to democracy  
H3B: Democracies that succeed authoritarian regimes with representative military 





3.5: Summary of Analytical Approach 
Table 3.1 combines my observations from the previous sections to summarize my 
argument in full. The argument offers a significant contribution to the existing literature 
by providing an integrated theory on how authoritarian civil-military relations impact the 
military’s role in transitional politics. It demonstrates how contingent choices made by 
authoritarian leaders shape the cleavages and interests that structure civil-military 
relations throughout the duration of the authoritarian regime and beyond. These cleavages 
condition how the military responds at critical junctures during the democratization 
process, when the military’s role monopoly on violence becomes most useful but also 
most dangerous to the continuation of the dictatorship.  
 





The argument further contributes to literatures on military rule and military 
ethnicity, illustrating how neither choice begets a straightforward path to consolidated 
democracy. While military regimes are fairly likely to transition to democracy, the 
democracies that succeed them are unlikely to survive. Regimes with ethnic civil-military 
relations on the whole fare worse, on balance never democratizing in the first place. This 
study’s central outcomes and hypotheses concerning them can thus be condensed into 
three core propositions, each with observable implications:  
1) Democracies which succeed military regimes are unlikely to last long,  
2) Civilian-led regimes with ethnically stacked armies will tend to block 
democratic transitions, and  
3) Civilian led authoritarian regimes without ethnically stacked armies will be 
most likely to transition to stable democracy. 
The remainder of this dissertation is devoted to empirically investigating the 
theory proposed here. In the next chapter, I test the observable implications of the theory 
laid out here using an original database of democratic transitions in Africa between 1990 
and the present day. Though the analysis provides strong evidence in favor of the idea 
that the types of civil-military relations I identify are associated with the transitional 
outcomes argued, the cross-country analysis is not sufficient to identify the precise causal 
mechanisms at work. Instead, qualitative assessments are needed to confirm the extent to 
which the civil-military cleavages I specify, through their impact on the military’s 
behavior at critical junctures, cause the transitional outcomes in the theory. Therefore, the 
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fifth, sixth and seventh chapters extend my argument and use process tracing methods to 
identify the causal mechanisms in three cases with varying democratization outcomes and 
differences in authoritarian civil-military relation type: military regimes in Nigeria, ethnic 




Authoritarian Militaries in Africa and their Discontents: 
Cross-National Patterns of Democratization since 1960 
 
This chapter draws an original database of transitions to and from democracy in 
Africa from 1945 to the present to investigate the core claims of my theory. The 
descriptive statistics and confirmatory analyses largely confirm this project’s hypotheses. 
Military rule and ethnic stacking strongly influenced democratization patterns. Where 
about two-thirds of military regimes resulted in democracy, democracies that succeed 
such regimes last only eight years on average, half the length of other democracies. The 
relationship is evident based on descriptive statistics and statistically significant in every 
regression model used. Likewise, non-military led regimes with ethnic armies 
transitioned to democracy only 20 percent of the time. Depending on the specification, 
regression models indicated that such regimes were between 30 and 60 percent less likely 
than average to permit transitions than other kinds of armies in other authoritarian 
contexts, a finding also robust to every regression specification used.  Democracies 
succeeding regimes with ethnic armies lasted 11 years, about average for all new 
democracies in Africa. Finally, Africa’s autocratic regimes with representative armed 
forces have the surest path to stable democracy. These regimes transition to democracy 
four-fifths of the time, more frequently than other regimes, and democratic settlements 
last nearly 20 years, almost twice as long as average.  
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This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section discusses how 
the database was constructed, the central variables used, and how these variables reflect 
the key concepts in the rest of the dissertation. The second section examines the core 
tenets of the theory using descriptive statistical analysis of authoritarian civil-military 
relations and democratization outcomes. The final section tests the hypotheses made in 
Chapter 3 with cross-country regression analysis, using a full set of controls and a 
combination of models selected to account for various forms of bias and provide easily 
interpretable results.  
 
4.1: Data Collection and Coding Procedures 
To test my core theoretical claims, I compiled and expanded on existing data 
relating to democratic transitions, democratic duration, military rule, ethnic stacking, 
military institution type. The data was culled principally from pre-existing data sets, but 
supplemented by scholarly accounts, newspaper articles, and reference books. Table 1 
indicates the study’s independent, dependent, and control variables, offering a brief 
description of each and stating the principal scholarly source, if applicable. In this 
section, I describe the key concepts, definitions, and coding techniques associated with 
the study’s independent, outcome, and control variables. The two major outcome 
variables of interest to this study include transition percentage, which denotes whether an 
authoritarian regime resulted in democracy, and democratic duration, which measures the 
length of emerging democratic regimes. The independent variables of interest include 
military capabilities and military institution type, which are coded based on the 
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interaction of institutionalized military rule and ethnic stacking. Control variables 
included per capita income and income growth, oil and mineral wealth, colonial status, 
transitional conflict, previous coup attempts, and ethnic fractionalization and dominance.  
  
Table 4.1: Independent, Outcome and Control Variables 
Variable Description Source(s) 
Independent Variables 
Ethnic Stacking Whether authoritarian leaders attempt to create 




Whether a group of military officers is 
responsible for decision-making 
Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014 
Military 
Institution Type 
Categorical variable measured with categories 
including: institutionalized military rule, 
civilian dictatorship w/ ethnic army, civilian 
dictatorship w/ civil army 
Harkness 2012; Geddes, Wright 
and Frantz 2014; various 





Whether authoritarian regime resulted in a 
democratic transition or a blocked transition 
Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 
2016); Geddes, Wright and 
Frantz 2014; various scholarly 




Duration of democratic regime succeeding 
transition 
Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 
2016); Geddes, Wright and 
Frantz 2014; various scholarly 
accounts, reference and news 
sources 
Control / Conditioning Variables 
Military 
Capabilities 
Measured as: 1) military expenditure as a 
percent of GDP, and 2) military expenditure per 
soldier 
International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Stockholm 
International Peace Research 
Institute 
Economic 
growth / size 
GDP or one-year change in GDP at time of 
transition / end of democratic regime 
World Bank 2016 World 
Development Indicators 
Oil/Mineral 
Wealth   
Whether or minerals constitutes “major” or 
“principal” export of a given country 
Harkness 2016 
Colonial Status Indicator based on whether country was former 






Indicator based on whether deaths occurred 
during the transition 
Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014 
Previous Coup 
Attempts Number of coup attempts in past ten years Marshall and Marshall 2016 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
Probability that two randomly selected 
individuals belong to different ethnic groups 
Alesina et al 2003 
Ethnic 
Dominance Percentage of population of largest ethnic group Alesina et al 2003 
 
 
4.1.1: The Outcome Variables: Democratic Transition and Duration 
To code transitions to and from democracy, I draw primarily on the work of the 
Polity IV project and the recent database of Barbara Geddes, Erica Frantz and Joseph 
Wright on authoritarian transitions. To define and measure democracy, I relied on the 
Polity IV project, which defines democracy as “1) the presence of institutions and 
procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative 
policies and leaders and 2) in which there exist institutionalized constraints on the 
executive power by the executive.” The Polity IV uses a composite indicator to measure 
both the expression of citizen preferences and constraints on the executive on a twenty-
point scale. Democracies receive a positive score; autocracies receive a negative score.206   
I chose to use Polity IV for two principal reasons. First, Polity IV contains data on 
democracy dating back to 1800, making it the most historically comprehensive database 
available. Other commonly used measures of democratization, such as the Freedom 
                                                          
206 See Monty Marshall, Ted Gurr and Keith Jaggers. “Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual,” (Center 
for Systemic Peace, 2016). 
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House rankings, do not have anywhere near the same level of historical coverage. 
Second, Polity IV’s primary focus on political participation and constraints creates a 
considerable amount of variation on the dependent variable in Africa. Since few African 
countries meet more maximalist definitions of democracy that include civil and political 
liberties or economic rights such as health care and universal education, a more 
minimalist definition of democracy is appropriate.  
The use of the Polity data allowed the adoption of straightforward coding 
procedures to measure transitions to and from democracy. A transition is coded as a 
“democratic transition” in one of two cases: 1) a country previously receiving a negative 
polity score during one year receives a score of zero or above the following year; or 2) a 
country with a previously negative polity score enters a period of interregnum or 
transition, followed by a positive polity score.207 The democracy is coded to have begun 
the first year of the “transition” and after the interregnum. The reverse is true for 
democratic collapse. A democracy is coded to have ended if 1) a country previously 
receiving a positive polity score during one year receives a score of negative one or 
below the following year; or 2) a country with a previously positive polity score enters a 
period of interregnum or transition, followed by a negative polity score. In these cases, 
the democracy is considered to have ended at the onset of the interregnum or transition 
                                                          
207 The Polity IV codebook identifies three cases in which it does not assign a Polity score: interruption, 
interregnum, and transition periods. Interruption periods occur in the case of occupation by foreign powers 
or during the establishment or attempted establishment of ethnic, religious or regional federations. 
Interregnum periods refer to the total collapse of centralized political authority. A “transition” is a period 
during which new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect. See Marshall et al, 
“Polity IV Project,” p. 19. 
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period. In a small number of cases, a democracy was also considered to have collapsed if 
the government falls to an insurgency.  
Ghana is a country that has experienced each of the kinds of transitions to and 
from democracy outlined above. After the 1996 elections, won by Flight Lieutenant Jerry 
Rawlings, the country received a Polity score of 2, up from the score of -1 it received 
during the 1992 elections, also won by Rawlings. Ghana is therefore coded as having 
transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy after the 1996 elections. In 1969, Ghana 
entered a period of interregnum as the military government held the country’s first 
competitive elections since 1956. Upon Kofia Busia’s assumption of power in 1970, the 
regime became a democracy, with a Polity score of 3, up from the -7 it received prior to 
the period of interregnum. After Busia fell victim to a coup in 1972, Ghana’s Polity score 
plummeted back down to -7 in 1972, ending democracy.  
I code a “blocked” transition as occurring in one of two cases: 1) a country with a 
previously negative polity score enters a period of transition or interregnum and emerges 
with a negative polity score; or 2) one authoritarian regime is replaced by another. The 
first type of case was coded using Polity data. An example is Gabon, when authoritarian 
president Omar Bongo was elected to a third term as president after a period during 
which elections were organized and the country undertook some political reform. The 
change in Polity score from -9 to -4 after a one-year transition period in 1993 was not 
enough to change Gabon’s status as an authoritarian regime. The transition was thus 
coded as “blocked.” 
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To code instances where one authoritarian government is replaced by another, I 
relied on the dataset of Geddes, Frantz and Wright, which measures regime changes to 
and from democracies and between different forms of autocracy as changes between the 
small “leadership group” who makes a country’s most important decisions.208 As Geddes 
and her colleagues argue, making this distinction, which is responsible for a little less 
than half of all transitions, is crucial to understanding why autocracy leads to democracy 
in some cases but not in others. I manually extended to 2015 the database of Geddes and 
her colleagues, which previously ran to 2010. An example of this type of transition is 
Libya, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi’s 1969 coup replaced the monarchy of Idris I. 
Because the leadership group of the authoritarian regime changed without resulting in 
democracy, the transition is considered “blocked.” 
The resulting dataset yields 92 cases of transition in Africa since 1960, 44 of 
which resulted in transitions to democracy and 48 of which resulted in blocked 
transitions. As of the end of 2016, 8 current regimes in Africa have never experienced a 
transition in Africa and are considered “founding” regimes.209 These regimes are 
included in calculations on democratic transitions, but not transitions.  Due to data 
limitations and the manifestly different nature of colonial rule, this article does not 
consider transitions immediately following the collapse of colonialism, instead 
considering such regimes to be founding governments. 
                                                          
208 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A 
New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 2 (2014), p. 315.  
209 These include Eritrea, Botswana, Mauritius, Swaziland, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, and the 
Gambia. See Appendix B for full list of countries and transitions.  
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4.1.2: Independent Variables: Military Rule, Ethnic Stacking and Authoritarian Civil-
Military Relations 
Two key concepts, military regimes and ethnic stacking, are central to my project 
and are used to derive the authoritarian civil-military relations (authoritarian CMR), this 
study’s main independent variable. This project follows Geddes in defining military rule 
as “a group of officers that determines who will lead the country and has some influence 
on policy,” and in arguing that the distinction between military and other forms of rule 
has important consequences for a regime’s prospects and opportunities for 
democratization.210 The coding for this variable is mostly drawn from the work of 
Geddes, Frantz and Wright, and extended to cover from 2010 to 2015 as well as countries 
with fewer than one million people.  
To define and measure the degree of ethnic imbalances within the armed forces, I 
draw on and extend the data of Kristen Harkness, who examines the role of ethnic armies 
in African politics post-colonialization and in constitutional transfers of power. Harkness 
identifies two strategies that African leaders use to build co-ethnic armed forces: 1) 
restructuring the officer corps of an existing army along co-ethnic lines or 2) constructing 
co-ethnic parallel military institutions, such as presidential guards and militias, and 
                                                          
210 Geddes, Barbara Geddes. “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” Annual 
Review of Political Science 2.1 (1999), p. 124. Some border-line cases exist, which the authors cross-coded 
as combinations of different categories of authoritarian regimes. One example is Egypt from 1952-2011, 
which Geddes and her colleagues coded as “t-threat” to indicate that the regime combined elements of 
institutionalized military, single party, and personalist rule.  For consistency’s sake, I chose to always code 
such cases as “institutionalized military regimes.” See Geddes, Wright, and Frantz. “Autocratic Breakdown 




disarming the regular military.211 Following Harkness, I refer to either of these two 
strategies “ethnic” or “sectarian” stacking. Harkness’ data extends from only from 1960 
to 2010 and covers a limited number of countries, so additional efforts were made to fill 
in missing data through consulting other scholars, news sources, and archives around the 
time of the transition periods in question.  
Authoritarian civil-military relation type, my primary independent variable, was 
coded based on Table 2, which characterizes all authoritarian regimes in Africa since 
independence based on whether the armed forces were in power or whether they were 
subject to ethnic stacking. The characterization was based on an expanded dataset drawn 
from the work of both Harkness, Polity IV, and Geddes and her colleagues. Ethnic 
stacking accompanied by civilian rule is most common form of civil-military relations 
under authoritarianism in Africa, comprising 41 different authoritarian regimes. I refer to 
these as ethnic civil-military relations or ethnic armies. The next most common regime 
type was the military regime, which occurred in 35 cases.212 In 16 regimes, a civilian has 
ruled without creating co-ethnic military institutions, creating representative civil-
military relations or representative armies. A full list of regime-spells included, their 
coding, and transition outcomes can be found in Appendix B.  
 
                                                          
211 Kristen Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of 
Democratization in Africa.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 4 (June 1, 2016), p. 594. 
212 Note that in nearly all cases of military rule, sectarian stacking occurred as well. This makes military 
rule without sectarian stacking in Africa for all intents and purposes an empty set, occurring in only three 


























       Source: Frantz, Geddes and Wright 2014; Harkness 2016; 
       Marshall and Jaggers 2016; author’s own coding 
 
I contend that by treating each of the types of armies I identify above as distinct 
analytical categories, we gain significant analytical leverage and concerning under what 
circumstances the armed forces is likely to support democratic transitions and allow 
democracies to survive.  
 
4.1.3: Control Variables 
In the cross-country regression analysis, I adopted a series of controls selected 
both for theoretical significance and for common use in other studies of both 
democratization and military intervention. These control variables include: 1) Military 
capabilities; 2) GDP per capita and GDP growth, commonly found by scholars to be 
strongly associated both with democratic transition and democratic collapse; 3) whether 
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or not the country had significant oil or natural mineral wealth, commonly found to 
impede democratization; 4) former colonial status; 5) number of coups in the previous ten 
years; and 6) whether the period of transition was accompanied by conflict.  
I adopt two variables with which I proxy for military capabilities. The first is 
military spending as a percentage of GDP, drawn from the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2016 database. This measure is fairly commonly used 
in previous studies in Africa and elsewhere that have attempted to examine the 
relationship between military resources and political transitions.213 The second variable 
included is military spending per soldier, with estimates on the number of soldiers per 
country drawn from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 2016 global 
military balances data. This second measure is far less commonly used.214 It is, however, 
argued by some scholars to be a good measure of military professionalism, reflecting the 
idea that modern armies tend to rely more on equipment, technology and training than on 
raw manpower.215 The data on military capacity only extends back to 1988, so it is not 
used in all regressions.  
                                                          
213 See, for example, Gavin Kennedy, The Military and the Third World (Duckworth and Co., 1974); 
Robert Jackman, “The Predictability of Coups d’Etat: A Model with African Data.” The American Political 
Science Review 72.04 (1978), pp. 1262 - 1275; Craig Jenkins, and Augustine J. Kposowa. “The Political 
Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic Competition, Military Centrality, and the Struggle over the 
Postcolonial State.” International Studies Quarterly 36.3 (1992), pp. 271–291; Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler, “Coup Traps: Why Does Africa Have So Many Coups d’État?” Centre for the Study of African 
Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford. 
214 For two exceptions, see Jonathan Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups 
d’État," Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 6 (2012) and Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State.” 




 One of the most well-established findings in the literature is that economic 
prosperity and democratization are closely related processes. Cross-nationally, 
democracy is strongly correlated with income.216 Higher-income countries are both more 
likely to transition to democracy, and more likely to remain democracies.217  Low-
income democracies are particularly vulnerable to collapse if they fail to achieve 
consistent economic growth218 or as a result of an economic crisis.219 Therefore, this 
study uses both GDP per capita and GDP growth as control variables. Income-related 
variables are measured at the time of transition for the models on democratic transition, 
and at the time of collapse or using the most recent information available for the models 
on democratic duration.  
Another well-established finding in the literature is that significant oil and mineral 
wealth impede democracy, a phenomenon known as the “resource curse.” Numerous 
cross-national studies find strong linkages between oil and mineral wealth and 
authoritarianism220 among other negative outcomes including civil war221 and low 
                                                          
216 Seymour Martin Lipsett, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53.01 (1959), pp. 69–105; Adam Przeworski and 
Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49, no.2 (1997), pp. 155–83. 
217 Preworski and Limongi, “Modernization.” 
218 Ibid.  
219 Mark Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History 
Analysis" American political science review 89, no. 04 (1995), pp. 882-897; Jan Teorell, Determinants of 
Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972–2006, (Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
220 See, for example, Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World, " Arab Studies 
Quarterly (1987), pp. 383-398; Terry Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Univ of 
California Press, 1997); Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001), pp. 
325–61; Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon. "Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in 
Africa." Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 7 (2004), pp. 816-841.  
221 James Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, "American Political Science 




economic growth.222 For the purposes of this study, a country was considered a major oil 
or mineral exporter if, according to the most recent publicly available figures, oil or 
mineral exports constituted greater than five percent of GDP. As with the income 
controls, these figures were measured either at the time of transition, collapse, or using 
the most recent data available.  
Third, a common argument in the Africanist literature is that patterns of state 
formation have been uniquely influenced by Africa’s colonial history.223 The French, 
with the development of the West Africa currency union and a persistent pattern of 
military support for intervention, have remained particularly economically and militarily 
active in former colonies. This project follows a wide range of scholars studying both 
military intervention and democratization in Africa and controls for the unique influences 
of former colonies by including a dummy variable indicating whether the country was a 
former British or French colony.  
Finally, I included controls for the number of coup attempts in the previous ten 
years and a dummy variable to denote whether the transition was accompanied by 
                                                          
War." Oxford Economic Papers 56.04 (2004), pp. 563-595. Michael L. Ross, "What Do We Know about 
Natural Resources and Civil War?" Journal of Peace Research 41.03. 3 (2004), pp. 337-356. 
222 Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann, "Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and 
Economic Growth" (International Monetary Fund, 1999). Richard Auty (ed.), Resource Abundance and 
Economic Development (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
223 See Ali Mazrui, “Francophone Nations and English-Speaking States: Imperial Ethnicity and African 
Political Formations,” In Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola (eds.), State versus Ethnic Claims: 
African Policy Dilemmas (Westview Press, 1983) and Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in 




conflict to account for reverse causality.224 The literature on military intervention 
establishes a strong relationship between present and past coup attempts.225 Likewise, 
emerging democracies are far more likely to succumb to conflict than other regime types. 
It is therefore possible that transitions to and from democracy could be influenced by 
previous coup history or by transitional conflict rather than pre-existing military 
institutions. The coup data was drawn from Monty and Marshall’s data, which covers 
from 1945-2015.226 The data on transitional conflict was drawn from Geddes, Frantz and 
Wright, who denote whether the transitions in their database resulted in any deaths.227 
 
4.2: Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
In this section, I examine the relationships between military rule, ethnic stacking 
and democratization in Africa using descriptive statistics. This project’s hypotheses are 
reproduced in Table 1 below. The key implications of my theory are: 1) African countries 
with ethnic armed forces are unlikely to transition to democracy, 2) that democracies that 
succeed authoritarian regimes with political armies are unlikely to survive, and 3) 
authoritarian regimes with civil-military institutions will be both more likely to transition 
                                                          
224 For more on the tendency of emerging democracies to become engaged in conflict, see Mansfield, 
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder. Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (MIT Press, 
2005). 
225 Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer. "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 47, no. 5 (2003), pp. 594-620; Collier and Hoeffler, “Coup Traps.” 
226 Monty Marshall, "Coup D’État Events, 1946-2015” (Center for Systemic Peace, 2016). 
227 See Geddes, Wright and Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown.” 
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and to survive. These hypotheses are tested on an original database of African transitions 
dating back to 1960. 
 
Table 4.3: Authoritarian Civil-Military Relations and Predicted Transition Paths 
 
Authoritarian 










Military divided along personal, 








Military divided along ethnic 








United military little used in 
internal police action 
Democratic 
Stability 
Most likely Most stable 
 
The descriptive results concerning the effect of military rule and ethnic stacking 
on democratization outcomes are illustrated in Table 4.4. Countries experiencing military 
rule transitioned to democracy two-thirds of the time, whereas those with ethnic stacking 
in their military institutions transitioned somewhat more than one-third of the time. By 
contrast, institutionalized military rule resulted in democracy two-thirds of the time; the 
average was half. Democracies that succeeded countries experiencing military rule or 







Table 4.4: Democratization Outcomes of Countries Experiencing Military Rule & Ethnic Stacking, 
1945-2015 
Armed Forces Type Democratic transition (%) Democratic survival (yrs) 
 
Military Rule (n=35) 66% 8 
 






Though these results support my hypotheses overall, they understate the 
magnitude of the effects of pre-existing military institutions on democratic change. The 
main reason for this is that ethnic stacking, which occurred in over 80 percent of all 
cases, is far too common to provide meaningful variation on the outcomes of interest. 
When the descriptive statistics are further disaggregated to reflect this project’s central 
hypotheses, which represent military rule and civilian institutions with ethnic stacking as 
distinct analytical categories, the results are even more compelling.  
 Table 4.5 presents descriptive statistics describing democratization patterns of 
authoritarian regimes disaggregated by the typology of military, ethnic, and 
representative civil-military relations. The results confirm my hypotheses and assert a 
powerful association between authoritarian military institutions and democratic transition 
patterns. 23 of the 35 regimes in Africa (66 percent) that experienced military rule ended 
in democracy. However, these 23 regimes have lasted only eight years on average, three 
years less than average and half as long as authoritarian regimes with civil-military 
institutions. These results provide strong evidence to support my argument that 
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authoritarian regimes with political militaries tend to follow transition paths of 
democratic instability.  
Likewise, the descriptive evidence supports my argument that the most frequent 
outcome for civilian-led authoritarian regimes with ethnic stacking is to foreclose 
democratization before it begins.  Only seven of the forty-one authoritarian regimes (17 
percent) with ethnic armed forces ended in a democratic transition, three times less than 
the average and with four or five times less frequency than other authoritarian regimes. 
Despite the small sample size, the seven democracies that succeeded such regimes lasted 
an average of 11 years, the same as the average length for democracies that succeed 
authoritarian regimes of all kinds. This renders democracies following regimes with 
ethnic civil-military relations more likely to survive than democracies that succeed 
military rule and less likely to survive than democracies that succeed authoritarian 
regimes with representative-military institutions.  
The 16 cases where the military managed to stay out of power and avoid 
polarizing the armed forces along ethnic lines had by far the easiest path to democracy. 
13 out of 16 authoritarian regimes (82 percent) with representative civil-military 
institutions transitioned to democracy. Democratic settlements that result from regimes 
with representative armies last 16 years on average, five years longer than those that 
succeeded regimes with ethnic military institutions and eight years longer than those that 
succeeded military rule. If the founding extant democracies with representative civil-
military relations of Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, and Liberia are 































































         
         Sources include: Harkness 2016; Geddes et al 2012; Marshall and Jaggers 2016 
  
The descriptive statistics, then, are consistent with my argument that military 
regimes tend to follow paths of democratic instability, regimes with ethnic civil-military 
relations paths of democratic obstruction, and regimes with representative civil-military 
relations paths of democratic stability. We now examine whether these descriptive 
relations are able to withstand the scrutiny of more rigorous forms of analysis. 
 
4.3: Regression Analysis 
This section tests my theory through cross-country regression analysis of the 
relationship between military institutions under authoritarianism and subsequent 
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democratization patterns. Several different measurement strategies were applied to each 
outcome of interest. First, both ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression were 
employed to test hypotheses concerning democratic transition. Each model employs a 
binary outcome denoting whether the transition to democracy was successful or blocked. 
The coefficients on the OLS model can therefore be interpreted as probabilities.   
For the hypotheses on democratic duration, it is not appropriate to use OLS with a 
count of years as the outcome variable. This is because the data includes 40 extant 
African democracies for which information about their ultimate prospects for survival is 
incomplete. Therefore, hypotheses are tested using a 1) a linear probability model with a 
binary variable denoting whether the democracy lasted ten or more years; and 2) a right-
censored duration (Weibull) model, with the outcome variable denoting the number of 
years a democracy survived or is likely to survive. The use of each of these models has 
benefits and drawbacks. Though an improvement over OLS, the linear probability model 
may still produce biased results for the nine democracies within the dataset that have 
democratized within the previous ten years. The survival model, by contrast, estimates 
the likely survival time for extant democracies by treating surviving democracies as right-
censored. It should produce the least biased estimates that retain the most information, 
and has been employed by several previous scholars interested in measuring democratic 
survival.228  
                                                          
228 See Harkness, “Coup Traps” and Michael Bernhard, Timothy Nordstrom, and Christopher Reenock, 
"Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic Survival." Journal of Politics 63, no. 
3 (2001), pp. 775-803. 
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The independent variables in the analysis are indicator variables constructed from 
Table 4. For all models, I used categorical dummies to denote authoritarian regimes 
under military rule (military); civilian-ruled authoritarian regimes with ethnic stacking 
(ethnic); and civilian-led regimes without ethnic stacking (representative). About half of 
the models include military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the log of military 
expenditure per soldier. This data is only available post-1988, so it is not included in all 
regressions. 
The results confirm the findings of the descriptive statistics. Authoritarian 
regimes with ethnic armed forces are far less likely to transition to democracy than 
authoritarian regimes with different military institutions. The OLS model indicates that 
ethnic armed forces are between 47 to 64 percent less likely to permit transitions to 
democracy than representative military institutions, the significance of which is also 
confirmed in the logistic regressions (see Table 4.6). The coefficient is strongly 
statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of military expenditures and other 
controls. The small decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient when military spending 
is included is likely due to the smaller number of post-1988 observations included in the 
regressions with military spending. Unsurprisingly, Wald tests further confirmed that 
democratic transitions were significantly less likely to occur in authoritarian regimes with 
ethnic armies than when following military rule.229 The evidence is therefore quite 
                                                          
229 For both OLS and logistic regression models, the Wald statistic was above 6 and significant at a one 
percent level.  
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convincing that ethnic armies are less likely to countenance transitions to democracy than 
their counterparts in military regimes and representative-military institutions.  
The results also support the argument that military regimes are less likely to 
permit transition to democracy than representative ones. Though the difference between 
representative civil-military relations and military regimes is statistically significant at the 
10 percent level only when the full-set of non-military expenditure controls are included, 
the co-efficient is negative in every model. In the models with more than 70 observations, 
military regimes are between 16 and 28 percent less likely to support democratic 
transitions than regimes with representative civil-military relations. In sum, the regression 
results confirm this dissertation’s central hypotheses: authoritarian regimes with 
representative armies are most likely to transition to democracy, followed by military 
regimes, followed by authoritarian regimes with ethnic armies, who are by a considerable 
margin least likely to be succeeded by democracy.  
Oil production, military spending as a percentage of GDP, GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, previous coup history, ethnic fractionalization, and whether the transition was 
accompanied by a civil war show no relation to the probability of a democratic transition 
in either model. French and British colonial rule are associated with a stronger probability 
of transition to democracy in the model without military expenditure data included but 
have little relation post-1988. Though the coefficient on military expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP is positive in all models, it is not statistically significant in both the 
OLS and the logit models when the full set of controls are included. This association 
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would indicate, quite reasonably, that British and French colonial policy had a stronger 
influence on democratization patterns shortly after independence.    
The main findings from the cross-country analysis on democratic transitions are 
illustrated in Figure 4.1, which is a dot-whisker plot showing the point estimates and 90 
percent confidence intervals for the OLS regressions with a fully specified set of controls 
(model 4 in Table 4.6).230 The coefficients whose confidence intervals do not touch zero 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The small sample size does, however, 
lead to high variances and confidence intervals. Even the confidence interval on ethnic 
armies, for example, is wide̶—between approximately 30 percent and 90 percent. 
Nevertheless, support for the study’s central argument is evident. Regimes with ethnic 
armies are significantly less likely and regimes with military governments marginally less 
likely than representative military institutions to permit democratic transitions. Former 
British colonies are significantly more likely to democratize, and all other factors are 
insignificant.  
                                                          
230 The 90 percent confidence interval is 1.65 times the standard error, which are in parentheses in Table 7. 
This model included data from 1960-2015, which meant leaving out the military expenditure data.  
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Table 4.6: Determinants of Democratization in Africa, 1960-2015 
   
 Dependent variable:       Probability of Democratic Transition 
 OLS logistic 
Independent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ethnic -0.593*** -0.474** -0.640*** -0.490** -2.937** -3.636*** -5.111* 
 (0.130) (0.196) (0.157) (0.229) (1.420) (1.226) (2.625) 
Military Rule -0.146 -0.159 -0.284* -0.013 -1.522 -1.969 -1.114 
 (0.132) (0.168) (0.161) (0.223) (1.355) (1.218) (1.610) 
Military Expenditure/GDP  -0.082*  -0.017 -0.493*  -0.383 
  (0.044)  (0.066) (0.272)  (0.394) 
Military Expenditure/Soldier  0.016  -0.013 0.094  0.203 
  (0.078)  (0.134) (0.484)  (0.704) 
LnGDP/Capita(2010)   -0.074   -0.156  
   (0.083)   (0.489)  
GDP Growth   -0.002 -0.006  -0.007 -0.021 
   (0.005) (0.011)  (0.032) (0.059) 
Oil Producer   -0.100 -0.318  -0.994 -2.876 
   (0.142) (0.189)  (0.848) (1.757) 
British Colony   0.466*** 0.185  1.977** 1.106 
   (0.169) (0.306)  (0.869) (2.134) 
French Colony   0.250* 0.111   1.639 
   (0.150) (0.273)   (1.937) 
Fractionalization   -0.198 0.181  -0.475 2.300 
   (0.245) (0.388)  (1.319) (2.394) 
#Coups(<10yrs)   -0.017 -0.030  -0.105  
   (0.035) (0.056)  (0.196)  
Transitional Conflict   -0.094 -0.223  -0.877  
   (0.125) (0.217)  (0.692)  
Constant 0.813*** 0.939 1.404** 1.028 2.919 4.488 1.329 
 (0.110) (0.666) (0.569) (1.097) (4.305) (3.479) (6.084) 
Observations 93 35 72 34 35 72 35 
R2 0.249 0.305 0.364 0.467    
Adjusted R2 0.232 0.212 0.260 0.200    
Log Likelihood     -15.977 -34.908 -12.772 




Figure 4.1: Dot-Whisker Plot of Linear Regression on Authoritarian Civil-Military Relations and 
Transitional Probabilities (Model 4)  
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The data on democratic consolidation in Africa also lends support to the findings 
of the descriptive statistics. Democracies that succeed military regimes last far shorter 
than democracies that succeed authoritarian regimes with representative military 
institutions (see Table 4.7). Democracies that succeed military regimes are between 30 
and 40 percent less likely to last more than 10 years compared to other democracies. The 
finding that democracies that succeed military rule in Africa are fated to end early was 
robust to every specification. Monte Carlo simulations run using the survival model 
(Model 7 in Table 4.7) predicts particularly vast differences; in 100,000 simulations, the 
average length of survival drops by close to 60 years when a regime changes from 
military to non-military rule while holding other variables constant at their means (see 
Figure 4.2). Only in the linear probability model, when included with the limited data on 
military expenditure (n=24), does the significance drop below the one percent level.   
The empirical results offer somewhat more qualified support for the argument that 
democracies that succeed military regimes last less long than those that succeed 
authoritarian regimes with ethnic armies. In all but the regression model with the post-
1988 expenditure data, the co-efficient on ethnic armies is less than the co-efficient on 
military rule. In the bivariate model with the full set of controls (Model 5), the coefficient 
on military regimes, while slightly smaller than that on ethnic armies, is not significantly 
different. In the hazard model, the coefficient on military rule is substantially smaller and 
the difference is significant (Model 7).231 Likewise, the results offer qualified support for 
                                                          
231 In the linear probability model, the Wald statistic was 0.15 and the p value was only 0.69. For the hazard 
model, the Wald statistic was 9.6 and the p-value was 0.0019.  
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the argument that democracies that succeed ethnic armies last less long than those 
succeeding authoritarian regimes with representative military institutions. In all OLS 
models and the bivariate hazard model, the coefficient on ethnic is negative and 
significant. In the hazard model with the full set of controls, the coefficient remains 
negative but is statistically insignificant (Model 7).  
In sum, the empirical results offer strong support for the argument that 
democracies that succeed military regimes are less likely to survive. They offer more 
qualified support for the predictions on the relative difference in survival probabilities of 
democracies following dictatorships with representative and ethnic armies in relation to 
one another and in relation to military regimes. In most but not all models, democracies 
succeeding authoritarian regimes with representative civil-military relations last longer 
than regimes with ethnic civil-military relations, which themselves last longer than those 
succeeding military regimes. These latter differences were in turn not always significant.  
As with the models on democratic transition, few of the controls are statistically 
significant, and the controls that are significant are not robust to specification. In the 
linear probability model but not the hazard model, former British and French colonies are 
positively associated with the length of democracy. Likewise, the military expenditure 
per soldier appears to have a positive effect on the duration of democracy in the hazard 
but not the linear probability model. The number of coups in the past 10 years also has a 
borderline statistically significant positive correlation in the OLS models. Given the lack 
of consistency for each of these variables, their robustness is suspect. None of the other 
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controls influence democratic duration patterns, and none of the controls are statistically 
significant in any of the survival models.  
To conclude, despite very different assumptions and the high degree of variance 
in the models used, there is robust empirical support for this project’s argument 
concerning the relationship between authoritarian civil-military relations and democratic 
survival. Cross-national regression analysis indicates that democracies that succeed 
military regimes have the shortest lifespans, those that succeed regimes with ethnic 
armies last a moderate length of time, and democracies that succeed regimes with 




Table 4.7: Determinants of Democratic Duration in Africa, 1960-2015 
 
 
                                                  Dependent 
variable: 







      Hazard Ratio 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
Ethnic -9.611** -0.500***  -0.798** -0.512** -2.028** -1.121    
 (3.781) (0.173)  (0.343) (0.219) (0.810) (0.858)    
Military  -12.722*** -0.548***  -0.404* 
-
0.611*** 
-2.602*** -1.873***    
 (2.914) (0.134)  (0.207) (0.198) (0.896) (0.878)    
Military Exp/ 
GDP 
  0.014 0.032    -0.191 0.0126  
  (0.085) (0.080)    (0.500) (0.607)  
Military Exp/ 
Soldier 
  0.159 0.125    0.848*** 0.819***  
  (0.100) (0.097)    (0.225) (0.283)  
LnGDP/Capita 
(2010) 
    -0.025  .0003    
    (0.131)  (.0002)    
GDP Growth     -0.006  0.025  0.001  
     (0.009)  (0.021)  (0.062)  
Oil Producer     -0.169  -0.263  -0.323  
     (0.207)  (0.514)  (0.924)  
British Colony     0.770***  0.111    
     (0.277)  (0.795)    
French Colony     0.670**  -0.126    
     (0.256)  (0.855)    
Fractionalizati
on 
    0.301 
 1.194  0.736  
     (0.308)  (1.333)  (1.823)  
#Coups(<10yr
s) 
    0.087* 
 0.202    
     (0.050)  (0.129)    
Transitional 
Conflict 
    0.283  -0.772    
    (0.186)  (0.708)    
Constant 20.722*** 0.722*** -0.978 -0.481 -0.023 5.257*** 3.287*** -2.877  -3.145  
 (2.183) (0.100) (0.937) (0.910) (0.880) (0.784) (1.162) (1.906) (2.209)  
Log(scale) 









Observations 50 50 25 25 40 50 38 25 24  
R2 0.294 0.281 0.105 0.361 0.408      
Adjusted R2 0.264 0.250 0.024 0.233 0.204      
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Figure 4.2: Predicted Duration of Democracies Following Military Rule (Y|X) and Other 
Authoritarian Regimes (Y|X1) Holding Other Variables at Means, 100,000 Simulations 
  
 
To verify the findings in the previous section, Table 4.8 displays the results of 
four series of robustness checks. First, I re-ran the transition regressions with the outcome 
variable as the absolute change in polity score pre-and post-transition. The change in 
specification of the outcome variable adds information on how different authoritarian 
military institutions affect the quality rather than just the presence of democracy in 
regimes that succeed them. As expected, regimes with ethnic civil-military relations have 
the most negative coefficient and are succeeded by regimes that are more than six points 
less democratic than average on the polity scale.  
Second, I adopted a more restrictive definition of democracy, dropping the use of 
polity scores altogether and instead measuring transitions to and from democracy from 
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Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s 2012 data. This resulted in a net loss of 18 cases from the 
data on democratic transition and 12 cases from the data on democratic duration. For both 
the transition and duration models, the results were the same; authoritarian regimes with 
ethnic armies were far less likely to result in democracy, whereas democracies 
succeeding military regimes were far less likely to survive. Taken together, the first two 
series of results provide strong evidence that my findings are robust to different 
conceptualizations and measures of democracy. 
Third, I further restricted the sample to remove any cases where I added new data 
or where I modified data from original sources due to suspected coding errors. This 
resulted was the removal of an additional 18 cases from the transitions data and nine 
cases from the duration data, both due to unavailable or unclear data on ethnic stacking, 
military rule, or democratic outcomes. The results remain unchanged: authoritarian 
regimes with ethnic armies are less likely to democratize, and democracies following 
regimes are less likely to remain democracies. The results of these robustness checks 
suggest that the results found were not due to differences in coding procedures between 
this study and previous ones or due to suspected coding errors. 
A final series of robustness checks was run adopting the restrictive definition of 
democracy and the restricted sample. Though the results are the same, small sample sizes 
limited the number of controls I was able to include in the analysis. The duration result in 
particular, with the very high coefficient on political armies and a sample size of only 21, 




                        Table 4.8: Robustness Checks 
     
 Change in 
Polity Score 
GWF Coding No additional cases 


















Ethnic -6.412*** -0.767***  -0.605***  -0.641**  
 (1.833) (0.182)  (0.186)  (0.242)  
Military -3.366* -0.228 -2.017*** -0.285 -3.768*** -0.172 -20.520*** 
 (1.875) (0.190) (0.653) (0.183) (1.130) (0.249) (2.808) 
LnGDP/Capita 0.115 -0.047 0.001 -0.123  -0.178  
(2010) (0.975) (0.121) (0.002) (0.101)  (0.155)  
GDP Growth 0.061 -0.007 -0.205 -0.002  -0.006  
 (0.060) (0.008) (0.175) (0.005)  (0.009)  
Oil Producer -1.970 -0.059 -2.373 0.040 0.3565 0.015 0.385 
 (1.658) (0.167) (1.151) (0.156) (1.009) (0.192) (0.556) 
British Colony 4.723** 0.309 0.740 0.532*** 0.774 0.474* 0.198 
 (1.969) (0.192) (2.069) (0.192) (1.739) (0.236) (1.278) 
French Colony 1.985 0.028 1.410 0.205 0.0813 0.176 -0.455  
 (1.746) (0.174) (3.421) (0.165) (1.764) (0.214) (1.202) 
Fractionalization 1.914 0.232 1.300 -0.230 -2.788 0.103 -0.544 
 (2.860) (0.343) (4.596) (0.315) (2.499) (0.411) (1.811) 
#Coups(<10yrs) -0.113 -0.022 -0.042 -0.010 -0.075 -0.018  
 (0.408) (0.039) (0.282) (0.039) (0.434) (0.046)  
Transitional 
Conflict 
-0.391 -0.100 -1.467 -0.113 -0.317 -0.179  
(1.455) (0.143) (1.472) (0.137) (1.450) (0.173)  
Constant 6.280 0.990 2.037** 1.641** 7.747*** 1.740* 22.712 











Observations 72 54 22 54 29 43 21 
R2 0.332 0.459  0.413  0.421  
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.333  0.277  0.240  
    
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Overall, the descriptive and cross-national regression analysis presented in this 
chapter is strongly supportive of the three central arguments I advance in this dissertation. 
Consistent with my argument that regimes with ethnic civil-military relations lead to 
patterns of democratic obstruction, such regimes are far less likely to transition to 
democracy than other kinds of authoritarian regimes. Consistent with the argument that 
military regimes engender democratic instability, such regimes are fairly likely to 
transition to democracy, which are far more prone to collapse. Finally, consistent with the 
argument that regimes whose armies neither rule nor are ethnically stacked have the 
surest path to democracy, authoritarian dictatorships with representative military 
institutions are both more likely to transition and to endure than either authoritarian 
regimes with ethnic institutions or those following institutionalized military rule.  
First, though the empirical analysis confirmed this project’s central arguments, 
small sample sizes and significant differences between model assumptions precluded the 
confirmation of less central predictions. The empirical evidence is strongly suggestive, 
but not fully supportive, of the notion that when controlling for other factors, 
authoritarian regimes with representative armies are more likely to transition than 
military regimes. Likewise, the evidence was suggestive, but not fully supportive, of the 
idea that democracies that succeed dictatorships with ethnically stacked armies tend to 
endure longer than those following military regimes and shorter than those following 
dictatorships with representative armies.  
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the crude measures used here are not 
sufficient to gain insight into causal mechanisms. The argument that in Africa military 
regimes tend to result in democracy more often than other regime types because divisions 
between praetorian and traditional officers condition the military’s response at critical 
junctures cannot be verified here. Neither can the claim that acts of ethnic stacking by 
civilian rulers make the armed forces more unified and resilient in the face of pressure to 
liberalize. In the subsequent chapters, I draw on intensive case analyses of military 
regimes in Nigeria, ethnic civil-military relations in Sudan, and representative civil-
military relations in Tunisia to more closely trace processes, verify causal mechanisms, 




Chapter 5. Military Rule and Democratic Instability in 
Nigeria 
 
 Most transitional coups in Nigeria have revolved around the following; the late Brigadier 
General Ibrahim Bako, a brilliant Armoured Corps officer who died in unexplained 
circumstances in the 1983 coup d’état that sent Shehu Shegari packing. Others were, General 
Murtala Mohammed, Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, an accomplished strategist of vast 
resources and the hero of the Onitsha campaign. General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani 
Abacha. These were the carpetbaggers, the first tier of coup merchants. 
 
Chris Alli, The Federal Republic of the Nigerian Army (2001), p. 62  
  
Babangida's own words betrayed his motives: 'We in the military waited for an opportunity. 
There was the media frenzy about how the election was, massively rigged, corruption, the 
economy gone completely bad, threat of secession by people who felt aggrieved. There was 
frustration within society and it was not unusual to hear statements like, the worst military 
dictatorship is better than this democratic government. Nigerians always welcome military 
intervention because we have not yet developed mentally the values and virtues of democracy.' 
  
'You admit you were waiting for an opportunity?' I asked. 
  
'You see we are very smart people. We don't intervene when we know the climate is not good for 
it or the public will not welcome it. We wait until there is frustration in the society. In all the 
coups, you find there has always been one frustration or the other. Any time there is frustration, 
we step in. And then there is a demonstration welcoming the redeemers.' 
 
Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen (2000), p. 58 
 
 
The period from 1983, when the armed forces seized power after four years of 
civilian rule, to when they exited power in 1999 was the most traumatic period of 
authoritarianism in Nigerian history. During military rule, Nigeria suffered through three 
successful coups and as many as four failed coup plots, averaging a coup, coup attempt, 
or coup plot once every two years.232 As Nigeria’s elite enriched themselves off of the 
                                                          
232 Successful coups include the 1983 coup that brought Muhammadu Buhari to power, the 1985 coup that 




country’s abundant oil resources, Nigeria’s economy shrank by one third and poverty 
grew to afflict more than half of the population. Tens of thousands were detained, 
tortured and killed for speaking out against the regime, including democracy activist Ken 
Saro Wiwa; Moshood Abiola, a business tycoon who decisively won the annulled 1993 
election; and the former vice president, General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua. Ultimately, after 
annulling the 1993 election and orchestrating a 1994 coup, the Nigerian military 
remained in power for another five years until it orchestrated a transition back to civilian 
rule. Remarkably, Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has now lasted almost two decades, making 
it the longest-standing government in Nigeria’s history.  
It is my contention that Nigeria’s history of military governance and the cleavages 
it created within the armed forces are crucial to understanding Nigeria’s lurches between 
authoritarianism, democracy, and more recent democratic stability. As is characteristic of 
African military regimes, the Nigerian military splintered into factions from virtually the 
moment it seized power in 1983. The most prominent of these factions was a group of 
several dozen officers who were responsible for the coup, most of whom had served in 
political roles in previous military governments and whom actively cultivated power. Yet 
these officers represented only a small fraction of the country’s one hundred thousand--
                                                          
Interim National Government of Ernest Shonekan. The period also suffered one confirmed failed coup 
attempt in 1990 from disgruntled officers mainly from Nigeria’s south, as well as three suspected coup 
plots in 1985, 1995, and 1997 that led to public charges. Some suspect that these plots were in fact 
instigated by the government. For more on classifying how various sources have classified coups and coup 
attempts, see Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsay Marshall, "Coup D’État Events, 1946-2014 
Codebook.” Center for Systemic Peace (2015); Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, "Global 
Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 a New Dataset." Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2 (2011), pp. 
249-259; and Patrick J. McGowan, "African Military Coups D’État, 1956–2001: Frequency, Trends and 
Distribution" The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no 3. (2003), pp. 339-370. 
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strong army, most of whom never served in political roles and had few political 
ambitions. Ultimately, the cleavages between praetorian and traditional officers and 
between officers jockeying for rank and power within the praetorian fraction created a 
series of coups, retirements, and counter-coups, leading to a “cyclical game of self-
destruction” that cannibalized nearly every institution in the country, including the 
military. 233   
The Nigerian military’s internal cleavages and inability to overcome them help 
explain one of the central puzzles posed in this chapter: why the armed forces acted to 
block a transition to democracy between 1993 and 1994, and then presided over a 
successful transition to Nigeria’s Fourth Republic a mere five years later, in 1999. In both 
instances, the removal of a military dictator sparked a struggle for power within the 
military and elevated demands both within civil society and in the international 
community for democratic change. In the former instance, these demands fell upon deaf 
ears, as a coup led by General Sani Abacha plunged Nigeria headlong into five additional 
years of military dictatorship. Abacha’s coup was strongly but not uniformly supported 
by a substantial number of high-ranking soldiers that had served in the country’s military 
government. Five years later, when Abacha died, it was the more traditional faction of the 
Nigerian military that found itself in power, and this faction helped engineer a transition 
to democracy. These inconsistent democratization outcomes, as well as the factionalism 
                                                          
233 Said Adejumobi. “Beyond the Politics of the Gun: The Search for Democratic Stability in Nigeria.” 
DPMF Publications, 1999.  
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that helped cause them, confirms this project’s argument concerning the tendency of 
military regimes to result in uncertain and varying transition outcomes.  
 These cleavages further help to explain the Second Republic’s premature demise 
and the Fourth Republic’s enduring democratic stability. The end of the Second Republic, 
a democracy which lasted only four years between 1979 and 1983, likewise confirms this 
project’s argument that the cleavages between praetorian and traditional factions of the 
military dampens the survival prospects for democracies that succeed military regimes. 
The group of officers that seized power in 1983 had served in senior political roles during 
the previous military regime that ended in 1979. The transition to democracy benefitted 
them through the retirement of many senior officers whom they had served under and by 
providing them the opportunity, four years later, to seize power for themselves as more 
senior officers. It is no coincidence that these same officers have been involved in every 
successful coup in Nigerian history.  
Yet the fact that the Fourth Republic has proved so durable provides a challenge 
to this study’s observation that military regimes tend to result in democratic instability. 
Nevertheless, a closer look at the circumstances that have contributed to the current 
regime’s resilience provide further evidence to support the causal mechanisms advanced 
here. At least two important series of civil-military changes have helped Nigeria escape 
the legacy of military government. First, in the immediate aftermath of the transition, the 
Nigerian military, in collaboration with civilian officials, changed the military’s 
incentives and recruitment structure by prematurely retiring officers that had served in 
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political roles and adopting more meritocratic recruitment practices. Second, these 
changes were made possible in part by the fact that many civilian politicians, including 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, had former military backgrounds. Civilian rule became 
attractive in part because it allowed retired or expelled officers the opportunity to use 
their connections, military knowledge, and wealth to continue to seek power.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section 
provides basic information on Nigeria and situates the country within this study’s sample 
of cases. The following sections use process tracing methods to investigate the extent to 
which the Nigerian military regime’s role in the country’s transitional politics reflects the 
central arguments advanced in the dissertation. The third section discusses the 
institutional context behind the Nigerian military’s seizure of power in 1983, explaining 
the army’s choice to rule as a collective and their decision to prematurely end democracy 
after just four years. The fourth section examines the political and ethnic cleavages that 
arose within the Nigerian military as a result of military rule. The fifth section 
demonstrates how those cleavages led the Nigerian military to fracture in the lead up and 
aftermath of the 1993 annulment, and how praetorian officers were able to capitalize on 
the military’s internal divisions to extend military rule. The sixth section briefly considers 
how military government under Abacha differed from the previous military regime. The 
seventh examines the military-led transition in 1999, and considers why it succeeded 
despite the failure five years earlier. The eighth section examines the internal changes 
within the Nigerian armed forces in the aftermath of the country’s transition to 
democracy, arguing that both the forced retirements of officers with previous political 
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experience and the continued political influence of retired officers are crucial factors in 
the Fourth Republic’s resilience. The final section of the chapter summarizes how the 
causal processes behind the Nigerian military’s role in the country’s transitional politics 
reflect this dissertation’s theoretical framework.  
 
5.1: Nigeria in Context: Background and Case Selection 
 
  Home to over 180 million people, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa 
and the seventh largest country in the world (see Figure 5.1). Nigeria is home to over 500 
different ethnic groups, the three largest being the Hausa, who dominate the mostly 
Muslim North, and the predominantly Christian Igbo and Yoruba, who dominate the 
South and West, respectively. As a former British colony, English is the official 
language, but other languages, including those of the three major ethnic groups, are 
widely spoken. Rich in oil, the country’s GDP per capita is around $3,000, though wealth 
distribution is highly unequal (see Table 5.1). According to the World Bank, roughly 86 
million people, or close to half of the population, live in extreme poverty, making less 
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 Following Nigerian independence in 1960, the Nigerian First Republic lasted just 
six years before it experienced back-to-back military coups that divided the country along 
ethno-regional lines. Between 1967 and 1970, a brutal civil war was waged between the 
North and West and the Igbo-dominated South, in which between 1 and 3 million people 
were killed.234  After the war, which the Igbo lost, the country experienced an oil boom, 
and the Nigerian military remained in control until 1979, when it voluntarily ceded power 
to the Second Republic. The Second Republic lasted only four years before it to 
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succumbed to another military coup in 1983. After an annulled election followed in 1993 
aborted a transition to a Third Republic, the Nigerian military remained in power until 
1999. By the time the Nigerian armed forces relinquished control to the current Fourth 
Republic, they had ruled Nigeria for nearly 30 out of this country’s 40 years as an 
independent nation. 
Due to time and space constraints, this chapter will focus primarily on Nigeria’s 
latter period of military rule from 1983 to 1999. In this dissertation’s quantitative 
database, this period consists of two observations; one for the 1983 to 1993 period, which 
is coded as a military regime followed by a blocked transition to democracy, and one 
from 1993 to 1999, which is coded as a successful transition to democracy. The primary 
aim of the remainder of this chapter will be to employ standard process tracing methods 
to identify the causal mechanisms through which this project’s independent variables— 
authoritarian choices and civil-military relations—facilitate the dependent ones, 
democratization outcomes. This dissertation’s process tracing approach will be 
implemented by paying particular to the military’s motivations for choosing military rule, 
the primarily civil-military cleavages in Nigeria, the impact these cleavages had on the 
Nigerian military’s response to popular pressure at critical junctures in 1993 and 1999, 
and how these responses did or did not facilitate political transitions. Other qualitative 
chapters will follow a similar structure. By identifying the intervening causal processes, 
these chapters reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis, which only illustrated 
correlations between authoritarian civil-military relations and democratization outcomes 
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without examining the intervening steps proposed in my argument’s theoretical 
framework.235 
However, this chapter differs slightly from the two chapters following it in that its 
structure allows it to make two series of comparisons. First, it parses the differences 
between the 1993 and 1998 transition outcomes to investigate why the military chose to 
block the former transition, but facilitated the latter. Given that the annulled election and 
the successful transition took place within five years of one another, within the same 
country, and facing a comparable context with respect to the internal and external 
pressure placed on the regime, the two different choices are not easily explained. Though 
this dissertation does not explicitly take up the question of what causes some military 
regimes to transition to democracy when others do not, the insight from this analysis 
could aid in future research. 
Second, the chapter examines the sources of resilience in contemporary civil-
military relations to determine why the military has remained out of politics during the 
Fourth Republic. The Fourth Republic has lasted close to 20 years, which makes it an 
outlier both in Nigeria’s history as well as among African military regimes more broadly, 
whose average length, according to this country’s dataset, has been only eight years. By 
comparing Nigerian civil-military relations at the end of the Second Republic to the 
beginning of the Fourth, this chapter will provide insight as to why the military has 
refrained from intervening in the Fourth Republic after governing the country for so long, 
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and, more generally, to speculate on how democracies following military regimes can 
escape the legacy of military rule.  
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Figure 5.1 Political Map of Nigeria 
 
 




5.2: The Choice: The Nigerian Military Regime’s Seizure of Power 
 
In his December 31, 1983 broadcast announcing the military’s re-assumption of 
power after just four years on the sidelines, Brigadier General Sani Abacha cited a litany 
of abuses perpetrated by the country’s civilian leaders. Under democracy, Abacha 
claimed, Nigeria’s economy had been “hopelessly mismanaged,” its hospitals reduced to 
“consulting clinics without drugs, water and equipment,” and unemployment figures had 
reached “embarrassing and unacceptable proportions.”  Nigeria’s leaders, he said, “revel 
in squandermania, corruption and indiscipline, and continue to proliferate public 
appointments in complete disregard of our stark economic realities.”236 
Abacha’s colorful descriptions of the state of Nigeria’s political and economic 
affairs were for the most part accurate. The government of the civilian president Shehu 
Shagari had managed to squander much of the oil wealth they had inherited from 
Nigeria’s previous military regime, which had ruled the country from 1966 to 1979. From 
1980 to 1983, Nigeria’s GDP shrunk by nearly half, the government budget went from a 
$7 billion surplus to a $10 billion-dollar deficit, and inflation may have approached 100 
percent.237 The straw that broke the camel’s back was the 1983 elections, which Shagari’s 
party won by a substantial margin amidst allegations of corruption, fraud, waste and 
                                                          
236 Sani Abacha, “Broadcast Announcing the Military’s Return to Power,” Federal Radio Corporation of 
Nigeria, December 31 1983.  
237 See Shehu Othman, “Classes Crisis and Coup: The Demise of Shagari’s Regime,” African Affairs 83, 
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blatant vote-rigging. The sorry state of affairs meant that the military was welcomed back 
into government with open arms.  
 Political crisis and popular support may have been necessary factors in 
precipitating the Nigerian military’s return to power after four years in the wilderness. 
But they were far from the only factor, and possibly not the most significant. After he 
was removed from office, Shehu Shagari accused opposition politicians of engaging in 
‘coup-baiting,’ which describes “the deliberate preparation of civil and military political 
opinion for a coup.”238 To a large degree, the atmosphere of political crisis and popular 
support for military rule that permeated Nigerian society in 1983 was strongly 
encouraged and deliberately instigated by a segment of the armed forces that had designs 
on returning to power ever since it left in 1979. It is this segment of the army that retired 
Major General Chris Alli, who served in prominent roles in the military regimes of 
Buhari, Babangida and Abacha, called “the first tier of coup merchants,” and it played a 
prominent role in the founding of every Nigerian military regime, beginning with the 
cabal of officers that brought Yakubu Gowon to power in August of 1966.239   
 At the time of the 1983 coup, there were approximately 30 senior officers who 
had served at high levels in the previous military regime.240 During the Shagari 
administration, at least three different groups of these officers independently plotted to 
                                                          
238 Max Siollun, Soldiers of Fortune: Nigerian Politics from Buhari to Babangida (Cassava Republic Press, 
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seize power. They coalesced into one group in early 1983, and, according to General 
Babangida, who served as head of Nigeria’s military government from 1985 to 1993, 
deliberately decided to strike after the elections so that they could not be accused of 
sabotaging the electoral process.241 “The military was more educated, more aware, and 
smarter than us,” observes Babagana Kingibe, a civilian politician at the time. “In the 
contest for control over the political space, they had the upper hand.”242 In fact, the 
legacy of the previous military regime was explicit, with fledging military administration 
acknowledging itself as an “offshoot” of the military government of Murtala Mohammed 
and Olusegun Obasanjo that had governed the country between 1976 and 1979.243  
Given this legacy, it is of little surprise that the engineers of the 1983 coup chose 
a government of institutionalized military rule. Upon the military’s assumption of 
political power, all civilian political appointees lost their jobs and were placed in 
collective detention.244 The Federal Military Government (FMG) that replaced Nigeria’s 
Second Republic was a near replication of the previous military government. The 
government’s lead decision-making body was the Supreme Military Council (SMC), 
composed entirely of top military officers who held strategic posts. The SMC had 
confirming authority for cabinet positions, usurped the traditional functions of the 
legislature, and controlled decision-making at the federal level through military decrees 
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and edicts. State-level governance was supervised by the National Council of States, 
which was made of most of the higher-ranking members of the SMC and military 
governors, who replaced civilian ones. Decrees issued by both federal- and state-level 
military administrations were immune from judicial oversight.245 
In other words, the Nigerian military’s 1983 seizure of power did not occur by 
happenstance and was not solely because of the Shagari government’s ineptitude. Rather, 
Nigeria’s previous legacy of military rule led to the formation of a politically experienced 
class of officers who sought and competed with civilians in order to wield political 
power. The military government that began in 1983 owed its existence to the strategic 
choices, coordination, and planning of these officers. In Babangida’s own words: “At the 
risk of being called immodest, if there is any military government that prepared itself 
before it went in, it's our government. We knew what we wanted.”246 The clear choice of 
the Nigeria’s authoritarian leaders was the military regime.   
 
5.3: Cleavages Between Praetorian and Traditional Officers Under Military Rule 
 
According to this project’s argument, military regimes are uniquely factionalized 
forms of civil-military relations because of the cleavages that exist between officers who 
serve in a ruling capacity and cultivate power, and the rest of the military, which tends to 
serve in more traditional roles. The Nigerian experience with military rule is reflective of 
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these cleavages. From nearly the moment the Nigerian military seized power, its officers 
became deeply divided over how and when to leave. These divisions manifested 
themselves in two primary ways: as a violent struggle for power, and as a more open and 
less contentious conversation within broader military circles. On one side of this divide 
were soldiers such as Salihu Ibrahim, Domkat Bali, and Abdulsalami Abubakar, three 
senior military officials in the Buhari, Babangida and Abacha administrations who never 
participated in a coup and never served in political roles. In his memoirs, Alli remarks of 
Ibrahim: "By his nature, I knew that coup-making was not his cup of tea, even if he drank 
a lot of tea; indeed, he abhorred it and all that it stood for."247 On the other side of this 
divide were coup merchants such as Abacha and Babangida, who once admitted to 
having a hand in every single successful coup in Nigeria history.248 A good number of 
officers, such as Alli himself, fell on a spectrum somewhere in between.249  
The divisions within the praetorian clique of officers were self-evident. They may 
have agreed on seizing power, but the coup merchants within Nigeria’s military did not 
agree on who was to wield it. Between 1983 and 1993, Nigeria suffered four coup 
attempts, three of which were the designs of officers within the clique. When it first took 
control of the government, the army settled on Major General Mohammadu Buhari, the 
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most senior officer among the core network of coup plotters. Almost immediately, 
however, fissures opened up between Buhari and Ibrahim Babangida, who held the 
sensitive post of the Chief of Army Staff and who himself had designs on power.250 In 
response to an inquiry into the financial dealings of Babangida’s key associates and amid 
rumors that Babangida’s forced retirement was imminent, Babangida seized power in a 
bloodless coup, 20 months after Buhari came to office. Babangida’s changes to Buhari’s 
government were mostly cosmetic, renaming the Supreme Defense Council the Armed 
Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and expanding its membership to include more 
Babangida loyalists.  
Though Babangida remained in power for eight years, the next coup plot came a 
mere four months into his administration, and was possibly motivated by the desire to 
purge the armed forces of officers that remained loyal to Buhari.251 A second coup 
attempt, which almost cost Babangida his life, occurred five years later in 1990 and was 
masterminded by mid-ranking officers from the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Where the 
two previous coups were mainly struggles for power within the dominant Northern and 
Middle Belt clique of officers, the Niger Delta coup was the first and only coup within 
the period to be explicitly ethnic in character. Driven by personal animus towards 
Babangida, frustration at the government’s neglect of the Delta, and personal and 
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professional grievances against their colleagues, the coup plotters tried to expel the 
northern states of Bauchi, Borno, Katsina, Kano and Sokoto from Nigeria.252    
The prospect of a putsch was not the only serious source of division within the 
armed forces generated as a result of military rule. Though the officers in the armed 
forces who seized power might have liked to have completely marginalized their more 
traditional counterparts, the reality was not so simple. In the Buhari and Babangida 
regimes, the military’s involvement in the day to day governing of Nigeria was as 
expansive as it ever was. Nevertheless, no more than several hundred out of several 
thousand officers and roughly one hundred thousand active soldiers ever served in any 
kind of political capacity.253  Nigeria's “coup merchants” needed at least the tacit support 
and compliance of traditional officers whose experiences and inclinations were more 
broadly representative of the military. Even many officers who actively supported 
Babangida’s coup had done so with the understanding that, like previous military 
regimes, the current military administration would be temporary and corrective in nature. 
Alli, for example, remarks that he advised Babangida that, in his estimation, the army 
should stay in power for a period of no greater than two years.254 Indeed, it was Buhari's 
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own refusal to put a timetable on the return to democracy that may have pushed some of 
the more professionally inclined soldiers loosely into Babangida's orbit. 
Nevertheless, when, early in 1986, Babangida attempted to correct Buhari’s 
mistake by inviting the military to submit its opinion on the timing for a return to civilian 
rule, attitudes were so divided that it was unable to present a consensus view.255 To 
thread the needle between those in his officer corps who might have preferred a more 
rapid exit from power and those who preferred an extended stay, a decree issued in 1987 
advocated for a slow transition to civilian rule in the form of diarchy.256 The idea was for 
Nigeria to transition from military to civilian rule in stages, reconstituting the political 
process through “political learning, institutional adjustment, and a reorientation of 
political culture at sequential levels of politics and governance, beginning with the local 
governments and ending at the federal level.”257  
Yet the closer the regime got to the transition date the more it delayed. Initially 
the date of the transition was to be October 1, 1990, which was subsequently moved to 
October 1, 1992, then to January 1, 1992 and, finally to August 27, 1993. The delays 
were accompanied by an array of tactics that politically-minded officers in the Nigerian 
military used to confuse, divide, and play the country’s civilian politicians off of one 
another. The rules governing the constitution and composition of political parties were 
frequently changed; the electoral system was continually manipulated, in one case 
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producing some 286 candidates for president, the country’s highest ever; the results of 
elections were declared invalid on account of corruption or because of reservations the 
military government had about a particular candidate.258  
 Over time, the regime’s excuses began to wear thin. For many, the determination 
of at least some faction of the Nigerian military to cling on to power became evident after 
the regime annulled the results of the 1992 presidential primaries. These primaries were 
won convincingly by Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, himself a former senior military officer 
who retired from the military and became one of Nigeria’s principal advocates for 
civilian rule. The military government annulled Yar’Adua’s victory on account of 
corruption and with the excuse that it was politically unacceptable for a northerner to win 
the presidency after so many years of northern domination of the country’s political 
system. The problem with this excuse was that by that time, it was clear that many in the 
armed forces were themselves benefitting from massive corruption, and that Yar’Adua’s 
superior organization and broad support from across the country would likely have led to 
a convincing victory for him and his party, the SDP.259 According to General Jon 
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Temlong, who served in the Babangida administration, many in the armed forces 
counseled Babangida to let Yar’Adua come to power.260  
For eight years, Babangida’s extended transition process managed to hold the 
central factions in the military’s officer corps in check. For much of the period, officers 
who were sincere about the desire to hand over power to civilian rulers labored under the 
assumption that the military’s stay in power would be temporary. For those who preferred 
military rule, Babangida’s strategy of continual delay allowed them to continue to enjoy 
the benefits of governance. Ultimately, it was the events leading up to and in the 
aftermath of the 1993 annulled elections that shattered the perception held by more 
traditional officers that Babangida wanted the military’s stay in power to be temporary, 
while providing officers with more praetorian inclinations another chance to strike.  
 
 
5.4: The First Critical Juncture: The 1993 Annulment and Abacha’s Coup 
 
According to this dissertation’s analytical framework, one of the central 
mechanisms through which civil-military relations influence democratic transitions is by 
their impact on the military’s response when the regime comes under pressure to 
liberalize. These pressures mounted throughout Babangida’s tenure as head of state, 
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coming to a climax during and in the aftermath of the 1993 annulment. As predicted in 
my argument, the Nigerian military fractured in the face of this pressure. After nearly 
eight years of delay that, by one count, included over 41 modifications to the transition 
program, more and more military officers were becoming convinced that the Babangida 
regime had no intention of leaving.261 The hardliners, however, remained as determined 
as ever to continue military governance. Ironically, though Nigeria’s officers agreed on 
little else, they did agree on the need for Babangida’s removal. In the ensuing chaos, the 
praetorian officers, led by Sani Abacha, were able to collectively organize a coup and 
ensure the continuation of military rule.  
Babangida’s regime managed to use the crisis generated by the annulled 1992 
primaries to extend the military’s time in office to August 27, 1993, with elections to be 
held in June of that year. However, under mounting internal and external pressure, it was 
the last delay the regime was able to affect. The international community, which had 
previously been enamored of Babangida’s charm and commitment to implementing 
Washington consensus-style austerity measures, began to put increasing pressure on the 
military to hand over power. Nigerian civil society became increasingly assertive, leading 
to mass protests, demonstrations, and a more hostile media environment. Under 
considerable pressure, Babangida first signaled his intentions to potentially leave power 
by setting up a Transition Council to replace the Armed Forces Ruling Council. Members 
of the junta were "violently divided by the turn of events."262 Babangida called it "a very, 
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very tough meeting, one of the toughest [he] had handled in [his] seven years as 
president."263 The military was able to reach a consensus on the timetable, but only after 
48 hours of intense negotiations.  
Weeks before the election, the coalition within the military that undergirded 
Babangida’s rule, already under considerable strain, began to openly split. According to 
Senator John Shagaya, a close confidante of Babangida’s, the consensus among most 
senior officers at the time was to go forward with the elections.264 By early June, 
however, an unsettled and sleepless Babangida informed Colonel Umar Dangiwa, another 
confidante who had pressed for elections, that hardliners within the regime, led by 
Minister of Defense Sani Abacha, were pressing for him to use a court injunction to 
prevent the elections from taking place.265 Though the injunction was granted, 
Babangida, to the fury of the hardliners, nevertheless ordered the National Electoral 
Commission to allow elections to proceed as planned. 
In what was widely considered to be the freest and fairest Nigerian election 
conducted up to that point in time, the SDP candidate Moshood Abiola, who emerged as 
the consensus candidate to replace Yar’Adua, cruised to a convincing victory. The 
outcome of the election put considerable pressure on Babangida both from civil society 
and from the more traditional soldiers within the Nigerian armed forces to allow the 
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election results to stand and Abiola to succeed him as head of state. In the estimation of 
both Dangiwa and Alli, the majority of military officers supported the installation of 
Abiola.266 Alli recalls that most of the army’s ranks were “bored by the continued 
dominance of a clique of officers in the affairs of the nation” and “wanted to return to 
their professional roles.”267 On the other hand, the praetorian faction of the Nigerian 
military, led by Abacha and constituting much of the senior officer corps, was implacably 
opposed and began immediately putting pressure on Babangida to annul the results. 
Multiple senior officers, including Director of Military Intelligence Hailu Akilu and 
National War College Director David Mark, threatened violence if Abiola was to become 
president.268 
Ultimately, the officers who favored continued military rule won out. On June 26, 
1993 the results of the Nigerian election were annulled via an unsigned, undated memo, a 
clear sign of just how divided the military government was over the decision.  As 
Benjamin Nwabueze observes: “it is known that the annulment was not a 'collective' 
decision, that most members of the council only knew of it afterwards, and that it split the 
NDSC and the top echelon of the military. The Transitional Council which was supposed 
to oversee the final phase of the transition was not consulted at all."269  
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In subsequent interviews, Babangida took "full responsibility" for the decision to 
annul the 1993 elections, a decision widely regarded as the biggest mistake of his 
presidency.270 If it was indeed Babangida's intention to try to remain on, then he badly 
miscalculated. By ceding to the demands of the hardline elements within the military to 
annul the election, he infuriated those that were encouraging him to abdicate. For these 
same hard-liners, the annulment rendered him as vulnerable as he had ever been and a 
clear political liability. For the first time in his presidency, those in the military who 
wanted to remain in power and those in the military who wanted to leave were united in 
the opinion that Babangida must go. Serious plots to remove Babangida began to be 
discussed in both the middle and senior ranks of the Nigerian military.271 Babangida, who 
was uncertain of the loyalty of those around him and mindful that continuing in power 
might have cost him his own life, chose to leave on August 23, the date he had laid out 
earlier in the year, appointing an interim government (ING) under President Ernest 
Shonekan to oversee the transition.  
When he abdicated power, Babangida was first set on removing his entire senior 
staff from government. In a last-minute decision, however, he assigned the post of 
Secretary of Defense of the ING, with the power to terminate the government in the case 
of a crisis, to Abacha. There exists some debate as to whether this decision was motivated 
by a Northern conspiracy to stay in power, opposition from military hard-liners to the 
return of civilian rule, or a personal relationship or agreement that existed between 
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Abacha and Babangida as a result of the former’s loyalty. Babangida’s advisor and friend 
Omo Omuruyi, quoting from a series of meetings he had with an increasingly morose 
President, portrays all three factors as salient: 
“Sani is opposed to a return to civilian rule… Sani seems to rally the northern 
elders to confront me on this matter. Where do I go from here? They do not trust 
me. Without Sani, I will not be alive today; without the North, I would not have 
become an officer in the Nigerian Army and the president of Nigeria… I don’t 
want to appear ungrateful to Sani; he may not be bright upstairs but he knows 
how to overthrow governments and overpower coup plotters. He saw to my 
coming to office in 1985 and to my protection in many coups I faced in the past, 
especially the Orkar coup of 1990 where he saved me and my family including 
my infant daughter… if he says that he does not want Chief Abiola, I will not 
force Chief Abiola on him… That is the way I feel now. I cannot kill myself for 
the sake of what the country wants. I am sorry.”272 
 
Babangida’s appointment of Abacha as the sole military representative on the 
Interim National Government stamped Sani Abacha’s ticket to power. Following 
Babangida’s August resignation, a familiar series of events repeated themselves. The 
Nigerian polity viewed Shonekan’s tenure with suspicion. The political class became 
increasingly divided between those who wished see Abiola sworn in  as president (mainly 
from the South) and those who wished to hold a subsequent round of elections (mainly 
from the North). The country became paralyzed by strikes, riots, protests, and unrest. As 
it had done twice in 1966, in 1975, 1983, and 1985, the ‘coup-baiters’ in the military 
capitalized on the environment of economic and political uncertainty. In mid-November, 
the government announced a 700 percent hike in the price of oil, a decision that 
                                                          




according a former minister in Abacha’s government, was encouraged by Abacha with 
the intention of causing political chaos.273 The National Labor Congress responded with 
an immediate strike after Abacha offered to pay the salaries of demonstrating workers 
from his own personal bank account.274 Three days later, on November 17, 1993, Sani 
Abacha forced Shonekan’s resignation after a mere three months of transitional civilian 
rule.  
Many, including Babangida, did not think Abacha’s tenure would last.275 He 
ended up ruling for close to five years, very nearly succeeding in making himself a 
dictator for life.  His opponents consistently underestimated his cunning, misread his 
intentions, and mistook his taciturn nature for artlessness. For example, in the process 
leading up to the annulment and Babangida’s resignation, Abacha played the role of a 
democrat. He gave substantial sums of money to support protests against military rule, 
which convinced some civilian politicians and activists that his interest in democracy was 
genuine.276 Abacha convinced Abiola to flee the country shortly after Babangida’s 
resignation in August, warning the president-elect that his security could not be 
guaranteed.277 In November, Abacha convinced Abiola to return, assured by a promise 
from Abacha that he was going to hand over power. After waiting for seven more 
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months, Abiola declared himself President from Lagos in June 1994, under the possible 
illusion that doing so would cause some in the military to rally to support his cause.278 
Instead, he was charged with treason and would up in a prison cell. 
Abacha played a similarly deceptive game within the military. Given his position 
as both Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense, Abacha was at 
the forefront of efforts within the army to remove Babangida.  Initially, as the army’s 
most senior officer, he was able to enlist the support both of officers who preferred that 
the military remain in power as well as those who were hopeful for a way out. One by 
one, however, the officers agitating for a return to democracy were retired or forced to 
leave. Abacha talked Colonel Dangiwa out of tendering his resignation under the 
assurance that he would hand over power to Abiola, only to accept Dangiwa’s resignation 
letter and nearly try the colonel for coup plotting shortly after Abacha’s assumption of 
power.279 Major General Ishola Williams resigned in protest three days after Abacha’s 
coup, the only officer of his rank to do so.280 Within a year of Abacha’s assumption of 
power, General Williams was followed by forced retirement of half a dozen other 
prominent members of the Nigerian armed forces who had either expressed preferences 
for a return to democratic rule or whose loyalty could not be counted on, including 
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Generals Chris Alli, Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, John Shagaya, Josh Dogonyaro, David 
Mark and Sambo Dusuki.  
Abacha’s double game lasted just long enough for him to consolidate power. In an 
explosive interview with Newswatch in April 1994, Mark revealed that the actual plan 
within the armed forces was to stay in power for “at least five years,” a disclosure which 
shocked the nation and led the editors of the article to be briefly jailed on treason 
charges.281 With the imprisonment of Abiola, there could be no doubt with respect to the 
direction in which the regime was headed. In response to Abacha’s refusal to specify a 
timetable for return to democracy, pressure on his government mounted. The political 
opposition that refused to be co-opted organized into a unified political coalition known 
as NADECO, and organized, strikes, protests, and civil disobedience opposing Abacha’s 
continued rule. The United States and other Western countries actively supported these 
pro-democracy groups and imposed sanctions on the regime, further isolating it. Abacha 
responded by further tightening the regimes’ fist, arresting, imprisoning, and killing 
hundreds of pro-democracy agitators.282 
The evidence from Nigeria confirms the argument laid out in this dissertation that 
cleavages between traditional and praetorian officers in military regimes make transitions 
contingent and uncertain processes. In the leadup to and in the  aftermath of the 1993 
annulled elections, top officers within the Nigerian military lost any pretense of unity 
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they once shared about whether to stay in power or to leave. Under pressure from many 
top officers, Babangida went ahead with elections, only to annul the results after 
receiving even more pressure from hardliners. Both hard- and soft-liners briefly united 
around the need to remove Babangida from power. But, in this particularly instance, 
control over the Nigeria was won by Abacha, who used his position as Defense Minister 
to abort a transition to democratic rule before it began, stage a military coup under the 
guise of returning order, dismiss the remaining top officers he perceived as disloyal, and 
re-institute military rule, which lasted another five years.   
 
5.5: Abacha in Power: The ‘Pariah’ Dictator Hollows Out the Military 
 
Upon Abacha's assumption of power, professional divisions and personal 
animosities continued to permeate the upper echelons of the Nigerian officer. A small 
cabal of high-ranking officers, including Generals Jerry Useni and Ahmed Abdullahi, 
remained personally loyal to Abacha, but even after Abacha's initial purges, he appears to 
have remained deeply paranoid and mistrustful of his fellow soldiers, the majority of 
whom at this juncture probably favored a return to the barracks. In order to consolidate 
power, Abacha relied heavily on his chief security officer, Major Hamza al-Mustapha, 
who oversaw a relatively small unit of middle and lower ranking soldiers.283 These same 
men served as Abacha's enforcers, and were heavily involved in the killings, torture, 
imprisonment and other illegal activities that came to characterize his regime. According 
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to one general during the time, officers within the military and public services were so 
afraid of Abacha’s enforcers that they at times refrained from engaging in fraudulent 
practices.284 Babangida had ruled both formally, through the Armed Forces Ruling 
Council and informally, by consulting a "kitchen cabinet" of the 20 to 30 officers of 
different ranks who were responsible for bringing him to power. Abacha formally ruled 
through a Provisional Ruling Council dominated by military officers, but ended up 
marginalizing the body by eschewing regular meetings and acting without 
consultation.285 
Abacha's coercive methods succeeded in entrenching the dictator in power for a 
time. But they also shattered what was left of the army's esprit du corps, from its lowest 
ranks to its most accomplished officers. A key turning point for many in the armed forces 
was when former generals and civilian politicians Olusegun Obasanjo and Shehu Musa 
Yar’Adua, who were campaigning for a return to civilian rule, attempted to use the 
constitutional assembly meeting of 1995 to maneuver Abacha out of power.286 For their 
efforts, they were thrown in jail on trumped up charges of coup plotting. Yar’Adua later 
died in prison, likely of poison administered to him during a health check-up.287  
Abacha’s ire was by no means restricted to retired soldiers. Officers and enlisted 
men at all levels in Abacha's regime had to constantly watch their backs for fear that one 
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wrong word or utterance could send them to prison, jail, or worse. According to one 
faculty member at the Nigerian Army School of Finance, “officers would at times not 
even go to the mess because they were wary that their words might be used against 
them.”288 For some, it did not matter how careful they were. For example, the 
government's key witness in the coup plotting case was an officer by the name of Bello 
Fadilie. Tortured by Abacha's henchmen, he was forced into testifying against Nigeria's 
former leader, accusing him of crimes he did not commit.289  
In the 1970s and 1980s, Nigeria had one of the more professionalized armies and 
officer corps in Africa. By the mid-1990s, there was not much of a professionalized army 
left. In a poignant testimony to just how badly the officer corps had been eviscerated, 
Chris Alli claims that of the 53 graduates of his NDA course in 1967, by early 1994 only 
two had survived long careers in the army; the other officers in his class had either died 
during the civil war, retired, or been caught up in the dozens of purges that wracked the 
army during its time in power, which at that point had ruled for over 20 of the country's 
30 years as an independent country.290 Between 1995 and 1998, close to 400 officers 
were summarily dismissed or forced to retire, with officers of non-northern origin singled 
out.291 Between 1993 and 1996, the chiefs of army, air and naval staffs were changed 10 
times in order to prevent rivals from staying too long in sensitive positions.292  In 1997, 
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Abacha imprisoned Oladipo Diya, his effective number two, on what may have been 
trumped up coup charges, initiating yet another round of purges.  
The toll that military rule exacted on the army’s physical capabilities was equally 
as great, and likely a mixture of deliberate neglect to prevent the potential for a coup as 
well as an effect of the country’s dire economic straits. Despite commitments to 
peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the size and spending devoted to the 
armed forces continued to stagnate, with direct consequences for the material welfare and 
military preparedness of the rank and file. By the late 1990s, pay and benefits had 
declined in real terms, and as few as 10 percent of the army’s barracks were fit for 
habitation.293 Up to 75 percent of the army’s equipment was broken or missing vital parts. 
The navy had eight serviceable ships, six times less than the number of admirals. The Air 
Force continued to be in a state of dismal disrepair, with 10,000 men and 20 functioning 
aircraft, a combat readiness ratio of perhaps 15 percent.294 
If there had existed genuine divisions within the Nigerian armed forces over 
whether it ought to have left power in 1993, by the mid-late 1990s it is safe to conclude 
that the cumulative effect of the purges, the neglect of the armed forces as a professional 
institution, the near total loss of esprit du corps, and the considerable amount of social 
and international pressure left most of Nigeria’s service members exasperated with 
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military rule. As one retired senior soldier who was a middle ranking officer during the 
time of military rule recalls: “Military government was not helpful to the military, which 
led to a loss of support within the military for military rule.”295 
  Nevertheless, by the middle of 1998, it appeared that Abacha was on the verge 
of success in his plot to transmute himself into a dictator for life. His grip on his security 
forces appeared airtight, as those who remained in service were motivated by a mixture 
of ambition to continue to enjoy the fruits of military rule and fear of being accused of 
treason by al-Mustapha and company. His major sources of political and media 
opposition had been exiled, jailed, or had disappeared. A large number of politicians had 
been co-opted, and the tightly-controlled state press was agitating for the head of state to 
run in an election in which he would have been the only viable candidate. According to 
some news sources at the time, Abacha’s announcement that he would retire from the 
armed forces and stand for President was weeks away.296  
 
5.6: The Second Critical Juncture: Abacha’s Death and the Transition to the Fourth 
Republic  
At approximately 3:00 a.m.  the morning of June 8, 1998, Abacha suddenly died 
of a heart attack. The precise cause and his death was and remains extremely 
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controversial, in part because the late general was buried, according to Islamic tradition, 
within hours of his death and without an autopsy.297 On the one hand, Abacha had known 
health problems,298 and it is not inconceivable that his death was due to natural causes, 
which was and remains the official government account of his death.299 On the other 
hand, in the aftermath of his death, rumors emerged from multiple sources that Abacha 
was killed by members of the Nigerian Armed Forces.300 This view was the consensus of 
most U.S. military and intelligence officials, speaking off the record at the time,301 and is 
also hinted at by former U.S. Ambassadors John Campbell: “individual oga [leader] grabs 
for power has led to network realignments that can suddenly bring down the head of 
state. That was the fate of Abacha.” 302 
Senior officials within the Nigeria’s military government met the day after 
Abacha’s death. In one of the few instances in which a Nigerian head of state was chosen 
by consensus within the armed forces rather than from among a cabal of officers who had 
conspired to forcibly seize power, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, Abacha’s Chief of 
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Defense Staff (CDS) and the least politicized among Nigeria’s senior military leaders, 
was selected. Abubakar had remained loyal to every regime he served and had never been 
involved in coup plotting or “military politics.”303 The choice illustrates the degree to 
which even most senior officers within the military were ready to leave power, an 
observation confirmed by the insight that Abubakar was also not the most senior officer 
in the army at the time. That title belonged to Jerry Useni, who was probably Abacha’s 
closest associate of the army's general officers and who was deliberately overlooked by 
the council because they were suspicious of the role he may have played in Abacha’s 
death.304 
Though Abubakar’s ascension was met with initial skepticism, his regime 
embarked on a nine-month transition program that saw the country return to democracy 
in May 1999 after over fifteen years of military rule. Though the transition was swift, the 
military played an enormous and underappreciated role in dictating the terms. In the first 
place, the annulment, its aftermath, and Abacha’s oppressive reign had stoked ethnic 
tensions to a higher degree than at any point since the 1967-1970 Biafran civil war. The 
Niger Delta coup, the annulment of Abiola’s election to the presidency, and the brutal 
repression enacted against peaceful protest movements such as Ken Saro -Wiwa’s 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Ogoni People, generated real fear that much of 
Nigeria’s south would have supported secession had the next Nigerian president not been 
from the region. Though Nigeria’s military leaders were prepared to cede power, they 
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were wary of what it might mean to elect a candidate with little ties to the military and an 
axe to grind against the north.  
The stability of the Nigerian polity began to look even more tenuous just after the 
death of Abacha when, prompted by millions of supporters, Abiola continued to refuse to 
give up his 1993 mandate and insisted on being installed as president. This presented 
Nigeria’s military government, which had promised to free him and had already released 
most other high profile political prisoners, with a dilemma. Then, on July 7, 1998, the day 
of his expected release and one month after the death of Abacha, M.K.O. Abiola died, 
also of a heart attack. A subsequent autopsy report, conducted by a team of independent 
experts but the details of which have never been fully released to the public, concluded 
that Abiola, who was in poor health due to bad treatment in prison, died, like Abacha, of 
natural causes. Abiola became ill during a meeting with U.S. diplomats Thomas 
Pickering and Susan Rice, and rumors have persisted that he also was poisoned or killed, 
by the Nigerian military in collusion with the U.S.305  
With Abiola out of the picture, Olusegun Obasanjo quickly emerged as the armed 
forces’ preferred candidate for president. Given his former military background, pro-
democracy credentials and ethnic identity as a Yoruba from the south-west, Obasanjo 
was a man who, in Babangida’s words, the armed forces felt “it could do business 
with.”306 In fact, the idea for an Obasanjo presidency did not originate with the man 
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himself, but with former President Ibrahim Babangida and his Chief of Army Staff, Aliyu 
Mohammed Gusau.307 According to Obasanjo: “later on I was made to understand that 
Babangida and Gusau were concerned for Nigeria. I believe that if left to the politicians I 
wouldn’t have been the choice.”308 Babangida and Gusau managed to enlist the support 
of Abubakar, as well as TY Danjuma, an influential and wealthy retired soldier who had 
served under Obasanjo as Nigeria’s Army Chief of Staff from 1975-1979.  
Together, these serving and former soldiers were not only instrumental in 
convincing Obasanjo to run, but also in convincing “the politicians” to support him and 
in clearing his path to the presidency. As members of the People’s Democratic Party were 
process of selecting a candidate, Gusau, on behalf of Babangida and Abubakar, 
approached PDP leaders about the possibility of Obasanjo running as the party’s 
nominee.  According to former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who was a senior PDP 
leader at the time:  
My belief is that there were the hands of the military behind Obasanjo’s 
presidency. When we were considering who we wanted to nominate, 
Obasanjo was never mentioned as a potential candidate. But on the night 
we were to make a final decision, I had to briefly step out of our meeting 
in order to see Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, who requested to speak with me 
in my hotel room. At the time I adjourned the meeting, we had decided to 
concede the presidency to the south. And then here came General Aliyu 
Gusau. He said ‘Sir, I brought you a message on behalf of myself, General 
Ibrahim Babangida, General Abudsalami Abubakar and General TY 
Danjuma. We understand you have decided to support a southern 
candidate. We are your senior brothers. We know all these candidates 
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because we have worked with them. The best candidate who will now 
unite this country and bring stability to it is Olusegun Obasanjo.’ 
 
I went back to the meeting and had to call its adjournment in order to talk 
to the PDP’s key members one on one. After an all-night meeting, we 
decided to nominate Obasanjo as the party’s nominee. Four of us were 
mandated to fly to Lagos to meet Obasanjo. We met him at his farm in 
Ota, just after he had gotten out of prison, and said we wanted him to join 
and were giving him the ticket. At first he rejected it outright. He said 
‘You’ve come to send me back to jail again! Who told you I wanted to be 
president?’ He said you can go and come back. We came back after a 
couple of days. He said he prayed to God and decided to join the PDP.309 
Finally, the military under Abubakar's leadership subtly influenced the process 
through which Nigeria’s main political candidates were nominated. Late in the contest, 
the military government approved the merger of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) and 
All People’s Party (APP) into a joint platform to oppose Obasanjo's PDP, which under 
the election rules ought not to have been allowed.310 Furthermore, the candidate that 
ultimately ended up representing this platform was the AD’s Olu Falae, who, like 
Obasanjo, was a Yoruba Christian. The choice of Falae as these two political parties’ 
main presidential candidate is all the more curious considering the APP was the bigger 
party and that his running mate, Umaru Shinkafi, was from the north and likely would 
have garnered broader appeal.311 Obasanjo, being of the same ethnicity as Falae but also 
trusted by the broader establishment, cruised to easy electoral victory.  
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Thus, the key difference between 1993 and 1998 transition processes appears to 
be that, in 1998, traditional officers within the Nigerian military were able to seize power 
and guide the country towards democracy. No doubt, the choice of Obasanjo as the 
military’s favored candidate helped assure officers on the fence that the military’s 
corporate interests would be taken into account during the transition process. In addition, 
Abacha’s attempts to personalize power after the 1993 elections appeared to have turned 
much of the senior officer corps against him. In 1993, a visible struggle between the 
hard-liners and much of the rest of the Nigerian military had led to a continuation of 
military rule. By 1998, there were few, if any hard-liners left to put up such a struggle. 
The most innocuous interpretation of the events is that Abacha’s conveniently timed 
death provided to the military the opportunity to stand aside.   Another possible 
interpretation, with considerable circumstantial evidence to support it, is that senior 
officers inside and outside the military planned Abacha’s death in order to prevent him 
from becoming a permanent dictator and orchestrated a transition that allowed the armed 
forces to exit power on the most favorable possible terms.  
 
5.7: Democratic Resilience in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic 
 
From Nigeria’s independence in 1960 to the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 
1999, Nigeria suffered 10 military coups or coup attempts, good for one every four years. 
In eighteen years of democratic rule, Nigeria has yet to suffer a military coup or coup 
attempt, despite rumors of various plots that appear to have advanced little beyond the 
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planning stage. To date, Nigeria’s democracy has lasted two and a half times longer than 
the average length of a democracy that succeeds a military regime.  This fact is all the 
more remarkable considering the political instability and turbulence that has marked 
much of the Fourth Republic. The death in 2010 of President Umaru Yar’Adua or the 
upheaval caused by Boko Haram were both moments where, in past eras, the military 
might have taken advantage of the turbulence and uncertainty to seize power.  
The fact that the Nigerian Fourth Republic has proved so stable offers a tough test 
to the theory advanced here.  In examining several competing explanations for the 
military’s support of Nigerian democracy, I find most convincing support for the 
argument that the military’s lack of political interference is a result of the retirement of 
the praetorian officers out of the Nigerian military, which ended the cycle of political 
instability. Unlike the democratic transition of 1979, the 1999 transition was followed by 
a mass purge of senior officers that served in prior political roles. The retirement of these 
officers was actually the last of a long series of purges and retirements that drew former 
military officers such as Obasanjo, Yar’Adua, and Babangida into civilian politics.  
Despite the Fourth Republic’s democratic resilience, the fact that stable democratic rule 
in Nigeria was only possible after the retirement and marginalization of serving military 
officers who cultivated power is highly consistent with the causal logic of the theory 
advanced here.  
Though the decision to leave power may have been collective, Nigeria's 
democratic leaders inherited an army that was demoralized, deprived of operational 
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capabilities, divided along ethnic lines, and with a substantial network of officers who 
had joined with the intention of seeking political power. At the time, concern was rife 
that the Fourth Republic would suffer the same fate as the First, Second, and Third 
Republics and succumb to the ambitions of the next generation of coup merchants.  No 
leader was more conscious of the need to keep the military out of power than Obasanjo 
and his closest advisors, including vice President Atiku Abubakar and former General 
T.Y. Danjuma, who became his defense minister. These leaders adopted a series of 
policies have been widely cited as crucial in explaining the military’s loyalty to the 
Fourth Republic.  
The first series of policies concerned efforts to improve the military’s capabilities. 
When Obasanjo took office, his administration promised to undertake reforms to “down-
size and right-size” the military, upgrade soldiers’ welfare, and re-equip the services.312  
These efforts were only partially successful. Programs to upgrade soldier welfare appear 
to have been met with the most success, in part because the administration felt it was a 
good strategy to ensure the army’s loyalty to civilian rule. According to Obasanjo, “I 
knew that simple things like car loans, staff housing, barracks, officers’ messes would go 
a long way if you did not join the military for political reasons.”313 From 1998 to 2007, 
pay and benefits of both soldiers and officers were increased multiple times, making 
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military service a highly competitive and attractive profession.314 However, the plans to 
“down-size” the army went awry from the very beginning, with Obasanjo and Danjuma 
publicly disagreeing over whether a force reduction from 80,000 to 50,000 service 
members was appropriate at all.315 In the end, it was decided to leave the number of 
service-members unchanged, a concern that was partially driven by the fear of the 
security consequences of discharging so many men.316  
The consequences of prioritizing the welfare of individual soldiers while 
minimizing the military budget was a continued decline in the military’s operational 
capacity. With so much money devoted to recurrent expenditures such as staff salaries 
and pensions, a pitifully low amount of money was devoted to capital investment.317 For 
many years, the military made no major acquisitions; according to a former army chief of 
staff, the last time the military was well equipped and had a deliberate procurement 
process was under the Shagari administration, which ended in 1983.318 Very little of the 
equipment that the Nigerian military did have was serviceable.319 In a press release, the 
Nigerian government revealed that an appalling seven aircraft were in operational 
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condition as of May 2015.320 If true, this represents a decline even from the end of 
Nigeria’s military dictatorships. This neglect of investment in material capabilities has 
hindered the Nigerian military’s performance in combat. During the 2012 peacekeeping 
mission in Mali, Nigerian soldiers were so poorly equipped that they “did not have the 
capability to carry out even the most basic maneuvers necessary for forward 
operations.”321 In the early days of the Boko Haram insurgency, units with little food 
rations, poorly maintained vehicles, and magazines equipped with 30 to 60 bullets were 
thrust out to face an enemy with anti-aircraft weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. 322 
It is actually somewhat remarkable these conditions did not spur more widespread 
mutiny.  
Because efforts to improve the material conditions and operational capabilities 
were at best only partially addressed, it is unlikely they have had much influence in 
preventing a military re-seizure of power. As Figure 5.2 indicates, between 1988 and 
2014, overall defense spending fluctuated between .5 and 1.5 percent of GDP and slightly 
                                                          
320 Festus Owete, “EFCC Detains ex-Chief of Air Staff, Adesola Amosu, over N29 billion Arms Deal” 
Premium Times, January 28 2016.  
321 International Crisis Group, “The Challenge of Military Reform,” p. 14. 
322 Senior officers and lower-ranking soldiers I spoke with were nearly uniform in their agreement that the 
army’s problems with supply and equipment were the central obstacles in confronting Boko Haram. 
According to one senior military officer: “Equipment would sometimes come, but not at the right quantity, 
and the appropriations were there for everyone to see. You can’t ask a soldier to fight for you if they don’t 
have equipment. That’s what makes them a soldier.” Interview with Senior Military Officer who did not 
wish to be named, Abuja, June 2016. Confirming this officer’s sentiment, one former enlisted soldier in the 
Nigerian Army described being ambushed and unable to effectively retaliate due to expired bullets and a 
lack of ammunition and vehicles. The unit lost nearly two dozen men and ended up being court-martialed 




declined overall; spending per soldier has increased slightly, but much of the increase is 
likely due to increases in expenditures on salaries and other administrative expenses.  
 
Figure 5.2: Nigerian Military Expenditure Per Soldier & Relative to GDP, 1988-2015 
 
 
Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database 2016; World Bank World 
Development Indicators 2016; International Institute of Strategic Studies 2016 
 
 
It is therefore difficult to attribute Nigerian democratization to changes in the 
military’s operational capabilities. Under both authoritarian and democratic regimes, 
equipment fell into disrepair and was not replaced, and a culture of prebendalism 
permeated through the ranks. Nigeria’s soldiers, which in the 1960s fought a civil war 
against another using fairly sophisticated conventional warfare tactics, was rendered 
incapable of conducting basic forward operations during peacekeeping missions in the 
1990s and 2000s. All of Nigeria’s rulers, both under democracy and under military rule, 
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capabilities. Yet Nigeria suffered through three irregular transitions of power and seven 
coup attempts in fifteen years of military government, and no irregular transitions and 
zero coup attempts in nineteen years of democracy.   
The next series of reforms undertaken by democratic leaders was to attempt to 
redress ethnic stacking. Shortly after Obasanjo was elected, many officers from the 
highly politicized echelon of the military that was dominated by Northern and Middle 
Belt were retired. The new administration was further supported by 1999 constitutions, 
which stipulated that high-level government appointments needed to have a federal 
character. The officer recruitment process is also fairly well balanced, with each state 
selecting 22 officers to serve annually.323 The armed forces have generally promoted 
officers that have served more as bureaucrats and less as commanders during the Abacha 
and Babangida era, which had has had the effect of increasing representation of among 
the army’s higher ranks of officers from Southern regions and minority ethnic groups.324 
High level appointments within the military during the Fourth Republic are indicative of 
a far more even balance than under authoritarianism. Since 1999, 40 percent of Nigeria’s 
Defense Ministers and Army Chiefs of Staff, the two most sensitive positions in the 
Nigerian military, have hailed from the South. Nevertheless, some imbalances may 
                                                          
323 According to senior officers I spoke to, the process is not perfect. 7 out of the 22 slots are not based on 
merit, and civilian officials do at times interfere with promotions, but always in the name of “maintaining 
federal character.” How bad civilians interfere with such appointments has depended on the civilian in 
charge. This reform apparently dates back to the Armed Forces Act of 1993, though the effects have taken 
their time to work their way through the ranks. Interview with Senior Military Officials, Abuja, June 2016. 




persist among rank and file soldiers, due to the prestige and the history of the military 
profession in Nigeria’s North.325  
It is more difficult to dismiss this evidence. The domination of the military by 
officers of Northern and Middle Belt were a prominent source of civil-military tension 
during military rule, particularly in aftermath of the Niger Delta coup attempt. In 
addition, the reluctance that some officers had over the candidacy of Moshood Abiola – a 
southern Yoruba – directly contributed to the annulment of the 1993 election, a fact 
which was admitted by Babangida himself. During the 1998-1999 transition, Nigeria's 
transitional government and retired former officers worked assiduously to avoid the 
election of a southern candidate that they felt might have acted against their interests. 
During this period, their dislike of Abiola may have cost him his life. The efforts to 
restore ethnic balance to Nigeria’s military do appear to have gone some way to restoring 
the Nigerian military's internal cohesion and acceptance of civilian rule. 
 It is one thing to consider the ethnic imbalances within the Nigerian armed forces an 
important factor in explaining support for democratization within the ranks. But were 
these imbalances really the pre-dominant source opposition to democracy within the 
Nigerian military? In the first place, it is difficult to decipher whether the officers in the 
Niger Delta coup were motivated by genuine ethnic resentments or merely by the desire 
                                                          
325 Interview with Major General Joseph Lartey (rtd.), June 23 2016. According to one prominent Nigerian 
journalist that has extensively covered the military, Northerners are still overrepresented among Nigeria’s 
enlisted ranks, and have at times been known to disobey the commands of Southern officers. Despite the 
history of coups and retirements motivated by clear ethnic considerations, the fact that the Nigerian military 
has long tried to maintain the appearance of a nationally representative institution has likely made these 
reforms easier than if it had adopted a policy of institutionalized exclusion. Interview with Dapo 
Olorunyomi, Silver Spring, MD, May 3 2016. 
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to seek power for themselves. Likewise, were the Northern and Middle Belt officers who 
for so long dominated Nigeria's military motivated by the desire to preserve the North's 
institutional status, or were they driven by the baser motivation of ambition and the 
exigencies of maintaining power? The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but the 
fact that, of Nigeria's seven coup attempts during military rule, all but one was led by 
predominantly Northern and Middle Belt officers against fellow predominantly Northern 
and Middle Belt officers, attests to the importance of the struggle for power as an end in 
itself. In addition, not all mid- and high-ranking officers of southern origin in the military 
were involved in the Niger Delta coup plot, but a number of officers from the Middle 
Belt were.326 Similarly, not all of the Northern and Middle Belt officers within the 
military supported the 1993 annulment. Even if redressing ethnic stacking within 
Nigeria’s military may have been a necessary condition for democratization, it was 
clearly not sufficient.  
A final explanation is that the military became more supportive of democracy 
because the mass retirement of some 116 military officers who held political offices since 
1985. Most of these officers were from the North and the Middle Belt, but they were 
retired not because of their ethnic origin, but because of their prior political service; many 
officers from these regions remained. The announcement was enacted only two weeks 
                                                          
326 According to a senior military officer who was familiar Orkar, one of the main plotters of the Niger 
Delta coup: “Though I was from the south the main reason I never really knew the officers involved was 
because of lifestyle: they weren’t married and I got married at a young age. If not, things might have turned 
out differently. Under military rule, some set of officers were prominent ahead of others, and this is what 
dissatisfied Orkar. Primary game in the military had become to seek power at the expense of troops, and 
this was the principal justification for Orkar. You can always come up with excuses depending on what 




after Obasanjo was sworn in as president and was one of his first official acts. By 
deliberate design, it caught many of the more politically ambitious officers off-guard, 
before they would have had a chance to organize or form a strategy to maintain their 
positions. Though Obasanjo clouded the timing of the decision itself in some degree of 
secrecy, the idea was proposed and gained traction among many officials beforehand.327 
A transition panel, chaired by Danjuma, endorsed the decision to retire officers who had 
been military administrators, ministers, governors and prominent task force chairmen.  
There is compelling evidence for this explanation. First, the retirements sent a 
signal that ambition for political office was no longer going to be tolerated within the 
Nigerian military. It was clearly essential in shifting the balance of power in the 
military’s middle and senior ranking officers decisively towards the traditional, non-
political officers who represented the majority of the military. The decision was met with 
“jubilation” in the barracks and established a clear precedent to discourage soldiers from 
seeking political office or interfering with Nigeria’s political affairs.328 The precedent has 
at times been acted on by subsequent administrations. In June 2016, for example, dozens 
of senior Nigerian Army officers were fired for professional misconduct in election 
matters.329  
                                                          
327 According to Atiku Abubakar, the idea was discussed and accepted in meetings he’d conducted with 
Obasanjo and other senior national security officials. Interview with Atiku Abubakar, July 14 2016.   
328 Ima Noboro, “Obasanjo’s Operation Sweep,” Tell Magazine, June 28 1999; Dotun Oladipo, “The Big 
Purge,” Newswatch, June 28 1999. 
329 Hassan Adebayo, “Nigerian Army Gives Formal Reasons Why It Dismissed 22 Senior Officers” 
Premium Times, September 27 2016. 
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Second, the retirements offer a clear contrast with the 1979 transition process, 
when officers such as Buhari, Babangida and Abacha, each of who had served in political 
roles in the previous military administration, were allowed to remain in the military and 
nearly immediately began plotting to seize control.  The coup of 1983 was largely the 
work of them and several dozen mid- and senior-level officers who had served in political 
roles and plotted coups as far back as Nigeria's first military government in 1966. The 
retirements early in the Obasanjo administration precluded the next generation of ‘coup 
merchants’ from attempting to re-enter politics.  
Finally, it is perhaps no coincidence that the mass retirements of active duty 
officers who had served in political roles was preceded by the mass entry of retired 
military officers into civilian politics. Numerous high-ranking former military officers, 
including Obasanjo, Buhari, Danjuma, Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, and Senators David 
Mark, Chris Alli and John Shagaya have gone on to high level political careers, in no 
small part due to the wealth and connections they were able to accumulate while they 
were in power.330 Of all the Fourth Republic’s presidents, only one, Goodluck Jonathan, 
has lacked previous service in or immediate family ties to the armed forces.  
From the forgoing analysis indicates that the reasons for the military’s support for 
Nigeria’s democratic stability are not inconsistent with this project’s broader overall 
argument. Recall that my core contention is that the cleavages between praetorian and 
traditional offers render military regimes distinct from other forms of authoritarian civil-
                                                          




military relations. Such cleavages are the main reason why military regimes tend to 
fracture at critical junctures, and the ambitions of the praetorian class of officers 
constitute the single greatest threat to democratic stability. It follows, then, that in order 
for a democracy following a military regime to have a reasonable chance to survive, 
praetorian officers within the armed forces must be marginalized. As a result of the 
steady stream of purges and retirements that caused many retired officers to support a 
return to civilian rule, along with the purges of former politicized officers early in the 
Obasanjo administration, these basic conditions were met, for the first time in Nigerian 
history. At the very least, it is likely that these conditions were also necessary, if not 
sufficient, conditions for Nigerian democracy to endure.  
 
5.8: Tracing the Mechanisms: Nigeria’s Military Regimes and Democratic 
Instability 
 In the quantitative chapter, I provided evidence in favor of my argument that 
military regimes tend to follow paths of democratic instability. I found that military 
regimes end in democracy at an approximately average rate, but that the democracies 
they give rise to are unstable, lasting approximately 50 percent less than average. The 
quantitative chapter provided strong evidence in favor of the relationship between my 
dissertation’s central independent and dependent variables, but it did not provide support 
for my argument concerning the causal mechanisms linking military regimes to the 
outcomes mentioned. The qualitative chapters, beginning with Nigeria, are meant to 
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provide this missing linking by more closely examining the extent to which the cleavages 
and mechanisms that lead to the observed outcomes are reflective this dissertation’s 
overall argument. To reminder of the reader of these arguments, this dissertation’s 
argument with respect to military regimes is reproduced below in Figure 5.2. 
 
 




The evidence, gathered both from an intensive examination of the secondary 
literature and interviews, is consistent with the argument. The Nigerian military officers 
who seized power in 1983 were predominantly from Nigeria’s North and Middle Belt and 
had extensive prior governing experience. They had long had designs on power and 
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modelled their government off of Nigeria’s previous military regime, which ruled the 
country between 1979 and 1983. With one brief interruption during the interim 
government of 1993, military officers controlled the country through by issuing decrees 
through various ruling councils until 1999. Nigeria is considered one of Africa’s 
archetypes of military governance.  
In addition, the Nigerian military was defined by cleavages between officers who 
served in ruling roles and those in more traditional military ones. The coup was a work of 
a relatively small group of officers whose opinions were not necessarily reflective of the 
overall military. Moreover, the military was never able to come to a consensus over when 
to leave, nor which among the ruling class of officers was to wield power. The seven 
coup attempts, four successful coups and four heads of military government that Nigeria 
had in just fifteen years is a strong indication of just how internally divided the military 
became. The fact that only one of these coup attempts had an explicitly ethnic character is 
further evidence that the central cleavages concerned were about the military’s role as 
ruler.  
These internal divisions caused the Nigerian military to split in response to 
pressure to liberalize. Each of Nigeria’s transition periods in 1993 and 1998 were periods 
of considerable uncertainty, as officers representing the more traditional military faction 
attempted to guide the country towards democracy, while hardliners sought to hang on to 
power. In 1993, in no small part due to the privileged position of hardliners within the 
interim government and their assurances to their traditional counterparts that a return to 
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civilian rule was imminent, the praetorian wing of the Nigerian military managed to hang 
on. When Abacha died in 1998, the soft-liners had the upper-hand, and, in collaboration 
with retired military officers, guided Nigeria to a democratic transition they hoped would 
also serve the military’s institutional interests.  
Nigeria therefore illustrates this project’s overall argument that the tendency of 
military regimes to fracture in the face of pressure to liberalize makes for uncertain 
transitional politics. A tentative conclusion from the Nigerian case is that the 1998 
transition succeeded where the 1993 one failed, in part because there was less support 
among Nigeria’s top officers for continued military rule in 1998; and in part because, by 
selecting a former military ruler as its preferred candidate, the armed forces was more 
certain that its institutional interests would be safeguarded under democracy. The 
variation in transition outcomes within military regimes themselves is a topic that is 
virtually unexplored in the academic literature and could lead to fruitful avenues of 
further research.  
Moreover, the cleavages between praetorian and traditional officers, and the 
struggle they caused, also explain the observed outcomes concerning the fate of Nigerian 
democracy. The fall of the Second Republic, which lasted only four years, follows my 
argument’s exact predictions. Nigeria’s democratic experiment between 1979 and 1983 
was ended by politically-minded officers who remained in the military after the first 
military regime ended in 1979 and deliberately sought power. Though the Fourth 
Republic has not met the same fate, an examination of the transition process offers a 
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compelling reason why: in 1999, almost immediately after the transition to democracy, 
officers with experience in mid- and high- level government positions were prematurely 
retired. They were the last of a generation of praetorian, politically ambitious officers to 
leave the military, breaking the cycle of political instability set in motion with Nigeria’s 
first military coup in 1966. Through their retirements, they joined a broader class of 
retired military officers, many of whom have used their wealth and their connections to 
reenter politics as civilians.   
Viewed from this perspective, the explanation for Nigeria's return to democracy 
and enduring democratic stability is relatively simple. It took four decades of military 
rule, but ultimately the praetorian officers within Nigeria’s armed forces cannibalized 
themselves and the military in which they served. After years of watching their peers 
prematurely retired, tried, imprisoned, and even executed, there were few officers left 
who genuinely believed that military rule was to the benefit either of the military as an 
institution, or to the country. Moreover, many of the officers who had benefitted most 
from the military had by that point been forced to retire or bought off as a result of the 
constant struggle for power. These two groups officers collaborated to orchestrate a 
transition to democracy that they hoped would take the military permanently out of 
power, but largely on their terms. They organized an election, selected one of their own 
as a candidate, and foreclosed the possibility of further military rule by prematurely 
retiring any soldier left in the military they suspected of harboring political aims. They 
knew that the best way to prevent a coup was to discourage networks of politically 





Ethnic Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Obstruction in 
Sudan 
 
The military officers and politicians who seized power on 30 June 1989 held a monolithic vision 
of the identity of Sudan. They maintained that Islam, the majority religion, and Arabic, the 
language of the Quran, represented the essential bases for the country’s nationalism and should 
define its legal, political and economic systems. Arabic should supersede indigenous languages 
as well as English, the colonizer’s language. Minorities must either merge into that Islamic 
culture or be exempt from a few religious punishments. Christians could practice their faith, but 
adherents of traditional African faiths could be compelled to convert, since they were not 
monotheist ‘people of the book.’ The regime sought to compel the public to follow its rigidly 
defined social code, cultural norms, and religious forms. 
 
Ann Mosley Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities (1998), p. 113 
  
The Arabs came here looking for pasture, and when the grass was finished they went back. They 
used up our grass, but they took good care of the gardens and the people. There were no 
robberies, no thieves, no revolution. No one thought of domination; everyone was safe. We were 
afraid only of lions and hyenas. Now there is nothing but trouble, all over Sudan. There is no 
government, no control. Look around you. What do you see? No women, only armed men. We no 
longer recognize it, this land of ours.' 
 
Sheikh Heri Rahma, quoted in Julie Flint and Alex de Wall, Darfur: A New History of a Long 
War (2008), p. 276 
 
For over 27 years, Sudan has been ruled by Omar al-Bashir, an army officer who 
has since become the longest-serving leader of the longest-running regime in Sudanese 
history. Since coming to power in 1989, Bashir has survived several coup attempts, a 
confrontation with the Islamist party that brought him to power, international sanctions, 
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cruise missile strikes by the United States, and two devastating civil wars, one of which 
led to the independence of South Sudan in a 2011 referendum.331 Bashir’s survival in 
office is due in no small part to his support within the Sudanese armed forces, which have 
come to comprise not only the regular army but a plethora of parallel military institutions.  
This chapter argues that Bashir’s support stems from his use of ethnic stacking 
within Sudan’s armed forces, which do not rule directly but are deliberately manipulated 
to serve the interests of a northern, Arab elite that have dominated Sudan’s political 
institutions since the country’s independence in 1956. Like Nigeria’s rulers, Bashir is a 
high-ranking military officer who came to power in a democracy-ending coup. Yet unlike 
in Nigeria, the main co-conspirator in the coup was not the military itself, but Sudan’s 
National Islamist Front (NIF), a party that sought to remake Sudan into an Islamist state. 
Other than Bashir, few senior military offices serve in non-national security-related roles, 
which are instead mostly filled by civilian politicians. By serving as the military’s key 
interlocutor with a civilian political sphere, Bashir was eventually able to personalize his 
rule after a confrontation with Hassan al-Turabi, an Islamist politician whom many 
considered the power behind the throne in the early years of Bashir’s tenure.  
After it seized power, the NIF became split between those like Bashir, who saw it 
as a vehicle to continue the North’s dominance of Sudan’s political and military 
institutions, and Turabi, who sought to mobilize non-Arab Muslims in peripheral regions 
in support of the regime.  The confrontation was won by Bashir after Turabi was expelled 
                                                          
331 Unless otherwise specified, demographic statistics cited in this chapter refer to the whole of Sudan prior 
to participation in 2011.  
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from the NIF and imprisoned in 1999. Critical to Bashir’s victory in this confrontation 
was his use of his position as head to state and party leader to maintain control over 
Sudan’s military institutions. Though the country practices a policy of national 
conscription, Arabs have historically been significantly overrepresented in the officer 
corps of the regular army. In the early days of Bashir’s rule, his regime reinforced the 
northern dominance of the military’s highest echelons and purged large numbers of 
officers they suspected of being disloyal to the Islamist cause. 
In addition to these purges, the army retained its loyalty to Bashir in part because 
of the creation of a parallel military institution, the Popular Defense Force (PDF). In 
principle, the PDF was meant to replace the traditional military with an Islamist one that 
appealed to a broader portion of Sudan’s population, 70 percent of which practices Islam. 
In practice, the group was controlled by an Arabo-Islamist officer corps and composed of 
a combination of Arab militia groups and conscripts, who went through training meant to 
indoctrinate them into Islamist principles. After the PDF proved to be ineffective on the 
battlefield, Bashir marginalized the institution by placing it under his personal control. In 
this way, both the PDF and the regular army have checked one another’s influence and 
have been instrumental in ruthlessly repressing protests that have at times challenged 
Bashir’s rule.  
Beyond the regular army and the PDF, the final, most destructive, and perhaps 
most crucial instrument though which Bashir has been able to sustain himself has been 
through use of ethnic militias as instruments of repression and war. Since the mid-1980s, 
the Sudanese state has incorporated organized joint military operations, funded and allied 
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with numerous militias who recruit exclusively along ethnic lines. In the south, home to 
mostly Christian and animist groups, the Sudanese government worked closely with tribal 
militia groups to wage war and exploit divisions among rebel groups. In Darfur, where 
Islam predominates but where Arab tribes make up roughly one third of the population, 
the Sudanese militaries conducted an almost identical strategy of funding Arab ethnic 
militias to violently repress groups opposed to Bashir’s rule. These militias have been 
crucial to helping Bashir maintain power, but at horrific cost. 
Sudan thus offers a particularly compelling contrast with Nigeria, another large, 
ethnically diverse, formerly British petro-state divided between a mostly Muslim North 
and Christian and animist South. As in Nigeria, a military officer seized power—in part 
to serve the interests of the northern elite that historically dominated the country’s 
political institutions—and made further efforts to cement control by appointing co-
ethnics into key positions within the regular army. Yet the parallels end there. Nigeria’s 
military leaders were never so blatant in their attempt to transform both the country and 
the armed forces into instruments of ethnic rule. They remained committed in principle, if 
not always in practice, to regionally and ethnically representative military recruitment 
and promotion, and insisted that the regular army serve as the regime’s primary coercive 
force. In the Sudan, Arabs dominated the officer corps not only of the regular army, but 
also paramilitary institutions that have demonstrated unwavering loyalty to the Sudanese 
regime and a near limitless capacity for violence. Only through the ruthless militarization 
of ethnic differences has the Sudanese regime managed to remain so long in power.  
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The remainder of this chapter is divided into seven sections. The second section 
provides basic background information on Sudan and situates the country within the 
broader universe of African cases. The third examines how the fact that the 1989 coup 
was masterminded by the NIF political party meant that the coup leaders chose to not to 
institutionalize military rule, but rather to enact a civilian-led government. The fourth 
section argues that the primary civil-military cleavages in Sudan are ethno-regional in 
character, and illustrates how Bashir was able to use his status as a representative of the 
northern Arab elite to stack the Sudanese Armed Forces and consolidate power. The 
subsequent sections illustrate how these cleavages have contributed to the resilience of 
authoritarianism in Sudan. The fifth section examines Bashir’s clash with Turabi, arguing 
that the latter’s control over the military and parallel military institutions were crucial in 
cementing his control over Sudan’s political system and blocking the potential for greater 
liberalization. In the sixth section, I examine the Sudanese government’s use of ethnic 
militias to wage war and repress demands for popular representation both in Darfur and 
the Sudan, leading to war and the eventual secession of the country’s South. In the 
seventh section, I briefly examine how the Sudan’s legacy of ethnically stacked military 
forces contributed to the current civil war in South Sudan, which inherited fragmented, 
deeply polarized security institutions. In the final section, I summarize how the casual 
processes behind Sudanese military’s support for Bashir’s regime reflect this 





6.1: Sudan in Context: Background, History and Case Selection 
 
Prior to partition, Sudan was home to over fifty million people and encompassed 
close to one million square miles of territory, one third the size of the continental United 
States (see Figure 1). Bordered by 11 countries in the heart of northeast Africa, home to 
hundreds of ethnic groups and a mixture of Islam, Christianity and indigenous religions, 
Sudan was considered by many to be its own microcosm of the African continent. A 
former English colony,332 Sudan has historically been divided between a predominantly 
Arab and Islamic North, an ethnically diverse and Christian / animist South, and a West 
where Islam predominates but there exists a mix between Arab and indigenous self-
identified ethnic groups (see Table 1). Though the country benefits from substantial oil 
wealth, a near continuous history of war since independence in 1956 has contributed to 
make GDP per capita the lowest of the three countries considered in this dissertation.  
Sudan offers a particularly compelling comparison to Nigeria. Sudan was Africa’s 
largest country in terms of land mass; Nigeria is the continent’s most populous. Both 
countries are former British colonies, with substantial religious, ethnic, and cultural 
differences between a predominantly Islamic North and predominantly Christian South. 
The regimes of both countries are dependent upon oil reserves, which are responsible for 
most government revenue. In both nations, oil wealth, periods of economic stagnation, 
and political divides have led to major post-independence civil wars. Nigeria’s two most 
                                                          
332 During the colonial period, Sudan was technically jointly administered by Egypt and Great Britain, 
though it was the English who effectively ruled. For a concise summary of the history of this arrangement, 
see Robert Collins, A History of Modern Sudan (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 33-68. 
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serious conflicts were the short but intense Biafran civil war between 1967 and 1970, 
which nearly led to the secession of the southeastern part of the country, and the more 
recent conflict with Boko Haram, which has devastated the country’s Northeast. For 
Sudan, nearly continuous conflict between the North and South since independence 
ultimately led to the secession of the south in 2011, though conflict continues in the 
borderlands of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. More recently, an ongoing conflict in 
the Western region of Darfur led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands and is considered 
one of the greatest human tragedies of the twenty-first century.  
Finally, in both countries, military leaders seized power from democratically 
elected governments in the 1980s. In 1983, the Nigerian military seized power and the 
country was formally and informally ruled by a group of military officers until 1999, 
when the military left power. In 1989, Colonel Omar al-Bashir seized power in a coup 
backed by Islamist political and military factions, and has since personalized his rule after 
winning a confrontation with Islamists in the late 1990s. Though the military’s backing 
has been crucial to maintaining Bashir in power, the military has little influence in day to 
day policy decisions and does not openly rule, a subtle but crucial distinction with 
Nigeria. Bashir’s authoritarian regime is the longest serving in Sudan’s history, and the 
fact that Bashir has managed to remain in power for over 26 years provides another 
remarkable contrast to Nigeria’s rapid succession of military rulers followed by its 
































































































Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators and CIA World Factbook 
 
As the remainder of this chapter will argue, differences in the civil-military 
relations under both authoritarian regimes are crucial to understanding authoritarian 
persistence in Sudan. In Nigeria, a predominantly Northern elite has monopolized power, 
but at times shown willingness to cede the country’s highest office to Southern members 
of non-Muslim ethnic groups. Though ethnic stacking pervaded the Nigerian military 
throughout its period of authoritarian rule and constituted an important obstacle to the 
country’s democratization, Nigeria’s military leaders and the institution itself remained 
committed in principle to a multi-ethnic state. In Sudan, the regime’s basis of power is far 
narrower. Sudan’s state institutions, including the top posts of the armed forces, have 
historically been monopolized by a sub-group of Northern or riverain Arabs that come 
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from three tribes who constitute about five percent of the population. One of the key 
mechanisms through which this group has been able to maintain power is by divide-and-
rule tactics, which has kept Sudan’s periphery in a near constant state of conflict by 
polarizing the country along ethnic lines. Unlike Nigeria, Sudan has relied extensively on 
Arab-dominated parallel military institutions, including the PDF and private, ethnic 
militias to repress local dissidents and wage war in the country’s periphery. These 
parallel military institutions have at times served as a direct substitute for the regular 
army and possess a seemingly limitless willingness to be used as an instrument of 
repression. Sudan, in other words, represents a case of ethnic stacking to the extreme, 
with ethnic recruitment a common facet of the regular army and parallel military 
institutions alike.  
Finally, it is important to note that the militarization of tribal identity in Sudan is 
neither due to ancient hatreds nor fixed tribal customs, but to deliberate attempts by 
political leaders to exploit identities for political mobilization and gain. Though Sudan’s 
northern elites in Khartoum have long favored ideologies that promote the Islamic and 
Arab character of Sudan, the militarization of “Arab” and “African” identities is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Sudanese ‘Africanism’ developed to a large degree as a 
response to the notion of Arab supremacism; the SPLA leader John Garang used the idea 
of an “African majority” counter the Sudanese government’s claim that the Sudan should 
be an Islamic State because it had a majority Muslim population.333 Likewise, most 
                                                          
333 Alex De Waal. “Who Are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External 
Engagement.” African Affairs 104, no. 415 (2005), p. 199. 
233 
 
Darfurians historically would not have identified themselves as “Africans.” In Darfur 
itself, an “Arab supremacist” ideology did not exist until the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
when, some of Darfur’s Arabs began to draw on their Juhayna identities to combat 
Khartoum’s claims that they were second-rate Arabs at best.334 They were abetted by the 
Arab Gathering, a Ghaddafi-inspired organization with aims of spreading an Arab 
homeland across the Sahel, who in 1987 sent a now notorious letter demanding better 
Arab representation in Darfur, falsely claiming that Arab tribes represented more than 70 
percent of the population, and threatening violence should their demands not be met.335 
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Figure 6.1: Political Map of Sudan 




6.2: The Choice: The National Islamist Front (NIF) and Omar al-Bashir’s Coup 
 
On June 30, 1989, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by an obscure colonel 
by the name of Omar al-Bashir, seized power from the civilian government of Sadiq al-
Mahdi. The seizure of power came amidst significant popular discontent. Sudan’s 
democracy, which lasted only three years, had proved itself incapable of managing a 
stagnant economy and overseeing a six-year war that had re-erupted between the North 
and South. Like past officers who had come to power at the barrel of a gun, Bashir 
“justified his coup and his policies as the only alternative to civilian mismanagement.”336  
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Bashir appointed a Revolutionary Command 
Council composed exclusively of military officers to rule the country, and appointed 
himself head of state, defense minister, and commander in chief of the armed forces. The 
constitution was suspended, parliament dissolved, emergency rule imposed, and the usual 
spate of officers suspected of disloyalty to the regime retired.337 
In many respects, the SAF coup was similar to the seizure of power by the 
Nigerian military in 1983. It took place in an environment of significant internal unrest, 
ended a brief period of democracy, and was enacted by a relatively small group of 
Muslim officers with ethnic ties to the country’s North. Yet these similarities mask a 
crucial difference essential to understanding support within the Sudanese Armed Forces 
for authoritarian rule. The military seizure of power in Sudan was masterminded not from 
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within the armed forces, but by the National Islamist Front (NIF), a political party 
committed to turning Sudan into an Islamist state.338 The NIF infiltrated the military and, 
after being rebuffed by several other officers, recruited Bashir to lead the coup attempt. 
Among the first moves of the military-controlled RCC was not only to arrest much of the 
political class, but also to place under house arrest Hassan al-Turabi, the NIF leader who 
was reportedly behind the coup. In fact, this turned out to be an elaborate ruse designed to 
placate wary Western governments while giving Islamists, who were a minority party, the 
opportunity to seize control of the organs of government. In December 1989, Turabi was 
released from prison, upon which all members of the RCC, including Bashir, swore an 
oath of allegiance.339 
The pre-eminent role of the NIF in planning and organizing the coup d’état meant 
that Sudan did not follow Nigeria down the path to a full-blown military regime. Instead, 
during the early years of the Bashir administration the NIF attempted to assert control 
over nearly all aspects of government. Unions and secular political parties were banned, 
their properties confiscated. All but the most loyal newspapers were shut down, and the 
government cracked down on human rights activists, university professors, and 
intellectuals, many of whom left the country. Sharia laws were implemented more 
stringently than ever before, forcing thousands of women from their jobs and leading to 
many arbitrary arrests, public floggings, and other penalties for “scandalous conduct” and 
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“immodest dress.”340 Much of the judiciary was replaced, with the Islamist Jalal Ali Lutfi 
appointed as chief justice. Ministerial positions that were not directly related to national 
security were filled with mostly NIF-affiliated civilian appointees. In October of 1993, 
the RCC was dissolved, Omar al-Bashir became the country’s civilian president, and 
Turabi was appointed the speaker of an NIF-dominated parliament. With his election, 
Bashir was able to accomplish what his authoritarian counterparts in Nigeria never could, 
becoming Sudan’s head of state while ending the military’s formal control of the country.  
 
6.3: Civil-Military Cleavages: Bashir as a Scion of the Northern Arab Elite 
 
Though Bashir was a political neophyte, over time he and his close associates 
came to represent the interests of the Northern or riverain Arab elite, a group that has 
dominated Sudan’s state institutions since independence. The riverain Arabs, and in 
particular three tribes that live along the Nile north of Khartoum and constitute about five 
percent of the population, represent an elite-within-the-elite; every Sudanese president 
has hailed from this northern region and its officials have made up a majority of 
ministerial and other high level positions in nearly every government since 
independence.341 The three main groups from this region are the Ja’aliyiin of President 
Bashir, the Shagiyya of former vice-president Ali Osman Mohamed Taha and the Dangla 
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of Defense Minister Bakri Hassan Saleh.342 The riverain Sudanese are “overwhelmingly 
Arabic speaking… wholly Muslim and to a greater or lesser degree identify themselves 
as genealogically and culturally Arab.”343  
Bashir and his fellow officers represented this elite in that they shared a 
“monolithic vision of the identity of Sudan,” maintaining “that Islam, the majority 
religion, and Arabic, the language of the Quran, represented the essential basis for the 
country’s nationalism and should define its legal political and economic systems.”344 
Bashir was neither the first nor the last head of state to attempt to govern all of Sudan in 
the name of Islamist principles and on the basis of Arab identity, despite the fact that only 
70 percent of the country practiced Islam and about 40 percent identify as Arab.345 Even 
in pre-colonial times, what is now modern Sudan was wracked by significant political 
and social divisions between the country’s North, where Islam predominates and where 
most groups identify as Arab, the West, where many non-Arab groups practice more 
syncretic forms of Islam, and the South, which was for the most part neither Islamic nor 
Arabic. During the colonial period, the British favored an elite from within these 
Northern communities, who saw Arab culture as inextricably bound in the formation of 
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the Sudanese state.346 In 1966, Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of one of Sudan’s two main 
political parties at the time, proclaimed, “the dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic 
one and its overpowering expression is Arab, and this Nation will not have its entity 
identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival.”347  
The deliberate political marginalization of non-Arab, non-Islamic groups have 
played an important in political competition and political conflict throughout Sudan’s 
post-independence history. After privileging the North and neglecting the South, the 
British attempt to unify both regions helped ignite the post-independence civil war, which 
lasted from 1955 to 1972. In 1983, President al-Nimeiri attempted to further cement the 
political power of Arab and Islamist ethno-nationalist groups by instituting country-wide 
Sharia law, an action which helped prompt the second war. According to Lesch, the 
rebellion’s “aims of establishing a nonreligious, nonethnic government in which all the 
diverse peoples of Sudan would have an equal share threatened the essence of a Muslim 
and Arab-oriented country.”348 Five years later, the NIF coup was prompted by its 
expulsion from the al-Mahdi government as part of negotiation efforts to end the second 
civil war, which likely would have resulted in more regional autonomy for the South and 
formal recognition for secular, non-Arab political parties and groups. In short, Arab 
groups have monopolized on Sudan’s politics since independence, and the 1989 coup can 
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be read to a large degree as an attempt by the country’s Arabized elite, and in particular 
the Northern elite, to preserve political dominance. 
The dominance of Arab groups extends to the SAF officer corps. Exact statistics 
are not available due to their sensitive nature, but the consensus among scholars is that 
the dominance of Arab officers is persistent. According to Lesch, the British recruited 
officers for what became the SAF from mostly urban, educated elite based around 
Khartoum in the North, who were required to pass oral and written exams and display 
proficiency in Arabic. In 1981, at most five to 10 percent of officers in the Sudanese 
officers were Southerners.349 Though up to 60 percent of enlisted men were drawn from 
western regions such as Darfur and South Kordofan, soldiers from these areas were met 
with suspicion, had their numbers capped and were underrepresented in the officer corps. 
Even when Sudan was at peace between 1972 and 1983 and Southerners were integrated 
into the armed forces, no Southerners held important commands, and attempts by the 
government to transfer Southern troops to the North because of doubts about their loyalty 
helped justify a renewal of the Sudanese civil war. Arab officers have continued to 
dominate the SAF officer corps in the Bashir era, even after the 2005 peace agreement.350 
In fact, the seizure of power by the NIF government allowed Bashir to strengthen 
his hold over the military in two crucial respects: by purging officers hostile to the 
Islamist agenda and by appointing co-ethnics from a small sub-group of Northern Arab 
tribes into key positions in the military’s highest ranks. Despite the Arab bias within the 
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officer corps, Bashir appears to initially have been opposed by a number of groups within 
the armed forces that were either more moderate in their political leanings or seeking 
themselves to seize power.351 Bashir’s response was to purge hundreds of officers who 
were not affiliated with the NIF agenda, sometimes brutally. In April 1990, Bashir’s 
government executed 28 officers in the aftermath of an alleged coup plot, an act which 
“left the majority of active duty officers silent for fear of being dismissed, jailed or 
shot.”352 Within the first five years of his rule, Bashir forced as much as one third of the 
Sudanese officer corps not affiliated with the NIF into retirement.353 The precise effect of 
these purges on ethnic representation within the Sudanese officer corps is unclear, though 
it is likely that his actions further increased representation of Northern Arab groups most 
likely to supportive of Bashir’s agenda. Regardless, the atmosphere of fear created by 
Bashir’s purges and the NIF infiltration of the military was sufficient such that the several 
coup plots that emerged over the subsequent years never appear to have advanced much 
beyond the planning stages, were not well connected to the political class, and were 
quickly snuffed out by loyalists within the military.  
Bashir’s efforts to purge the officer corps of those opposed to the NIF agenda was 
accompanied by efforts to even further narrow the political representation of senior 
officers, who were almost exclusively appointed from Northern or “riverain” Arab tribes. 
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Under al-Mahdi’s government, Northern Arabs were considerably overrepresented but 
less so than they had been at any point in post-independence Sudanese history, filling 
about 45 percent of the country’s ministerial positions.354 Under Bashir’s government, 
Northerners had filled 60 percent of all ministerial positions, 80 percent of the top staff 
appointees in the presidential palace, and two thirds of the Revolutionary Command 
Council (the RCC). Nearly all presidential ministers, ministers of defense, and ministers 
of internal affairs were generals from the North. When the RCC was disbanded, only 
Northern officers remained in the government, and most senior generals in the Sudanese 
administration appear to be of riverain extraction.355  
Civil-military relations under Bashir’s government therefore follow my 
argument’s predictions and fall principally along ethno-regional lines. Bashir’s status as a 
personalist, civilian dictator allowed him to shape Sudan’s security institutions in ways 
that have assured their loyalty, and his use of ethnic stacking has helped make soldiers in 
Sudan’s military and paramilitary institutions the dictator’s most reliable allies. The 
support of the Sudanese armed forces have been the lynchpin of his rule, and was crucial 
in helping Bashir overcome one of his regime’s first major crises: a major confrontation 
with Turabi, the Islamist leader who was widely credited with bringing him to power and 
to whom he had supposedly sworn allegiance.   
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6.4: The Critical Juncture: The Confrontation Between Turabi and Bashir  
 
The appointment of co-ethnics and other party loyalists in key positions within the 
armed forces may have been a necessary condition to stabilize Bashir’s rule. Yet ethnic 
stacking within the regular army also occurred in Nigeria under military rule, meaning it 
was not likely sufficient. More importantly, the removal of the military from political 
power limited the political access of Bashir’s rivals within the military and prevented the 
same kinds of debates over how and when to leave power. Perhaps just as crucially, 
Bashir was able to mobilize powerful parallel military institutions that served both to 
complement and counterbalance the SAF. Support from Sudan’s security institutions 
were crucial in helping the dictator maintain power, particularly during a 1999 
confrontation with his erstwhile mentor, Hassan al-Turabi.  
The most visible parallel military institution was known as the Popular Defense 
Forces (PDF). Founded by legal decree in November 1989 and composed of Islamist 
party activists, Arab militias based in the south and west of the country, and students, 
youth, and conscripts, the PDF was intended to become one of the regime’s primary 
instruments of political and popular mobilization.356 All male Sudanese citizens over the 
age of 16 were required to attend PDF training, which was supervised by pro-NIF 
military officers, and included “Islamist lectures, religious songs, and chants alongside 
basic military training.”357 The PDF was also initially intended to replace the SAF, whose 
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loyalty the Islamists felt was suspect and whose fighting capacity had at that time been 
significantly diminished as a result of years of civil war.  
In part, the struggle over the PDF became a deeper contest for power between 
Bashir, who came to represent the interests of the northern elite and Turabi, the NIF party 
founder who attempted to “broaden the agenda and the constituency of the Islamist 
movement” by appealing to all Muslims, including those of West African and Sudanese 
extraction, such as the Hausa, the Fulani, the Fellatta, and Darfurian groups such as the 
Fur and Masalit.358 This “Western strategy” was ostensibly meant to undermine the 
orientation of Islam in Sudan towards the Arab world. Though the Western strategy 
initially won the support of some non-Arab non-Muslim groups, as time went on and 
Bashir consolidated his control over the Sudanese political system, it became increasingly 
clear that the Northern elite had little intention of sharing power.  
Through a deft series of manipulations, Bashir managed both to turn the PDF into 
an important paramilitary force while maintaining the loyalty of the SAF. In the first 
place, despite the attempt to draw recruits from across a broad spectrum of Sudanese 
society, the PDF maintained a “a distinct Arab-Islamic philosophy.”359 The PDF was a 
heterogenous organization, and many of its units were simply rural, Arab militias that had 
been incorporated into the PDF at its founding and were supplied through local PDF 
offices and committees.360 Its upper echelons were dominated by Islamist student groups 
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which also had a distinct Arab orientation, principally the Muslim Brotherhood. And as 
with the regular army, the Westerners and Southerners recruited into its ranks were 
mostly used as foot soldiers. Thus, though the PDF’s orientation was designed to give it a 
nationally representative veneer, in practice it was still controlled by the Arab elite. 
 This structure allowed Bashir to use the PDF as a force that both counterbalanced 
and complemented the regular army. The PDF counterbalanced the armed forces in the 
sense that it was a parallel military institution with a separate command structure. Its 
urban units were specially designed as instruments of social control and to provide a 
disincentive to the Sudanese armed forces to attempt a coup. Accompanying the regime’s 
extensive purges of disloyal military officers in the early 1990s was the forced 
recruitment of military officers into the PDF for reeducation. By 1996, the PDF’s 
150,000 members outnumber the 80,000 soldiers who served in the army, and were being 
extensively recruited to fight large-scale combat offensives.361   
Yet the PDF also complemented the SAF. For one, the emphasis on indoctrination 
into Islamist principles meant that PDF recruits did not receive nearly the same level of 
training as their military counterparts. This allowed Khartoum “to continue the war 
without large numbers of Northerners dying. PDF forces have been crucial in conflicts in 
Sudan as low-cost alternatives to trained military professionals.”362 Between 1992 and 
1995, the PDF was used as cannon fodder in campaigns against Southern rebel 
strongholds, which led to massive casualties.  
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As his rift with Turabi over the direction of the NIF widened, Bashir was able to 
use disenchantment within the PDF and his support within the regular army to further 
secure his hold on power. Though the PDF might have been a convenient prop, it was 
ineffective in combat and despised by the SAF, the two key factors that prevented it from 
attaining its ambitious goals. According to Salmon, the PDF’s coercive recruitment 
practices angered most Sudanese, including “devout and highly orthodox Muslims who 
did not adhere to the NIF’s project.”363 Many young men went to great lengths to escape 
conscription. One newspaper reported in 1997 that of the 70,000 graduates and drop-outs 
legally obligated to attend training, only 4,000 had joined the PDF.364 Even more 
importantly, the PDF was despised by many in the Sudanese military.365 According to 
Collins, “senior officers never trusted Turabi… and were determined not to permit the 
rabble of the PDF to supersede their authority.”366 Bashir, too, had “assiduously 
cultivated his popularity with the military, particularly the officer corps, for he was one of 
them.”367 Signs that the military had prevailed on the regime to reign in the PDF became 
clear in 1997, when mass recruitment into the PDF was eased, the armed forces was 
allowed to take de facto control of internal appointments into the organization, and a 
higher authority for mobilization led by a Northern general who reported directly to 
Bashir was placed in charge of the PDF. In 1998, compulsory national service for the 
SAF was re-instated.368 
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Backing from the country’s security institutions was crucial in Bashir’s ultimate 
confrontation with Turabi, which reached a climax in 1999. After signing legislation in 
which Sharia law became the country’s sole source of legislation and which significantly 
expanded the powers of the presidency, Turabi used the opening to reconstitute the NIF 
into the National Congress Party (NCP) and attempted to broaden his base of support by 
reaching out to other parties. He used his leverage within the newly formed NCP to give 
himself the power to approve official nominations before they were submitted to the 
National Assembly, where he was the speaker. He then proposed legislation to allow 
governors to be elected directly rather than be selected by Bashir, and sought to push 
through a constitutional amendment that would allow a two-thirds vote of parliament to 
depose the president. This last act Bashir deemed a mortal threat to his presidency and 
mobilized the armed forces.369 On December 12, days before the National Assembly was 
to vote to curb Bashir’s powers, soldiers and tanks surrounded the legislative building, 
allowing Bashir to dismiss Turabi as speaker and dissolved the National Assembly. 
Shortly thereafter, elections that were neither free nor fair were held in northern Sudan, in 
which Bashir was able to claim a mandate by winning 86 percent of the vote. 
Bashir’s deft and pragmatic manipulation of schisms within Sudan’s elite were 
thus a crucial element of his ability to maintain control of the Sudanese political system.  
Much more so than Turabi, Bashir used Islamism as a political tool to keep Sudan’s 
Northern Arab elites in power.  By contrast, Turabi’s pan-Islamist rhetoric often belied 
his actions. In 1992, for example, he called Islamists of the “Negroid tribes” of Darfur 
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enemies of the state, and supported the arming of Arab tribes to forcefully disarm 
them.370 In Flint and de Waal’s estimation: 
the Islamist promise was a sham. Local government was still bankrupt; 
banditry was still rife; drought and desertification continued to spark local 
conflicts that the governor could not, or would not, try to stop. And before 
long Sudan's 'westerners' found that their version of Islam was not, after 
all, accepted on its own terms: they were regarded as true Muslims only if 
they adopted Arab values and culture. In the decade following the 1989 
putsch, the differences between President Bashir and the mercurial Turabi 
became ever more apparent. Turabi had ambitions for revolution 
throughout Africa and the Middle East; Bashir held to the traditional view 
of Sudan as the possession of an Arabised elite.371 
As is evident by the events of 1999, the continued domination of the Arabized elite, in 
particular the riverain elite, over Sudan’s governing institutions were crucial catalysts for 
keeping Bashir in power and allowing him to personalize his rule.  
And perhaps no institutions were more essential to maintaining Bashir in power 
than Sudan’s military and paramilitary institutions, which Bashir’s status as a civilian 
leader with a military background placed him into enviable position to manipulate. In the 
early years of his rule, Bashir had actively used the PDF and the Islamist agenda as a 
cudgel through which to dismiss disloyal officers, diminish the military’s capability to 
enact a coup, and repress civilian dissent. At the same time, Bashir used the threat of 
irrelevance to shore up support within the SAF for a confrontation with hard-core 
Islamists when the time was right. Within Sudan’s elite, Bashir’s status as a civilian 
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leader offered him an ability to cultivate a power base independent of the military that 
Nigeria’s leaders did not have.  
 
6.5: Ethnic Militias and the Suppression of the Periphery 
 
The decline of the PDF coincided with the rise of cheaper, deadlier and far more 
destructive paramilitary organizations: proxy militias. These groups, nearly all of which 
exploited tribal ties for recruiting soldiers, have become Sudan’s most ubiquitous armed 
movements. The degree to which these organizations cooperated with the Sudanese state 
varied: some were supplied and equipped by, conducted joint operations alongside, and 
even shared the same barracks with regular forces. Others operated more independently, 
with indirect sanction. In each instance, however, the strategy was more or less the same: 
Khartoum employed these militias to deliberately target civilians from other ethnic 
groups, waging a form of unrestrained warfare that worsened existing conflicts and, at 
times, created new ones in formerly peaceful areas. As a result, the peripheral regions of 
the Sudanese state have been in a near constant-state of conflict with one another and 
with Khartoum. The Sudanese regime’s Machiavellian use of these militias to exploit of 






6.5.1: War in the South 
 
Contrary to popular misconceptions, ethnic militias largely did not exist in Sudan 
until the 1980s, comparatively late in Sudan’s country’s post-colonial history. Their 
widespread use developed as a strategic response to advances made by the Southern 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in the earlier phases of the second Sudanese civil war. 
As the war progressed, the arming of tribal based groups with modern weaponry to 
ravage the south and exploit divisions among SPLA leaders became the central plank of 
the government of Sudan’s war-fighting strategy. Escalating the conflict in this matter 
further embittered ties between the North and the South, but helped maintain Bashir in 
power by dividing previously peaceful areas into militarized factions and facilitating 
fractures within the SPLA from which South Sudan has never fully recovered.  
The early phases of the second civil war did not go well for the government of 
Sudan. Faced with a well-armed, mobile enemy, the SAF initially ceded vast amounts of 
territory and lost most of the war’s opening engagements. Economic crisis and poor 
morale plagued the SAF, whose fighting efficiency had been degraded by prolonged 
deployments and significant casualties. The practice of relying primarily on Southerners 
to fight the war proved a liability because enlisted Southern soldiers often had ties to the 
SPLA and hesitated to be used to kill their compatriots.372 Initially, the government 
attempted to re-orient it’s strategy by making the PDF spearhead the offensive while 
regular forces in the South primarily defended garrisons and other fixed points of attack. 
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As discussed in the previous section, the poor training received by PDF recruits likewise 
ended up backfiring, making them good for use as little more than cannon fodder. With 
the decline of the PDF, the use of tribal militias became an increasingly central 
component of the government of Sudan’s warfighting strategy.  
The process of “militarizing tribalism” in Sudan began with the government 
recruiting Northern Muslim Arabic-speaking tribes bordering the south into militias 
known as the murahiliin in order to check the advances of the SPLA. These groups, 
collectively known as Baggara Arabs but made up a number of subgroups, provided 
particularly convenient sources of recruitment because their areas were directly 
threatened by Southern advances. In addition, many members were skilled in the use of 
modern weapons because of a history of service in the Sudanese army.373 The Sudanese 
government’s strategy of unleashing the murahiliin proved critical in preventing the 
SPLA from ever mounting a sustained offensive in northern Sudan. They did this not just 
by engaging in battles with rebel forces, but also by terrorizing members of non-Arab 
ethnic groups and conducting cross-border raids into the South, significantly increasing 
the scope, the costs and consequences of the war. 
The experience of the Ngok Dinka and Homr Arabs serves as a good example of 
how the use of the murahiliin by the Sudanese government helped blunt the progress of 
rebel groups northward while militarizing peaceful regions of the country. The Ngok 
Dinka are the only sub-group of the several million Dinka that were administered in 
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northern Sudan, in the province of South Kordofan. In part because of cordial ties 
between the ruling families, the Ngok Dinka co-existed peacefully with the Homr Arabs, 
a subgroup of the Baggara who outnumbered the Dinka in the region.374 During the 
second civil war, the government of Sudan recruited the Homr Arabs into militia groups 
to fight against the Southern rebel movement, but did not use them to hit military targets. 
Instead, as recounted by Deng, the Homr Arab militias were unleashed “against their 
Dinka neighbors. They killed at random, looted cattle, razed villages to the ground, and 
captured women and children as slaves.”375 The strategy succeeded in ripping the 
previously peaceful community apart, with the Dinka in the area now firmly aligned with 
the South and the Arabs aligned with the North. Not only did the use of ethnic militias in 
such a manner decrease the need for Khartoum to rely on its regular army; the Homr 
militia in South Kordofan became a buffer between the rebels and Khartoum and was 
indebted to the regime for continued funding and political support.  
The strategy was also employed with perhaps even greater effect to take the fight 
into the South itself, where, as de Waal observes, “the government of Sudan played an 
effective game of divide and rule, exploiting the greed and grievance of southern elites to 
turn the civil war into an internecine conflict between southern Sudanese armed groups, 
with militia commanders selling their services to the highest bidder.”376 At first, the 
Sudanese government merely exploited links with local groups that formed to defend 
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themselves from heavy-handed SPLA tactics, such as assassinations of local leaders, 
corruption, and forced recruitment methods. These groups, including the Bari, Mundari, 
Didinga, Toposa and Fertit, became known as the “Friendly Forces.” These forces had a 
relationship with the government that was mainly “tactical and defensive,” receiving 
arms and training from the Sudanese government in order to defend their communities 
against a common enemy.377 
However, the greatest damage to the rebel war effort occurred in 1991, when the 
SPLA-United, led by Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. Lam Akol, split off from the SPLMA-
Mainstream, led by Dr. John Garang. Although Machar and Akol cited their opposition to 
Garan’s vision of a united Sudan and their desire for Southern self-determination as 
reasons for the split, Garang’s dictatorial style and recruitment of his Dinka co-ethnics 
into top positions of the SPLA also loomed large. The result of the dispute was a further 
tribalization of the conflict, resulting in “wide-ranging and brutal war” between the 
Dinkas one side and the Nuers and Shiluks, who fought for Machar and Akol, on the 
other.378 Both sides deliberately targeted civilian non co-ethnics, including the brutal 
1991 “Bor Massacre” where the Nuer White Army fighting alongside Machar killed 
2,000 Dinka civilians.379 When the better equipped SPLA mainstream won, Riek and 
Akol turned to Khartoum for arms and survival, signing agreements in 1992 and 1996 in 
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which, contrary to the rebels’ stated aims, the unity of Sudan was unequivocally re-
affirmed.380 Though the liberation movement did not totally collapse, it never regained its 
former vigor, and Garang was left as the only commander in the country with a military 
force viable enough to take on Khartoum.  
The civil war with South Sudan was finally brought to an end in 2005, when the 
government of Sudan and the main rebel groups signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, both sides laid down their arms in 
exchange for a dual share in Sudan’s governance, oil wealth, and a referendum to be held 
in 2011 during which South Sudan would decide once and for all whether to stay or to 
part ways with Sudan. The agreement was hailed mainly as a victory for the South, who 
had managed to convince much of the Northern establishment that the conflict was not 
winnable through military means. Despite the doubling of Sudan’s military budget and 
the joint efforts of the SAF, the PDF, and affiliated militias, the regime could not claim a 
single substantial battlefield victory over the SPLA in the South.381 Moreover, the 
government hoped to normalize relations with the United States in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks by cooperating with the United States on terror and bringing 
the war against Southern Sudan to an end.  
Despite the heavy price, however, Sudan’s policy of total war against the South 
succeeded in keeping the Bashir regime intact and Bashir’s position as a personalist 
dictator secure. The regime’s mobilize of Arab militias prevented any dreams the SPLA 
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had of bringing the fight to the North by militarizing the border regions. And the regime’s 
divide and rule tactics prevented the formation of any politically or militarily unified 
opposition that could pose a fundamental threat to Khartoum. The existence of armed 
factions whose collective force in fact had come to outnumber Garang’s SPLA meant 
that, regardless of the outcome of the referendum, Southern Sudan’s political leaders 
would be as consumed by struggle amongst themselves as they were with Khartoum. 
Finally, beginning the early 2000s, the Sudanese regime faced a much more existential 
threat to its rule: the rise of armed insurgent groups in Darfur, who had long attempted to 
make common cause with the South and were equally incensed at Sudan’s domination by 




The origins of the current conflict in Darfur begin with the fallout from the split 
within the Northern Sudanese ruling coalition. With the expulsion of Turabi, many 
Darfurians who had come into government the Islamist movement left and founded the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the two major rebel groups in Darfur. The 
JEM’s publication of the Black Book in 2000 laid bare the extent to which the riverain 
Arab elite dominated Sudanese institutions of government at the expense of everyone 
else. Though the JEM was the militarily weaker of the two main rebel groups, it was the 
most feared by the government. This is because its leader, Khalil Ibrahim, was a 
charismatic former NIF insider with close links to Turabi. His main concern was not the 
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neglect and marginalization of Darfur but the unity of Sudan. By taking up arms against 
the Sudanese government, Khalil hoped to delegitimize the central government, foster 
regime change, and prevent self-determination for South Sudan.382 The direct threat that 
the split within the Islamist movement posed was a powerful motivating factor behind 
Khartoum’s willingness to negotiate with the Southern rebels; had Bashir’s government 
agreed to incorporate Darfur into the 2005 CPA, it could have meant the end of his 
regime. 
Shortly after the publication of the Black Book, members of the Fur, Zaghawa, 
and Masalit tribes mobilized into the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), the second major 
rebel group in Darfur. Free of association from the regime in Khartoum and as a coalition 
of three of Darfur’s largest ethnic groups, the SLA eclipsed the JEM in terms of 
manpower, equipment, resources, and fighting capacity. In 2002, they began mounting 
offensives against government police stations and army convoys. In February 2003, the 
SLA announced itself publicly after a major attack on Golo, the district headquarters of 
the province of Jebel Marra. JEM followed suit shortly thereafter, but had to appeal to the 
SLA for rescue after they were surrounded by government forces; as a result, many JEM 
soldiers joined and remained with the SLA.383 On April 25, a group of 300 rebels with 
light vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons managed to capture a government airbase at al 
Fasher, destroying all seven of the base’s aircraft and killing over 70 government troops. 
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The victory was significant. Not in 20 years of war had the SPLA inflicted those kinds of 
losses on the SAF air force.384 
The rebel victory at Al Fasher spurred the Sudanese government into action. Like 
it had been during the war in the South, Khartoum’s army was overstretched. In addition, 
the fact that so many enlisted members of the SAF were drawn from Darfur made the 
elites in Khartoum wary of defection or suspicious that the regular army’s troops would 
not be reliable in combat. As a result, the government’s response was rather obvious. 
According to de Walle: 
Critically for Bashir, the central pillar of the Sudanese state - a cabal of 
security officers who have been running the wars in Sudan since 1983 - 
was still in place. Faced with a revolt that outran the capacity of the 
country's tired and over-stretched army, this small group knew exactly 
what to do. Several times during the war in the South they had mounted 
counter-insurgency on the cheap - famine and scorched earth their 
weapons of choice. Each time, they sought out a local militia, provided it 
with supplies and armaments, and declared the area of operations an 
ethics-free zone.385 
Like it had in the war in the South, the SAF ultimately settled on a strategy of providing 
cash, arms, and training to Arab militia groups, who were unleashed onto non-Arab 
populations, dramatically escalating the scope and the costs of the conflict. Given the 
substantial Darfur-based population that identified as Arab, the government found a 
number of pre-existing groups with which it made common cause.  
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The formation of Arab-based militias was not new to Darfur. Though the history 
is complex, the first militias appeared in the mid-1980s, when former Arab fighters 
during the first Sudanese civil war were mobilized into Baggara and Bedouin militias. 
Like Homr Arabs in South Kordofan, they were formed to help fight the SPLA and were 
crucial to help checking the SPLA’s advances northward. In southern Darfur, the 
government had relied on the Beni Halba fursan (horseback) militias, who had routed the 
only major attempt by the SPLA to take Darfur in 1991; in cooperation with the SAF, 
they had had burned entire villages they suspected of cooperating with the SPLA.386 
Finally there were soldiers, mainly from Chad, who had fought for the Libyan leader 
Muamar Ghadafi and were defeated by the Chadian army at Ouadi Doum in 1987 and 
settled over the border, making alliances with cross-border Arab groups such as the 
Abbala Rizeigat.387 
Between 2003 and 2004, the Sudanese government funded an unprecedented 
expansion of these militias. In northern and western Darfur, militias were directly 
incorporated into the government armed forces, including the PDF, intelligence, border 
guard, and the police. In most of eastern and southern Darfur, the entire native 
administration system was reorganized to resemble military commands, creating militia 
units up to the level of the brigade.388 The most powerful of these militia groups, the 
“Swift and Fearless” brigade run by Abbala Rizeigat Sheikh Musa Hilal, ran a sprawling 
                                                          
386 Flint and de Waal 2008, Darfur, 56. 
387 Alex De Waal, “Who Are the Darfurians?”  p. 198. 
388 Ali Haggar, “The Origins and Organization of the Janjiweed in Darfur,” in Alex De Waal, ed. War in 
Darfur and the Search for Peace (Global Equity Initiative, 2007), pp. 128-129. 
259 
 
military base, maintained a direct line to Khartoum outside of the normal chain of 
military command, and could reportedly muster up to 20,000 men. According to de Waal 
and Flynt, these men “were distinguishable from regular troops only by their sandals, 
turbans, and the emblem they wore on their jackets—the armed man on camel-back.”389 
Collectively, they came to be popularly referred to as the janjiweed, a reference to the 
fact that like Hilal’s Abbala, many Arab militia groups of Darfur have nomadic origins 
and conducted raids and other operations on camel or horseback. The term’s actual 
origins are more obscure, dating to as early as the 1960s, when janjiweed was used to 
pejoratively describe vagrants from other Arab tribes, and then adopted by non-Arabs to 
refer to Arab armed groups.390 
At the height of the conflict in Darfur between 2003 and 2004, Arab militias 
cooperated hand in glove with government forces to inflict massive suffering on non-
Arab ethnic groups. On February 27, 2004, Hilal’s “Swift and Fearless Brigade” attacked 
the town of Tawila, 40 miles from where the rebels had seized the air force base at al 
Fashar. Over three days, hundreds of Hilal’s men killed 75 people, abducted 350 women 
and children, and raped over 100 women. Though Hilal denied ever being there, the raid 
was witnessed by hundreds of people, many of whom recognized him in the uniform of 
any army colonel. The militia men had been armed with light and medium weapons, 
Toyota land cruisers, and were resupplied by military helicopters in the midst of the 
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attack.391 In other instances, cooperation between regular forces and militias was even 
closer, with militias becoming integrated into military barracks and into army operations 
in the field. In Wadi Saleh near the Chadian border, regular army and janjiweed burned 
32 villages, displaced tens of thousands and killed hundreds in a matter of weeks. 
Military attack helicopters and airplanes were often brought in to burn empty villages and 
target columns of fleeing and displaced civilians.392 Their participation, which required 
the authorization of the chief of staff’s office in Khartoum, made it transparently obvious 
that the counterinsurgency operations in Darfur were being coordinated at the highest 
level of Sudan’s government. 
The government’s actions led to a massive escalation in the conflict that has 
permanently altered Darfur’s politics. In a few short years, close to 2,000 villages were 
destroyed, around 200,000 people killed, and 2 million displaced, a total of one third of 
the region’s pre-war population.393 The explicit targeting of non-Arab ethnic groups led 
U.N. officials and many others in the international community to use the term “ethnic 
cleansing” to refer to the Sudanese government’s policies. In September 2004, Secretary 
of State Colin Powell concluded that “genocide had been committed” during his 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.394 In 2008, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) charged President Bashir with genocide.  
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As it had in the South, the Sudanese government has used negotiations largely as 
a tactic to attempt to further divide the opposition. In 2006, the Sudanese government 
signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with one faction of the SLA, while remaining SLA 
and JEM forces continued the rebellion. Though the violence has never reached the scale 
of what it was in 2003 and 2004, the conflict remains unresolved despite numerous 
attempts at negotiation and the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force. It helped fuel 
ongoing conflicts in neighboring regions, including South Kordofan and the Upper Blue 
Nile. In 2016, the government of Sudan reportedly began using chemical weapons during 
its attacks in Jebel Marra region of Darfur, killing up to 250 people, most of whom were 
children.395 
In sum, the primary beneficiary of the Sudanese government’s decision to 
mobilize Arab militias has been the neither the “Arab” nor “Africans” civilians of Darfur, 
but the elites in Khartoum. These militia provide the regime with cheap, motivated foot 
soldiers that complement the regular army and prevent the large contingent of non-Arab 
Darfurians within the armed forces from having to actively fight fellow Darfurians.  Even 
more importantly, like the Dinka, Nuer, and other ethnic groups in the South, the 
proliferation of ethnic militia means that tribal groups in Darfur have spent much of the 
past two decades focused on fighting one another rather than making common cause 
against Khartoum. For the Bashir regime, the recruitment of tribal militia is an essential 
element of a political strategy to prevent a coherent Islamist opposition from forming. So 
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long as they are able to provide these militias with cheap small arms, training, occasional 
air support, and maintains a minimal forward operating presence for its regular army, 
Sudan’s Northern elite will continue, as they always have, to help themselves to a 
disproportionate share of the country’s wealth, monopolize state institutions, and neglect 
the western part of the country.  
 
 
6.6: Aftermath: Secession and War in South Sudan 
 
Sudan’s constant state of fragmentation and violence is a testament to the fact that 
once ethnically stacked security institutions are made, they are difficult to unmake. In the 
case of South Sudan, not even secession was enough of a rupture with the past to prevent 
its leaders from continuing to use ethnic stacking to instigate conflict and compete for 
power. A final consequence of Khartoum’s reliance on tribal militias during Sudan’s 
second civil war is that these same groups played key roles in the South Sudanese civil 
war that broke out in 2013, just two years after the country’s independence from Sudan. 
Far from providing the fresh start that many had hoped for and the multi-ethnic 
democracy its leaders promised, South Sudan’s militias have continued to wage war. This 
time, their guns have turned not towards Northern bogeyman, but one another.  
Three weeks after the signing of the 2005 peace accords, the SPLA leader John 
Garang was killed in a helicopter crash. Though some have speculated that he was killed 
by foul play, an independent investigation concluded that his death was most likely due 
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to poor weather and pilot error.396 Garang had been the principal proponent of the idea of 
a united, multi-ethnic Sudan, and much of the hope that there was that Sudan would 
remain unified died along with him. Instead, leadership of the SPLA was taken over by 
Garang’s deputy, Salva Kiir, who had long advocated for South Sudan’s secession. So 
long as South Sudan remained part of Sudan, Kiir was worried that Khartoum would 
continue to be able to use rival armed groups to manipulate the SPLA.397 A central issue 
was that, despite the SPLA being the largest armed group, other rebels were collectively 
better armed, and some, such as the South Sudan Defense Force, received direct 
sponsorship from Bashir.  
In order to prevent disunity, Kiir chose to absorb these militias into the Southern 
Sudanese army, which was to be made up of a mix of these former rebel groups and 
SPLA fighters.  Rather than disbanding these militias entirely, they were integrated into 
the army, many commanders were giving senior postings, and each soldier received $220 
per month. The salary was three times what the SAF paid its own militia for hire, and the 
intention was to effectively price the North out of the militia market in order to prevent it 
from continuing to manipulate South Sudanese politics. As extensively documented by 
Alex de Waal, the net result was not the demobilization that many had hoped for but a 
massive expansion in the SPLA payroll, from 40,000 fighters in 2004 to 240,000 in 
2011.398 The strategy was successful in preventing the North from influencing Southern 
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rebel groups during the 2005-2011 interim period, and contributed to the success of the 
2011 referendum in which 98 percent of the Sudanese population voted for secession. 
The problem with Kiir’s strategy is that it has led to a massive increase in rent-
seeking rebellion, where key army militia leaders mobilized troops, mutinied, and 
demanded a greater share of the country’s resources. De Waal described the strategy that 
emerged as follows: 
The logic of the mutineers is to organize enough force to compel the government 
to bargain, and the logic of the government is to use enough punitive force to 
compel the rebels to settle for a lower price. As remarked by a local chief, ‘We 
understand this government, it listens better to people doing bad things.’ On the 
surface these appear to be ethnic conflicts, but that is a product of the ethnic 
patronage that constitutes military units, not deep-rooted tribal animosities. 
However, these conflicts typically generate bitterness, enmity, and a cycle of 
revenge. Human lives are casually expended to signal seriousness in 
bargaining.399  
Prior to the secession, such munities were relatively isolated affairs. In 2010, for 
example, David Yau Yau rebelled against the SPLA after being denied a seat on the 
Jonglei-led assembly, leading a militia called the “Cobra Brigade,” composed almost 
exclusively of Murle, an ethnic minority in the state, which is majority Nuer. After a brief 
but intense conflict, Yau Yau signed a cease-fire agreement with the government, was 
given the rank of brigadier general, and integrated along with much of his militia into the 
SPLA in June 2011.400 After being denied the seat of county commissioner, the junior 
SPLA officer Gatlauk Gai led a similar rebellion in Unity State. Gai, who had served in 
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numerous pro-Khartoum militias during the civil war, was mysteriously killed days after 
signing an agreement to return to the SPLA as a lieutenant general.401  
The stakes increased dramatically in the aftermath of secession, however, when 
the two main factions that made up the SPLA began to split apart. The antagonists were 
President Kiir and his deputy Riek Machar, who was also the SPLA’s main Southern 
antagonist during the war with Sudan. Convinced that Machar was about to move to 
overthrow his government, Kiir kicked Machar out of his cabinet and directed security 
forces to target individuals they suspected of being closely associated with Machar. As a 
result, it appeared as if security forces were “targeting the Nuer community – this was 
largely a result of Machar and others surrounding themselves with their own 
tribesman.”402 For their part, Machar’s supporters contended that there was no coup 
attempt, and that Kiir and a small group of Dinka hard-liners used the fighting as an 
excuse to purge rivals.403 The split between Machar and Kiir has resulted in yet another 
civil war that has since morphed into one of Africa’s most deadly conflicts. 
In the early days of the war, Dinka elements of the Presidential Guard, the army, 
and other security forces engaged in systematic violence against Nuer in Juba.404 This 
helped provoke mass defection from the SPLA, some of whom joined rebel groups and 
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others who merely went home.405 In response, Machar organized the defecting soldiers 
into the SPLA in Opposition (SPLA-IO) and remobilized the “White Army” of Nuer 
youth to wage rebellion in Malakal, Beniu and Renk in order to attempt to control South 
Sudan’s oil fields. These armed groups, which are only questionably under Machar’s 
control, targeted Dinka civilians and communities in those areas.406 Kiir, in turn, 
responded by mobilizing allied Ugandan soldiers for key combat operations. These 
soldiers were crucial in helping to prevent Machar-led forces from taking the capital of 
Juba. In 2015, a peace agreement was signed that led Machar to return to Juba and retake 
his post as Vice President; in July 2016, he fled the country amid renewed fighting 
between his loyalists and Kiir loyalists after only three months on the job.  
As the conflict has gone on, it has become more multi-sided and the opposition 
more fragmented. After a mere year on the SPLA payroll, the Cobra brigade defected 
again to the opposition in 2012. The brigade was re-incorporated into the government 
after a 2014 peace accord which granted Yau Yau a “chief administrator” position with 
powers equal to that of a governor. The conflict has also further spread south to the 
Equatorias, an economically critical region that was largely untouched by the civil war 
with Sudan. In 2014, the SPLA-IO launched a handful of attacks against government 
facilities, largely to seize weapons. The SPLA-IO became increasingly involved in 
conflicts between cattle herders and farmers that the SPLA had been attempting to 
manage. The SPLA was seen as being partial specifically towards Dinka cattle herders, 
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and the SPLA-IO used the tensions to mobilize numerous armed groups against the 
government, provoking an increasingly aggressive response.407 Though estimates at this 
stage of the conflict are inexact, the toll of the conflict has been tens of thousands dead 
and hundreds of thousands displaced.  
In short, secession provided the opportunity for South Sudan to start anew. 
Instead, the bitter conflict that the South fought with North since Sudanese independence 
in 1956 has merely reproduced itself. South Sudan’s politicians have learned only too 
well from their northern brethren the power of informal, kinship-based security 
institutions as a mechanism for clinging to power. Without a concerted effort to disarm 
these increasingly personal, privatized militias and to reconstruct the security apparatus 
from the ground up, South Sudan will likely continue to be trapped in a nearly perpetual 
state of war.  
 
6.7: Tracing the Mechanisms: Sudan’s Ethnic Civil-Military Relations and 
Democratic Obstruction 
 This study of Sudanese civil-military relations likewise confirms this 
dissertation’s causal logic. In the quantitative chapter, I found that regimes with ethnic 
civil-military relations rarely result in democracy, but that democracies that succeed such 
regimes have approximately average chances of survival. Note that given the persistence 
of authoritarianism in Sudan, this chapter does not examine survival in democracies with 
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ethnic civil-military relations. Rather, I argue that the causal mechanism driving 
authoritarian resilience in dictatorships like Sudan is the fact that the principal civil-
military cleavages tend to fall along ethnic lines, making the civil-military apparatus 
more unified in the face of pressure to liberalize. To remind the reader, this dissertation’s 
argument with respect to military regimes is reproduced below in Figure 6.2. 
 




This analysis of Sudan provides evidence consistent with this argument. 
Notwithstanding Bashir’s background as a military officer, the fact that the NIF party and 
not senior officers within the military were the 1989 coup’s primary instigators is 
significant. Bashir’s role as head of state established him both as commander of chief of 
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the armed forces and as the military’s key interlocutor with an Islamist political class 
intent on bending the state to its will. The RCC’s disbandment in 1993 placed the armed 
forces in a clearly subservient role to civilians in matters of policy. 
Bashir’s status as a civilian president rather than a military dictator meant that the 
primary cleavages in Sudanese civil-military relations tended to fall along ethnic lines. 
Within virtually all of Sudan’s security institutions, ethnic stacking is used both as a tool 
to ensure loyalty and to keep the polity divided so that a narrow elite in Khartoum can 
continue to enjoy the spoils of power. Inheriting security institutions that were already 
dominated by riverain Arabs, Bashir further entrenched the domination of this group in 
the regular army. His government likewise ensured that co-ethnic Arabs controlled the 
PDF and most of the militia groups. As a result, Sudan’s central security institutions both 
complemented and counterbalanced each other, securing Bashir’s status as a civilian 
dictator. By recruiting co-ethnics into both the regular army and parallel security 
institutions, Sudan represents a case of ethnic stacking to the extreme.  
These cleavages are crucial in understanding the resilience of the Sudanese 
regime. In face of challenges from within his own party, constant civil war, and pressure 
from the international community, Sudan’s security institutions have remained loyal to 
Bashir. In the early years of his rule, Bashir deftly manipulated his status as a civilian 
leader representing the interests of the riverain elite to consolidate his control over 
Sudan’s politics. He simultaneously used his NIF affiliation to initiate massive purges 
within the SAF of those not loyal to the party, and to place Northern elites in top 
positions answerable only to him. These moves both helped neutralize internal threats to 
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Bashir from within his own army and were crucial in ensuring his ultimate victory in his 
confrontation with Turabi, who sought to expand Sudan’s basis of political representation 
beyond the Northern elite.  
Equally crucial to the current regime’s resilience is the use of tribal militias as an 
instrument of war to foster loyalty among Arab co-ethnics and to keep its rivals from 
coalescing around a coherent political opposition. These groups have demonstrated a 
nearly limitless capacity for repression and violence. During the civil war with the South, 
Arab militias use of unrestrained warfare prevented the advance of rebel groups 
northwards. The regime’s strategy of encouraging ethnic divisions within rebel forces 
helped foster a stillborn government in a newly independent South Sudan. In Darfur, 
Khartoum’s policy of supporting the janjiweed and other Arab militia in their war against 
non-Arab civilian populations has kept a once relatively peaceful region in a nearly 
perpetual state of conflict. The massacres perpetrated by parallel military institutions in 
Darfur led the regime have led to sanctions by the international community and Bashir to 
be indicted by the International Criminal Court.  
The ultimate irony of Khartoum’s blatant embrace of ethnic stacking within 
nearly all of Sudan’s security institutions is that they benefit neither the South Sudanese 
nor the majority of the country’s Muslims, nor even the majority of the country’s self-
identified Arabs. Rather, they serve to keep in power the same Northern elite that has 
always dominated Sudan’s state institutions. Representing no more than five percent of 
the population, this elite still remains in power. The proliferation of ethnic security 
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institutions across Sudan is both a symptom and a cause of the Sudanese regime’s 
determination to cling to power at whatever cost.   
Sudan’s status as a non-military regime with ethnically stacked armed forces is a 
crucial factor in understanding the dictatorship’s resilience. Under Bashir’s rule, the 
government of Sudan has lost a war and a third of the country’s population along with it. 
It has faced fierce armed opposition from peripheral states that it has brutally repressed. It 
has faced opposition from international actors that have isolated the country, applied 
trade sanctions, and declared Bashir and his associates war criminals. Nevertheless, 
Sudan’s security institutions, both an accomplice and instrument in Bashir’s ruthless 
game of divide and rule, remain loyal to the regime. With its armed forces so committed 
to Bashir’s survival, the current regime in Sudan has outlasted every previous 





Representative Civil-Military Relations and Democratic 
Stability in Tunisia 
 
Of the military establishments in the Arab world, Tunisia is almost unique. It is a non-
praetorian, highly professional body of officers and men which, as an armed force, never 
mounted a coup or fomented revolution against the state, never involved itself directly in 
the Arab-Israeli crisis, has never been the instrument of national emancipation except as 
the adjunctive arm of civilian policy, and has always answered to the authority of the 
state through the intermediary of a civilian minister of defense… The military has, 
therefore, never participated in the decision-making process as a political elite. Nor has 
the military had the opportunity to play the historical role of modernizers of a nation. 
Rather, they have served solely in the capacity of defenders of the national sovereignty 
and of the status quo and as a symbol of unity and an instrumentality that links people 
with government in the nation-building enterprise. 
- Lewis B. Ware, “The Role of the Tunisian Military in the Post-Bourgiba Era,” The OU 
Middle East Journal (1985), p. 37. 
 
For nearly six decades after achieving independence from France in 1956, Tunisia 
was considered one of the world’s most stable authoritarian regimes. The country 
experienced only intermittent periods of unrest, and one benign transfer of power in 
1987, when Zine el Abidine Ben Ali masterminded a “medical” coup to replace an ailing 
Habib Bourguiba. With annual GDP growth rates consistently topping five percent, 
falling poverty, and close relations with Europe, conventional wisdom assumed the 
Tunisian regime’s chances of failing were low even for a region known for authoritarian 
durability. Writing in the same year of the Tunisian revolution, Christopher Alexander 
observed that the majority of Tunisian appeared to favor the status quo, and that "political 
change in Tunisia will not come about through some dramatic event that suddenly 
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replaces the existing order with a new one."408 The conventional wisdom was proven 
wrong in a span of just three short weeks between December 17, when popular protests 
against the regime first began, and January 14, when Ben Ali fled the country.  
 As with Nigeria and Sudan, the role of the armed forces is central to 
understanding patterns of political transition and change in Tunisia. Unlike Nigeria and 
Sudan, Tunisia’s army played an unambiguously positive role in the country’s 
transformation from repressive personalist authoritarian regime to consolidated 
democracy. In the midst of massive popular protests that rocked the country in January 
2011, the army exercised restraint in confronting demonstrators, at times clashing with 
loyalist police and intelligence forces. As Ben Ali fled the country, the Tunisian army 
chief of staff General Rachid al-Ammar declared his support for an interim national 
government and then stood aside as civilians orchestrated a transition to multiparty 
democracy. Despite a shaky economy and a rising threat from Islamic-state affiliated 
insurgents, Tunisia’s armed forces have played a similarly stabilizing role in the 
aftermath of the revolution, resisting calls to intervene when Tunisia’s democracy 
appeared on the brink of collapse in 2013. With the election of Beji Caid Essebsi in 2014, 
Tunisia became the only democracy that has emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring 
to undergo a peaceful transfer of power from one political party to another.  
This chapter argues that the Tunisian military’s support for the country’s 
democratic institutions can be understood in large part due to its status as a representative 
                                                          
408 Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb (Routledge, 2010), pp. 
123-124.   
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military, absent use as an instrument of ethnic loyalty or the entanglements of power. The 
analysis in the chapter traces the causal processes and mechanisms through which the 
Tunisian army, as a representative military, embraced the country’s opposition, helped 
engender the country’s transition to democracy, and resisted further calls to seize power. 
The origins of the Tunisian military’s support for the country’s democratic institutions 
stems from the military’s exclusion from political power and patronage under both Ben 
Ali and Bourguiba. A complete ban on political activity, social engagement, and absence 
of extensive recruitment into top positions led Tunisia’s soldiers to abstain and even fear 
engagement in the political sphere. Moreover, as a result of their mistrust of the military’s 
motives, Tunisia’s dictators chose to employ a robust intelligence and police apparatus to 
serve the authoritarian regime’s coercive functions. 
These choices, in turn, caused the principal civil-military cleavage in Tunisia to 
occur between the regime and the armed forces. Rather than choosing to serve in a 
political capacity or being manipulated along ethnic lines, Tunisia’s soldiers developed a 
very strong corporate identity that defined itself apart from the regime. Soldiers viewed 
their counterparts in the intelligence and police apparatus first and foremost as rivals and 
even oppressors, and not as counterparts. Particularly in the aftermath of the 1991 
Barraket Essahel affair, in which a number of Tunisian officers falsely accused of coup 
plotting were tortured and imprisoned by the regime, the Tunisian army grew to disdain 
and fear the police apparatus. The enmity between the Defense and Interior Ministries 
was mutual, and deepened by the fact that the army was only rarely used in operations to 
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maintain internal order, and even then, saw its mission as one more guided by the need to 
protect than oppress.  
In the few instances in which the military was called in operations that involved 
confronting demonstrators, soldiers tended to choose the path involving the least amount 
of repression and the most rapid return to the barracks. For most of Tunisia’s post-
independence history, the approach was successful, as relatively respectful relations 
between protestors and the army helped ease tensions between protestors and the police 
during several periods of popular unrest between 1957 and 2011. So long as protestors 
remained regionally contained or did not explicitly seek to overthrow the regime, further 
repression by the army was not necessary.  
However, the military’s status as an actor apart from the regime was exactly what 
led it to support the revolution and accept Tunisia’s transition to democracy. Precisely 
when a violent crackdown on demonstrators would have been necessary to save the 
regime, Tunisia’s soldiers were unwilling to engage in mass violence against 
demonstrators they identified with, working with an internal security apparatus that had 
abused their colleagues, on behalf of a dictator that feared and neglected them. In order to 
ensure the collapse of Ben Ali’s regime, the Tunisian army hardly had to fire a shot: all it 
had to do was refrain from excessive violence and let demonstrators do the rest. Through 
an unspoken alliance between the military, opposition, and demonstrators, sunset fell on 
Tunisia’s dictatorship.  
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Finally, the civil-military cleavages that Tunisia’s authoritarian leaders wrought 
are also crucial in explaining the Tunisian military’s continued to support of democracy, 
despite continued political instability and further calls to intervene. Officers in Tunisia’s 
military have no history of political ambition, political interference, or ethnic cleavages. 
In fact, because of its previously marginalized status, the Tunisian army draws its 
legitimacy and its current primacy in the security sector from the elements of Tunisian 
society most opposed to authoritarian rule. The future of Tunisia’s armed forces thus 
depends upon close collaboration with democratic leaders, despite the general sense of 
disillusionment with the revolution. 
  The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. The second section provides basic 
background information on Tunisia and situates the country within the broader universe 
of African cases. The third section discusses the institutional context of Tunisia’s armed 
forces under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, illustrating how decisions by both dictators to 
politically marginalize the military were motivated by a fear of a military seizure of 
power. The fourth section traces how these decisions created an institutional culture that 
defined itself apart from the regime, disdained use as an instrument of repression, and 
created animosities between the regular army and internal security services. The fifth 
section examines the Tunisian military’s role in the 2011 uprisings, illustrating how the 
Tunisian armed forces’ marginalized role under both dictatorships led the military to 
identify with the goals of protestors and refrain from using excessive force, forcing Ben 
Ali to flee the country. The sixth section examines the role of the military in Tunisia’s 
transition to democracy, considering why Tunisia’s army refrained seizing power despite 
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the opportunity. The seventh section explores the army’s role in Tunisia’s nascent 
democracy, arguing that cleavages between the army and the dictatorship eased the task 
of further subordinating Tunisia’s armed forces to civil authority. A final section 
examines the extent to which the casual processes behind the Tunisian military’s support 
for the country’s democratic institutions reflect this dissertation’s theoretical framework.  
 
7.1: Tunisia in Context: Background and Case Selection  
 
 Tunisia is a small, overwhelming Sunni Arab country of 11 million situated in 
between much larger neighbors of Algeria and Libya along the Mediterranean coast of 
North Africa (see Figure 1). Arabic is the official language, though close and continuing 
ties to its former colonizer means French is spoken by over two-thirds of the population. 
Trade relations with Europe and significant investments in education and infrastructure 
have cemented Tunisia’s status as a middle-income country, with a GDP per capita of 
$4,317 (see Table 1). Tunisia has undergone only two transitions during its post-
independence political history: in 1987 from Habib Bourguiba, who ruled the country 
dating back to independence in 1956, to Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who ruled the country 
until its democratic transition during the Arab uprisings of 2011.  
Admittedly, Tunisia’s relative wealth and lack of ethnic diversity means that 
Tunisia has had an easier path to democratization than many other African nations. 
Unlike much of Africa, the Tunisia is almost exclusively made up of one ethnic and 
religious group; Sunni Arabs make up 98 percent of Tunisia’s population (see Figure 
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1). The lack of ethnic or sectarian divides within Tunisia made it impossible for 
Tunisia’s leaders to rely on ethnic stacking to ensure military loyalty.  
 Nevertheless, as argued elsewhere in this dissertation, these endowments are 
not sufficient to explain the causal mechanisms that lead the armed forces to decide to 
support democratic transitions or upend emerging democratic regimes. Though 
wealthier than most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Tunisia’s GDP per capita, at 
somewhat more than Morocco and Egypt but somewhat less than Libya and Algeria, is 
about average for North Africa.409 Likewise, ethnic diversity has not always led African 
dictators to stack their militaries along ethnic or sectarian lines. Though the practice is 
common, leaders of ethnically diverse dictatorships in Ghana, Tanzania, and Malawi 
refrained from privileging co-ethnics in their armed forces. Moreover, as illustrated in 
countries from Egypt to Brazil, non-ethnically diverse countries are far from immune to 






                                                          
409 Most recent GDP figures (in 2013 U.S. dollars), according to the World Bank 2016 World Development 






























































































In fact, considering the history of the immediate region and the circumstances 
under which the country democratized, in some respects Tunisia offers a tough test case. 
Given the country’s status as a middle-income country and close relations with Europe, 
the regime did not face anywhere near the level of external pressure to democratize 
confronted by many sub-Saharan African nations, who depend on aid for a considerable 
percentage of government expenditures. The Tunisian economy was also relatively stable 
prior to the transition, with growth rates ranging between three percent and five percent 
and consistent declines in poverty. The initial waves of democratization that hit much of 
Africa were provoked by years of economic crisis. In North Africa, Tunisia is the only 
country to have transitioned to democracy and experienced a peaceful transfer of power 
from one elected government to another. As the blocked transitions and general 
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authoritarian drift across the region can attest, the unprecedented and nearly unqualified 
support of Tunisia’s military for the country’s democratic institutions is a question 
worthy of further investigation.  
Despite these differences, there are some intriguing parallels between the 
military’s role in Tunisia’s democratization and those in other African countries. Though 
the immediate triggers were different, Tunisia did experience unprecedented mass 
popular protests, similar to the civil society activism that swept across Africa in the early 
1990s. Like representative armed forces in countries such as Zambia, Mali and Malawi, 
Tunisia’s army refused to engage in the mass repression of popular protests and instead 
turned on forces loyal to the regime. These four regimes constitute a subset of a broader 
class of Africa’s 16 civil-militaries who underwent a transition in my database, 12 of 
whom transitioned to democracy. The Tunisian military’s clear signaling of its 
preferences in favor of democratization during and after the transition period offers an 
opportunity both to more closely investigate the causal mechanisms involved in these 
class of cases but also to provide this project with some measure of external validity. As I 
have argued elsewhere in this dissertation, there is nothing inherent in my argument that 
limits my findings strictly to Africa, merely the desire to be conservative with my 
project’s overall assumptions given the continent’s unique political and institutional 
history.  
Finally, it is of additional importance to note that this chapter considers civil-
military relations under both the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes. This is because, despite 
the change in leadership from Bouguiba to Ben Ali in 1987, there was no fundamental 
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change in regime. Both leaders presided over a single-party civilian dictatorship with 
essentially the same leadership structure;410 one of the more drastic changes instituted by 
Ben Ali was to rename the party from Neo-Destour to the Constitutional Democratic 
Rally (RCD). The structure of civil-military relations likewise remained very much the 
same, with a relatively small military counterbalanced by robust police and intelligence 
forces. Because the decision to structure Tunisia’s military as such was made in 
Bourguiba’s time, it is essential to begin the analysis in 1956, with Tunisia’s 
independence from France. 
                                                          
410 Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic Regimes Code Book,” Version 1.2 
(2014), p. 202.  
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Figure 7.1: Political Map of Tunisia
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, available online through the University of Texas Library, last 




7.2: The Choice: Tunisia’s Representative Military 
 
The political history and personal experiences of both post-independence dictators 
led Tunisia to follow a different path in managing their armies than most other countries 
in Africa and the broader Middle East. Whereas most leaders in the region chose to make 
the military the basis of their political power or co-ethnicity among the security 
apparatus’ central organizing principles, both leaders chose a strategy that sought above 
all to marginalize the political influence of the military. Throughout nearly 60 years of 
Tunisian dictatorship, military officers were subordinated to civilian authorities, rarely 
served in top governmental posts, and even denied the right to vote or politically 
organize.  
No one has had a greater influence on the post-independence history of Tunisia 
than Habib Bourguiba, who founded the republican Neo-Destour movement, negotiated 
Tunisia’s independence from France, and ruled the country for over 30 years. Tunisia’s 
was a small military that, unlike other countries in the region, did not play a significant 
role in the nationalist movement. “Tunisia’s army did not have nearly as high profile a 
role in the country’s independence as other armies,” observed retired Colonel Major 
Mahmoud Mezoughi. “For example, the Egyptian and Algerian armies had a measure of 
legitimacy that the Tunisian military never had because so many Tunisian officers served 
in the French colonial army.”411   
                                                          
411 Interview with retired Major Colonel Mahmoud Mezoughi, Tunis, August 31 2017. 
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At the time of independence, the national military was composed of only a little 
over 1,500 former French troops, 850 former Beylical guardsmen, and 3,000 conscripts. 
Across the region, the armies of the era were beginning to take on an increasingly 
expansive political role. Egypt’s monarchy fell to a military coup in 1952, followed by 
coups in Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Syria throughout the late 1950s and into the early 
1960s. In Algeria, the army seized power in 1962 after waging a bloody eight-year 
insurgency against France. And in 1957 and 1962, a wide cross-section of soldiers 
participated in two unsuccessful plots organized by Bourguiba’s political enemies to 
remove him from office.412  
These early experiences led Bourguiba to fear that a powerful army was a mortal 
threat. To counter this threat, Bourguiba enacted a deliberate series of policies designed 
to politically and materially marginalize the military. The first component of Bourguiba’s 
policy was to refrain from appointing soldiers to the top echelons of Tunisian government 
and to subordinate Tunisia’s military to civilian oversight. Throughout most of 
Bourguiba’s tenure, few military officers served in high level political positions; not a 
single soldier was appointed to serve on Tunisia’s cabinet until very late in Bourguiba’s 
tenure. The separation between military and civilian roles extended even to defense 
policy, where, in direct contrast to other Arab nations, the army was overseen by a 
civilian rather than military minister. The fact that there was at least two degrees of 
separation between Tunisia’s commander-in-chief and the country’s men and women in 
                                                          
412 Michael Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence 
to the Arab Spring (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 87; Noura Borsali. Bourguiba à l'Épreuve de la 
Démocratie, 1956-1963 (Samed Editions, 2008), pp. 137-200. 
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uniform meant that few soldiers had many opportunities to build political loyalties and 
connections.  
Yet Bourguiba’s insistence on removing the military from political decision-
making went even further still, to the point of infringing on the political rights of soldiers. 
In 1957, Bourguiba banned soldiers from political activity or association of any kind, 
including the right to become members of the Neo-Destour party.413 Members of 
Tunisia’s armies were not allowed to participate in political events, comment publicly on 
politics, or even to vote in elections. The ban on political activity applied not just to 
serving officers but also to retired ones.414 Prior to joining the army, the political 
affiliations, connections, beliefs, and tendency for political engagement of officer 
candidates and their families were investigated to ensure maximum likelihood of 
compliance. Those who violated the ban on political activity were referred to military 
justice.415 
The military experienced a brief ascendance beginning in the late 1970s, a period 
marked by tensions of the border with Libya and internal unrest. In a sign of the 
military’s increasing profile, Zine El Abdine Ben Ali was promoted to the Interior 
Ministry in 1986, the first ever military officer to achieve a cabinet-level position. In 
1987, an ailing Bourguiba was overthrown by Ben Ali in what has been described as a 
                                                          
413 Michael Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb, pp. 86-87; Risa Brooks, "Abandoned at the Palace: 
Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011." Journal of Strategic 
Studies 36, no. 2 (2013), p. 209. 
414 This ban was only lifted in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. 




“medical coup,” due to the not unreasonable justification of the plotters that they acted 
because Bourguiba was proving himself to be increasingly unfit for office. Early on in 
Ben Ali’s regime, he appointed several other senior military officers to the traditional 
civilian posts of Foreign Affairs, Interior Minister, and Justice Minister.416  
This period of ascendance was, however, short lived. Ben Ali continued, and in 
some respects even doubled down on, Bourguiba’s policy of keeping the military 
politically marginalized. For one, even as he appointed some military officers into top 
positions, Ben Ali was cautious. He deliberately did not involve the military in the coup 
to overthrow Bourguiba, instead using his post as head of Tunisia’s Interior Ministry to 
draw on the National Guard to secure key locations, including the presidential palace.417 
And a closer reading of the early appointments reveals that most of them were life-long 
friends, some of whom he knew from his military days, and were not likely made with 
the explicit intent of elevating the military in mind.418 Instead, during the transition 
period of 1988, Ben Ali assumed the position of Secretary of Defense for himself so he 
could exert more direct influence over military posts and operations.   
                                                          
416 Hicham Bou Nassif, "A Military Besieged: The Armed Forces, the Police, and the Party in Bin ʿAli’s 
Tunisia, 1987–2011," International Journal of Middle East Studies 47, no. 01 (2015), pp. 68-69. 
417 Andrew Borrowiec, Modern Tunisia: A Democratic Apprenticeship, (Praeger, 2003), pp. 55-56. Ben Ali 
justified the coup on legalistic grounds, using Article 7 of Tunisia’s constitution to declare Bourguiba 
medically unfit to serve as president after receiving the signature of seven medical doctors. The removal of 
Bourguiba was met with support both within and without the Tunisian establishment, who were aware that 
the 84-year old Bourguiba’s health was in decline and behavior was becoming increasingly erratic. Ben 
Ali’s reliance on Tunisia’s internal security apparatus and constitutional means to secure power has led 
analysts to describe his 1987 seizure of power as a “constitutional,” “medical” or “police” rather than a 
military coup. 




Events would soon confirm that Ben Ali’s predominant attitude towards the 
military was, like his predecessor’s, one of suspicion. In 1991, four years after Ben Ali 
took office, the Interior Ministry announced the discovery of a coup plot between the 
military and the Islamist opposition group Ennahda. According the allegations at the 
time, Islamist cells infiltrated the military, were planning to seize major government 
ministries and centers, and had planned to shoot down Ben Ali’s plane with a Stinger 
Missile from Afghanistan.419 The imbroglio came to be known as the Barraket Essahel 
affair, named after the coastal town in which Islamist leaders and military officials were 
said to have met to coordinate plans to take down the regime.  
In reality, the coup allegations were a farce staged as a result of collusion between 
the ruling party (which had by then changed its name to the Constitutional Democratic 
Rally, RCD) and the internal security services. For these entities, the plot provided the 
opportunity to remove an increasingly powerful institutional rival and competitor for top 
posts. For Ben Ali, it provided an opportunity to marginalize what he likely considered 
the two greatest threats to his regime: the Islamists and the military. 
After the announcement of the affair, Ben Ali took steps to further marginalize the 
military and cement his control on power. He forced all ministers with a military 
background into retirement or into postings abroad and then refused to re-appoint a chief 
of staff of the armed forces. He left the military bereft of a leader to coordinate joint 
                                                          




operations and instead began taking personal command decisions himself.420 And he had 
the Interior Ministry arrest, detain, torture, and then retire some 244 officers whose 
loyalties he questioned. To replace the rest of the officers he dismissed, Ben Ali 
appointed officers to senior command positions whom he knew or through personal 
connections, including former classmates. And, much like his predecessor, Ben Ali 
denied cabinet-level postings to military officers for the remainder of his regime. He 
assumed that, so long as he was able to ensure the loyalty of his chiefs of army staff, he 
would ensure the loyalty of the army and the regime’s survival.421 
Finally, Ben Ali did not fundamentally alter any of the laws written in the 
Bourguiba period intended to ensure the military’s political neutrality. Military officers 
remained unable to join the party, unable to vote, and unable to organize and express 
political viewpoints. So notorious was the military’s silence that it became known in 
French as “La Grande Muette”—the Great Mute. Ever conscious of the latent policy that 
some military officer might eventually to do to him what he did to Bourguiba, Ben Ali 
went to even greater lengths than his predecessor to politically marginalize the military 
and subordinate it to the regime. The primary instrument through which he achieved this 
was with Tunisia’s internal security apparatus. 
 
                                                          
420Sharan Grewal, “A Quiet Revolution: The Tunisian Military After Ben Ali,” (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2016). Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/24/quiet-revolution-
tunisian-military-after-ben-ali-pub-62780 <accessed April 17 2017>.  
421 Interview with retired Major Colonel Mahmoud Mezoughi, Tunis, August 30 2017. 
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7.3: Civil-Military Cleavages: The Military Establishment and the Regime 
 
The choices Bourguiba and Ben Ali made to marginalize the military meant that 
the main civil-military cleavages in Tunisia existed not within the army, but between the 
army and the regime. By banning the military from political engagement of any kind, the 
regime ensured that the military maintained a politically neutral corporate identity. 
However, it also meant that both leaders had to look elsewhere for the day to day 
maintenance of the regime. To maintain internal order and serve as the regime’s primary 
instrument of repression, both leaders relied heavily on Tunisia’s internal security 
apparatus. The robust investments in police, intelligence and parallel security forces 
created considerable enmity between the Defense and Interior Ministries and, by 
extension, the regime itself.  
When asked to explain the Tunisian military’s historical lack of political 
intervention, nearly every soldier interviewed first cited the Tunisian military’s status as a 
republican army, more akin to those in the United States and France than those in the 
Middle East and Africa. Stated retired Major Colonel Habib Ouesalati: “The Tunisian 
army does not occupy itself with politics; our leaders were convinced of that.”422  Retired 
Major Colonel Akyl Manai agreed: “we are a republican army and do not participate in 
politics.”423 By refusing to sanction political action, Tunisia’s leaders engendered an 
army less riven than most by internal cleavages. 
                                                          
422 Interview with retired Major Colonel Habib Ouesalati, Tunis, September 7 2017. 
423 Interview with retired Major Colonel Akyl Manai, Tunis, September 10 2017.  
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Rather, the central civil-military cleavage that emerged in Tunisia was between 
the army on the one side and the regime and the internal security apparatus on the other. 
As a result of the military’s political marginalization, both Bourguiba and Ben Ali leaned 
heavily on the internal security apparatus to maintain internal order.  Beginning early in 
his regime, Bourguiba charged this sensitive mission to the Interior Ministry, which 
included the National Guard to fight crime and secure the border, the Brigade of Public 
Order to manage popular unrest, and the Presidential Guard to provide for the head of 
state’s personal security. Throughout Tunisia’s authoritarian period, the budget for the 
Ministry of the Interior was roughly equal to and at times significantly exceeded that of 
the Ministry of Defense.424 Though estimates vary considerably, the number of men 
serving in internal security forces also exceeded the number of men in military 
uniform.425  
The existence of these powerful internal security institutions, who were more 
implicated in the day to day management of authoritarian rule, were intended to act as a 
deterrent to military intervention, making it difficult to coordinate and unlikely to 
succeed. Unlike many countries in the region, the Tunisian military could not claim to 
have legitimately maintained a total monopoly on violence and was charged with 
                                                          
424 Derek Lutterbeck. “Tool of Rule: The Tunisian Police under Ben Ali.” The Journal of North African 
Studies 20.5 (2015), p. 816.  
425 The number of Tunisian police during the authoritarian era is a matter of some dispute. During the Ben 
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maintaining internal order only as a secondary mission. The Interior Ministry’s 
predominant role in the everyday maintenance of the regime meant that members of 
Tunisia’s armed forces did not see themselves as instruments of authoritarian repression.  
In the words of retired Major Colonel and former director of military security Moussa 
Khalfi: “The army can assist the police in maintaining internal order, particularly with 
respect to sensitive posts and critical infrastructure. But it is not the military’s role or 
mission to fire on or oppress unarmed civilians.”426 
As Khalfi indicates, the military was by institutional design only to be used in the 
“last instance” to maintain order when the National Guard and the Brigade of Public 
Order became overwhelmed.427 Military interaction with civilians was therefore minimal, 
but did occur on a number of occasions over the course of both authoritarian regimes. 
The four most notable such occasions were: in 1978, in response to a labor strike; in 
1984, in response to protests against a rise in the price of bread;428 in 1991, after protests 
erupted during and in the aftermath of the Gulf War; and in 2008, when protests over 
working conditions erupted in the mining town of Gafsa.429 Interactions between the 
police and military officers involved in putting down these uprisings were remarkably 
similar, particularly in 1978, 1984, and 2008. In each instance, protests overwhelmed 
                                                          
426 Interview with retired Colonel Major Moussa Khalfi, Tunis, September 28 2017.  
427 Ware, “Role of Military,” p. 48.  
428 For accounts of these uprisings, which occurred during the Bourguiba era, see Ware, Tunisia in the Post-
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local security forces, a state of emergency was declared, and the military was called in, 
engaging in at times violent clashes with protestors. Despite the loss of life, the military 
was perceived to have acquitted itself in a more even-handed manner than the civilian 
security apparatus, and after a matter of days retreated to the barracks.  
Soldiers attributed their role in calming the protests in part as a result of their lack 
of association with the regime. Where interactions between police forces and the 
population were usually marked by repression, the military saw its primary role as the 
protection of public installations and the prevention of further violence. According to 
Major Colonel Manai, who participated in containing the 1978 strikes: “Whereas 
protestors were often angry with the police, they have more confidence in the army and 
were more inclined to listen to us.”430 Said Major Colonel Mezhoughi, who helped 
contain the 1984 bread riots: “The military attempted to act with restraint in quelling 
popular unrest. The army does not feel as if it is there to repress the population, and 
though the mission was to cooperate with the police, a key difference is that the military 
attempted to minimize the loss of civilian life.”431 
The military and the interior security services did not just differ in their approach 
to handling popular uprisings. The military’s lack of use in internal oppression was 
accompanied by a general enmity between the Interior and Defense Ministries. The 
enmity was driven not only by competition over budgets and resources, but because of 
the former’s closeness to the regime, which led the latter to at times feel victimized. 
                                                          
430 Interview with retired Major Colonel Akyl Manai, Tunis, September 10 2017. 
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According to Mezhoughi: “Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s policies generated considerable 
friction between the army and the internal security services. The military recognized that 
the police and intelligence services were tainted by association with the regime. The 
military, as the only ‘clean’ institution in the country, felt despised by the internal 
security services.”432   
In fact, it was the task of Tunisia’s internal security apparatus to monitor the army 
and ensure it remained disengaged from politics. Under Bourguiba, the status of the two 
ministries was relatively co-equal. Though for most of Bourguiba’s tenure the military’s 
budget was lower and the social and political activities of Tunisian soldiers were 
monitored by the internal security apparatus, the Defense Ministry maintained 
operational oversight over the conduct of its soldiers. Petitions to organize socially, for 
example, were typically sent to the Defense Minister, where they were usually rejected, 
and misconduct was investigated via a military justice system before potentially being 
referred to the Interior Ministry for further action.433  While the police were charged with 
monitoring the operational activities of the military, the military, through its bureau of 
military security, did likewise with respect to the police.434  
In the aftermath of the Barraket Essahel affair, Ben Ali subordinated the Defense 
Ministry to the Interior Ministry, preferring to have security information centralized 
under his command.435 Where spending on internal security and the armed forces was 
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more or less evenly balanced at the end of Bourguiba’s reign, by 2010, the Interior 
Ministry budget was nearly 50 percent greater than the budget of the Defense Ministry.436 
Particularly preferential treatment was given to the 6,000-man Presidential Guard, who 
became the regime’s best paid and equipped security force.437 Despite planting fake 
evidence to implicate their military colleagues, the Interior Ministry was given additional 
power to monitor and survey military officers in order to ensure their loyalty. The 
military’s activities became so closely monitored that officials at the Ministry of Defense 
could not conduct any military exercises or operational maneuvers without first 
informing the police of the number of troops involved, the direction the troops were to be 
moved, and the length of the maneuver.438 In addition, military officers were completely 
discouraged from social gatherings outside of their duties, making it nearly impossible 
for them to meet in private without raising the suspicions of the regime.439  
Particularly deeply resented by the army was the treatment of the 244 officers 
arrested by the regime in the wake of the affair. These soldiers were rounded up, removed 
from duty, and tortured in order to extract confessions. Most of the defendants, all of 
whom were innocent of coup plotting, ended up being forced into prison or into early 
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retirement. Retired Major Colonel Mohamed Ahmed, one of the officers caught up in the 
affair, describes the ordeal these soldiers went though:    
When I was assistant to the chief of staff of the army for Military 
Intelligence and Security, I was arrested along with many other very 
promising young officers, and we were compelled to make false 
confession under torture. Afterwards, the Interior Minister, who just 
several months prior had been the Minister of Defense, Abdallah Kallel, 
told the officers that we were ‘excused’ and to return home. Though most 
of us were eventually released and then retired from the army, our 
pensions and health benefits were taken away and we could not find work 
that befitted our station. I personally couldn’t travel for 10 years, and our 
families were tainted by association with us. Whenever we were 
recommended for a job the police would intervene and indicate that we 
were plotters and terrorists. We all had to check in at police posts on either 
a daily or weekly basis.440 
The experience of Ahmed and his fellow soldiers makes clear the lengths to which the 
Ben Ali regime went to marginalize the military and instill fear in its ranks. In the 
aftermath of the affair, the message was clear: dissent of any kind, real or imagined, 
would not be tolerated. 
The affair and its aftermath generated resentment not just from the officers who 
were dismissed. Ahmed adds: “Under Ben Ali’s regime the military was totally 
subordinate to the Interior Ministry, in effect becoming a victim of the regime. Military 
commanders did not have a direct line of communication with Ben Ali, the Defense 
Ministry could not exercise their prerogatives, and Defense Ministers knew they were 
effectively powerless.”441 Rank and file soldiers, who knew their detained colleagues 
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personally and believed them likely to be innocent, were incensed at the arrests, causing 
the popularity of the regime and much of the senior military leadership to plummet in the 
aftermath of the affair.  
It is remarkable that, despite this sense of victimization, Tunisia’s armed forces 
never attempted a coup.  For some officers, even those caught up in the affair, the lack of 
putchist inclinations was simply a matter of the military’s institutional history of non-
interference. Colonel Major Hedi Kolsi, who was also arrested and retired as part of the 
Barraket Essahel affair, states: 
We didn’t care for any political scheme, don’t really think about politics, 
and no one has any desire for any kind of political career. Even after what 
I went through, never once did I think of supporting any kind of coup 
d’état against the regime. I never would have thought of that because my 
first duty as a Tunisian is to protect the country, not bloody it.”442   
 
Others stressed the sheer impossibility of being able to manage and coordinate a coup 
plot given the significant degree to which the armed forces were monitored. According to 
Major Colonel Ahmed:  
The rest of the military was scared. My colleagues couldn’t confirm that 
the allegations against us were false until after the revolution, though they 
had their suspicions. Many of them chose to believe the allegations, and 
even avoided us in the streets. Many feared that they would suffer the 
same fate and were afraid to even discuss a plot for fear that one officer 
might denounce another to the internal security apparatus.443  
Some officers split the difference. According to retired Colonel Mohsen Mighri:  
After Barraket Essahel, the army remained loyal to the regime for two reasons. 
First, many in the army were afraid of surveillance by the intelligence and police 
after what we suffered. After we were forced to leave, the army didn’t just 
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monitor me, but also my family, and especially my children who attended 
university. The second reason was the army’s culture of political neutrality. Ever 
since independence, for Tunisia’s soldiers, service to the nation came and 
solidarity within the officer corps came first.444 
 
The approaches of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali towards the security sector can be 
described as one that, in attempting to foster a politically neutral army, nevertheless 
created inherently political cleavages between the military and the regime. In the late 
1950s and early 1960s, Bourguiba charted the Tunisian military’s post-independence 
course when he decided to completely ban the military from political activity of any kind, 
and to marginalize the armed forces next to the internal security apparatus. As a result, 
the army took on a corporate identity that defined itself apart from the regime, 
particularly in relation to the internal security apparatus and in its interactions with 
civilians. After a brief period in which it looked to some as the military was on the rise, 
Ben Ali continued and even built on these policies. Leaving the ban on political activity 
in place, Ben Ali turned Tunisia into an effective police state in which the army was not 
merely subordinate to the police, but subject to continual surveillance and monitoring.  
As evidenced by the minimal amount of upheaval Tunisia experienced during 
well over 50 years of authoritarian rule, this arrangement was remarkably resilient. 
Nevertheless, the system of civil-military relations implemented by Tunisia’s 
authoritarian leaders contained a fatal flaw. Precisely because they had presided over 
such remarkable political stability, Tunisia’s authoritarian leaders never had to confront 
mass popular protests who sought to overthrow the regime. In the relatively few 
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circumstances in which Tunisia’s police forces needed support, the military quickly 
stepped in and quelled the uprisings. Though at times widespread, protests under 
Bourguiba never explicitly demanded that the regime leave power and were diffused 
through a combination of repression and concessions. During the Ben Ali era, protest 
actions against the regime were isolated and confined mainly to Tunisia’s interior 
regions.  The closest that the regime had probably come to a scenario resembling that of 
2011 was during the 1984 bread riots, where for a few short days Bourguiba’s reign 
appeared on the brink of collapse. Had Bourguiba remained firm in his insistence on 
maintaining the proposed increase in the price, the military might have been placed in an 
uncomfortable scenario where the only viable option for the continuation of the regime 
would have involved mass repression. Fortunately, the military was spared that choice 
when Bourguiba agreed to roll back the proposed price increases, and the protests died 
down.445   
In short, the Tunisian military had never been put in a situation where it had to be 
called upon to quell mass uprisings against the regime, with the very future of the 
republic at stake.   
 
7.4: The Critical Juncture: The Army and the 2011 Revolution 
 
The uprisings that engulfed Tunisia beginning in mid-December 2010 and early in 
2011 were unlike any the country had witnessed previously. An unprecedented number of 
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Tunisians participated, and as popular mobilization increased it became clear that the 
demonstrators would settle for nothing less than the end of Ben Ali’s regime. As in 
previous moments of unrest, Tunisia’s dictators relied mostly on the police and internal 
security services to contain the protests, and only called in the army to restore order once 
the internal security apparatus was overwhelmed. Despite initial impressions to the 
country, the army was not asked, nor would it likely have obeyed, orders to crack down 
on civilian demonstrators in order to save the regime. With the demonstrators demanding 
the dictator's resignation and the security apparatus unable to contain them, Ben Ali was 
forced to flee the country.  
 On the evening of December 17, 2010, the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, 
who had his vegetable cart confiscated by authorities earlier that day, set himself on fire 
with paint thinner in front of the municipal building of the central Tunisian town of Sidi 
Bouzid. Though Bouazizi was neither the first nor the last Tunisian to self-immolate as a 
form of political protest, local activists captured Bouazizi’s act on video, where it was 
widely viewed on Facebook and Al-Jazeera. Protests soon spread across the interior 
region of the country.446 The regime’s initial reaction combined public gestures of 
conciliation with typical police brutality towards protestors. Shortly after announcing $10 
million in economic aid for Sidi Bouzid, police shot and killed two demonstrators on 
December 24, prompting protests spread to country’s two largest cities, Sfax and Tunis. 
In a December 28 speech, Ben Ali expressed his sympathy with the unemployed and 
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visited Bouazizi, who had been transferred to a state hospital. Yet Bouazizi’s death on 
January 3, along with news that lawyers representing the protestors had been beaten and 
tortured by the police, prompted much of Tunisia’s class of legal, medical and education 
professionals to hit the streets. In early January, as many as 95 percent of Tunisia’s 8,000 
lawyers went on strike, major clashes between protestors and security forces killed 
dozens, and the rallies across the country continued to grow in size.447  
Realizing his regime was under mortal threat, Ben Ali’s next address to the public 
on January 10 was much harsher. He maintained that the clashes between security forces 
and protestors were “terrorist work that cannot be tolerated” and accused opponents of 
being “manipulated from abroad.”448 Ben Ali’s harsh address only prompted an even 
greater degree of mobilization, with Tunis wracked by its biggest protests yet, prompting 
the government to declare a curfew. On January 13, the dictator again softened his 
rhetoric, telling protestors he “heard and understood” them and promising not to run for a 
sixth term.  
Yet unlike in 1984, when Bourguiba’s agreement to maintain the price of bread 
was enough to send demonstrators home, the single largest anti-government protest 
Tunisia ever witnessed took place on January 14. According to a survey taken as part of 
Arab Barometer, 16 percent of Tunisia’s population, or roughly 1.7 million people, 
reported participating in the protests, twice the percentage of people who participated in 
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protests in Egypt.449 A report by the U.N. later determined that between mid-December 
and mid-January, 338 people were killed and 2,147 injured, mostly at the hands of the 
police. The casualty figures amounted to more than twice the number killed during the 
1984 bread riots.450 By this time, it was clear that only an even more violent 
confrontation with the protestors would have saved the regime, and that such a 
confrontation would have required support of the army. This support was not 
forthcoming. 
Contrary to popular belief, the Tunisian military did not directly disobey orders 
given to it by Ben Ali. Reports that Lieutenant General and Chief of Army Staff Rachid 
Ammar refused a direct order to open fire on protestors and had been put under house 
arrest by Ben Ali were confirmed to be fake by Ammar himself and by a social media 
activist who apparently made them up in order to pressure the military into siding against 
the regime.451 Moreover, subsequent reports have emerged that regime officials remained 
convinced of Ammar’s loyalty right up until Ben Ali left the country.  According to one 
former defense minister, Ben Ali asked Ammar to take control of the operations room at 
the Interior Ministry just hours before he fled to Saudi Arabia.452  
It is more accurate to conclude that the Tunisian armed forces interpreted the 
orders given to it by the regime in a way that allowed it to refrain from engaging in the 
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mass repression of protests and to stay neutral prior to Ben Ali’s departure. It was able to 
do so in part because the regime followed the protocol undertaken in 1978, 1984, 1991, 
and 2008 of keeping the military out of the business of responding to popular uprisings 
unless absolutely necessary. In the early phases of the protests following Bouazizi’s self-
immolation, Ammar was monitoring a military exercise, and was not aware that protests 
were spreading until he was instructed to put three battalions on alert on December 24.453 
The army did not become heavily involved in managing the protests until January 9, 
when Ben Ali realized his regime was on the verge of collapse and ordered soldiers to 
deploy to Tunis. This division of labor meant that the army stayed on the sidelines while 
the police brutally confronted increasingly large numbers of protestors. As the protests 
intensified, exhausted police, who had been working for days and were beginning to run 
out of ammunition, allowed rioters to loot the properties and the palace of the President’s 
relatives.454 By-mid January, the remaining police and intelligence forces lacked the 
resources necessary to continue to repress the uprisings.  
When the command did come for the military to take on a major role, beginning 
in mid-January, soldiers were simply ordered to cooperate with the police and internal 
security apparatus to maintain order. This meant that the military was able to interpret its 
mandate broadly, and in a different manner than their colleagues in the internal security 
apparatus.  “The training of the police was to do anything to safeguard the regime,” stated 
retired Major Colonel Kolsi. “Their loyalty was for the regime and against the people, 
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and their attitude was that the only person who ought to survive an uprising against Ben 
Ali was the dictator himself. By contrast, the military’s attitude was to do everything it 
could to safeguard the people, the flag, and the territory of Tunisia.”455 Throughout the 
first month of demonstrations, soldiers stood idly by as their colleagues in the internal 
security services beat, arrested, opened fire on, and killed demonstrators, who in some 
instances sought shelter from police gunshots behind military tanks and armored 
vehicles.456 Rather than arrest or shoot protestors, soldiers not only permitted protests to 
ransack and even burn police stations, but fraternized with and protected demonstrators.   
For civilians who participated in the revolution, the emerging solidarity between 
protestors and military against the police was obvious. According to Professor Oussama 
Ayara, who took part in demonstrations in Tunis between January 10 and January 14: 
From virtually the first week, we were told that the army was not 
intervening on behalf of the regime… As time went on, the contrast 
between the behavior of soldiers and the behavior of the police became 
obvious. People, including myself and wife and children, would take food 
and water to soldiers and asked if they needed anything. We felt like 
above all else the army was watching our country. Even today we refer to 
‘our soldiers’ in a similar manner to which we refer to ‘our children.’457 
According to another student who was in Tunis at the time of the revolution: 
I did not go to the mass rally on January 14 for fear of police snipers. By 
contrast, the army came to our dormitories to take some of us who did not 
have relatives in the area we could stay with to find transportation back to 
their home towns. In addition, I remember that the army during that time 
the army would even agree to pose with us for pictures, something that 
would never have been allowed before the revolution.458 
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As these experiences and many others like them indicate, the degree to which 
Tunisian citizens identified with and even felt protected by soldiers during the revolution 
is a striking contrast with the animosity and fear felt towards the police. Under these 
circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the army would have obeyed orders to engage in 
mass repression. As suggested by Hicham bou Nassif, the most likely result of a direct 
order to open fire on the protestors might have been mutiny, particularly among enlisted 
soldiers and low and mid-ranking officers.459  
The fact that the military let protestors attack police and sometimes interceded on 
their behalf suggests that the restraint was intentional, in no small part a product of the 
institutional grievances the military felt against both the internal security services and the 
Ben Ali regime.  For example, when the Defense Minister ordered the military to take off 
their helmets so as to make it difficult to distinguish between them and the police, 
Ammar ordered that soldiers wear red berets. In addition, Ammar explicitly instructed 
that soldiers not shoot anyone without the explicit authorization of top military 
commanders, an unusually strict order given the circumstances, according to retired 
Colonel Major Mokhtar Ben Nasser, former spokesperson for the military during the 
revolution.460 Though the Tunisian military did not openly defy orders given to it by the 
regime, Tunisian soldiers were not about to respond with an unprecedented level of 
repressive violence in favor of a regime that victimized it. 
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 That there existed some level of fear and enmity between the regime and its army 
was an open secret. With this understood, it is no surprise that Ben Ali knew that he 
could not count on the military to be used as an instrument repression, and never asked 
the army to repress civilians. Virtually every officer I interviewed maintained that, during 
the 2011 uprisings, the army never openly defected from the regime, but at the same time 
would never have consented to mass killing on its behalf. The most succinct summary of 
this argument was given by Major Colonel Ouesalati: 
The Tunisian military never defected from the regime. Ben Ali never 
asked the army to fire on the people, because that obviously would have 
made the situation worse. In our view, we were simply obeying orders to 
limit the violence. The army does not normally have contact with the 
population. Our obligation is to accomplish our mission, whereas 
confronting the population is the role of internal security. The population 
likes and often appreciates the military’s presence.”461 
 
Thus, by January 14th, 2011, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali had run out of options. 
Neither concessions nor Tunisia’s vaunted internal security apparatus succeeded in 
calming demonstrators, who were willing to settle for nothing less than the end of the 
regime.  With a military he knew to be unwilling to enact the level of repression 
necessary to sustain him and his inner circle no longer able to guarantee his security, the 
president fled the country later that day, never to return. For fifty years, the army’s 
political marginalization from the regime, which limited the army’s use as an instrument 
of internal repression and fostered the existence of a powerful police apparatus, made a 
military seizure of power unlikely to succeed and helped stabilize authoritarianism in 
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Tunisia. During the uprisings of 2011, those same factors made it virtually impossible for 
the Tunisian armed forces to continue to support the dictator. The army’s lack of 
willingness to repress on behalf of the regime was a crucial factor in causing Tunisia’s 
authoritarian edifice to crumble.  
7.5: The Outcome: A Democratic Transition 
 
After Ben Ali’s flight, the Tunisian army emerged as the country’s only 
institution capable of maintaining order. Despite the opportunity, Tunisia’s army chose to 
refrain from seizing power, instead supporting the creation of a civilian interim 
government that guided the country to democracy.  Tunisian military’s political culture of 
neutrality and lack of will to repress demonstrators did not change with the regime. If 
anything, the revolution reinforced the military’s role as an actor apart from the 
dictatorship and therefore untainted by Tunisia’s authoritarian past. Moreover, if 
abstention from repression allowed the military to become Tunisia’s central power 
broker, democracy offered the armed forces a pathway to institutionalize those gains. 
Under democracy, the Tunisian military could regain the status it had lost due to its 
marginalization under the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes.  
In the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s flight, uncertainty reigned in the upper 
echelons of the Tunisian government and in the Tunisian streets. Following Ben Ali’s 
resignation, two heads of state were announced within twenty-four hours. Over the next 
two weeks, the interim cabinet was reshuffled multiple times in response to continued 
protests, who opposed the appointment of RCD cabinet officials in top posts. With little 
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police presence in the streets, looters and gangs ransacked grocery stores, set fire to 
buildings, and attacked people and property.462 Initial attempts to find a political path 
forward were marked by confusion because the government was in complete disarray and 
the protestors were yet to be represented by coherent leadership. 
The support of the protestors and the breakdown of the former regime’s repressive 
apparatus meant that the military became the country’s central power broker, and 
remained so for many months after Ben Ali’s flight. Beginning in mid-January, thousands 
of Tunisian soldiers deployed to the capitol in order to protect public buildings, key 
infrastructure, and to attempt to prevent the protests from becoming too violent. The 
armed forces even guarded the Interior Ministry, which had been abandoned by the 
police.  
During this period, the army could have seized power had it wanted to. In the 
words of retired Major Colonel Akyl Manai, who was brought to Tunis by Ammar to deal 
with the continuing unrest:  
It would have been very easy for the army to have seized power during 
the revolution, as it had in Egypt. Particularly in the days after Ben Ali 
fled, everything was in total chaos, the army was effectively the only 
standing institution in the country, and therefore everything was in the 
military’s hands.463 
With continued tension between the interim government and the protestors, the Tunisian 
military might have massaged its status as a neutral arbitrator seeking to restore order. 
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Throughout this interim period, there were calls by protestors, government officials, and 
civilians alike for the military to take control.  
Instead, the Tunisian army continued to minimize its engagement with politics 
while signaling its preferences for a civilian-led democratic transition. 10 days after the 
flight of Ali, Ammar cemented the status of the interim government when he declared 
that the military stood on the side of the people, and let other military officials also 
confirm that the general preferred a democratic transition via elections.464 After Ammar’s 
announcement, the military faded into the political background, allowing an interim 
government, which controlled the country through the October elections, to be composed 
entirely of civilians.465 On October 22nd, 2011, the interim government was replaced by a 
national constituent assembly elected with the task of drafting a new constitution, 
completing the country’s democratic transition.  
Why did the Tunisian military make its preferences for democracy obvious in a 
political environment where it could have seized power? The simple answer is that, in the 
absence of the will to repress the Tunisian population, democracy was the path that best 
served the military’s institutional interests. Though the character of the Tunisian regime 
changed rapidly in the months following the revolution, the institution itself remained the 
same. The military saw its mission as one that involved maintaining order but not 
repression, and sought, like the rest of Tunisia’s population, the means to permanently 
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free itself from the grip of the regime, and in particular the internal security apparatus. A 
transition to democracy, and not a seizure of power, was most likely to guarantee this 
outcome, for several reasons.  
First, by seizing power for itself, the Tunisian military would have risked facing 
the same kind of ire from civil society to which Tunisia’s internal security institutions 
had been subject. The military did not want to place in power the kind of leader that 
would have “further catalyzed instability and a breakdown in the civil order.”466 
According to Ben Nasser: “Ammar was convinced that democracy couldn’t come 
through arms or via the army, and that the army had to interpret its mandate 
legalistically.”467 In a conversation with a demonstrator while the military was attempting 
to restore order at the Casbah, Major Colonel Manai recalls admonishing a civilian who 
was calling for intervention: “a military regime is a regime of the baton.”468 Retired Navy 
Colonel Lassad Bouazzi agrees: “We were conscious that there’s no worse dictator than 
the army.”469 The Tunisian military refrained from using excessive violence against 
demonstrators during the transition, and had little reason to wish to do so in its aftermath.  
The Tunisian army was not just hesitant to use force against protestors because of 
a concern for political stability. Opposition protestors proved the army’s allies in 
overwhelming the internal security apparatus. It was only after Tunisia’s internal security 
apparatus disintegrated, in no small part due to increasingly tense interactions with 
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protestors, that the army emerged from the uprisings as the country’s pre-eminent 
security institution. In addition, it was only with the sanction of Tunisia’s interim 
government that the Tunisian army shifted from a position of neutrality to one of more 
active confrontation with the departed regime’s police. In the aftermath of Ben Ali’s 
resignation, the military arrested Ben Ali’s former security chief, Ali Seriati, who was 
suspected of attempting to incite violence against the protestors and interim government. 
The military also engaged in gunfights against the police and presidential guard around 
the presidential palace, the force most loyal to the regime.470  
Only once the police and intelligence apparatus was marginalized did the military 
feel as if it had license to confront protestors. Prior to Ben Ali’s departure, any action that 
might have resulted in civilian casualties could have led the army to be tainted by 
association with the regime. According to statistics compiled by Nassif, between 
December 17th and Ben Ali’s flight January 14th, the death of only one civilian could be 
directly attributed to military forces. In the month after, 37 civilian deaths could be 
directly attributed to the army as it attempted more forcefully to restore order.471 Ben 
Nasser confirms that this was part of the military’s logic in acting with restraint: 
“Because no president would give a direct order to open fire on civilians, it meant that all 
killings of the civilians prior to the flight of Ben Ali were attributed to the police.”472 
Because of the solidarity between the protestors, the political opposition, and the 
army, democratization offered the Tunisian military the option of getting out from under 
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the thumb of the Tunisian police and intelligence forces once and for all. Tunisia’s 
soldiers had not forgotten their ill-treatment at the hands of their counterparts in the 
internal security services, whose interference in their affairs they resented and who 
closeness to the regime they despised. The Tunisian Revolution gave the armed forces the 
opportunity to redress the grievances it had piled up against forces more loyal to the 
regime, including the fictitious coup plots, the relative loss of funding and equipment, 
and harsh security measures to which they had been subject.  “Ben Ali created a situation 
of mutual suspicion between the two ministries, one where the Defense Ministry knew 
that the Interior Ministry had tortured their people,” retired Major Colonel Ahmed 
maintained. “This caused many in the army to further identify with the people, who were 
also oppressed by the police, who became closely associated with the regime due to its 
repressive tactics. The army stayed neutral during the uprisings in no small part because 
it could not support a regime that did what the Ben Ali regime did to its people.”473  
Thus, by standing in solidarity with the protestors, declaring its support for 
Tunisia’s interim government, and cracking down on the internal security apparatus, the 
army ensured its reputation was unsullied and that it above all other security institutions 
was in the best position to work with Tunisia’s interim leadership. The military’s active 
role in the revolution assured it more autonomy, more support from civilian leadership, 
and a more influential role in the security sector than it had under Ben Ali and Bourguiba. 
Any path other than a democratic transition would have risked an opportunity for the 
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Tunisian military to institutionalize the material and social gains it received as a result of 
refusing to associate itself with the old regime and its coercive apparatus.  
In short, democracy offered the Tunisian military to avoid having to implicate 
itself in internally repressive activity it disliked, to restore its status as Tunisia’s central 
security institution, and to free it from the grip of Tunisia’s internal security 
establishment.   
 
7.6: Maintaining Democracy: Civil-Military Relations after the Arab Spring  
 
At merely seven years of age, Tunisia’s democracy is still quite young. Yet the 
relative youth of Tunisia’s democracy makes it no less remarkable. Tunisia was the first 
Arab country to be convulsed by the Arab uprisings and the first to undergo a democratic 
transition. With the 2013 coup in Egypt, Tunisia is the only Arab country to remain 
democratic. And it has done so in the face of some significant challenges, including a 
moribund economy, an emerging terrorist threat as a result of the collapse of Libya and 
the Syrian civil war, and the return of a political elite sympathetic to the old regime.  
Despite these challenges, the Tunisian military has resisted calls by opposition parties to 
seize control and instead embraced attempts by civilian officials to remove the last 
vestiges of Ben Ali era personalism from the Tunisian armed forces. In addition, soldiers 
have benefitted from efforts to address past grievances, cultivate a more active social role 
for retired military officers, and increase military budgets. The army arguably remains the 
country’s most respected institution in precarious political circumstances.  
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In many respects, Tunisia is both less prosperous and less stable than it was under 
Ben Ali.  According to the World Bank, both overall GDP and GDP per capita were less 
in 2015 than they were in 2011, the year of the revolution. Unemployment remains at 15 
percent, with youth unemployment, widely credited to have sparked the revolution, over 
30 percent. The security situation is likewise perilous. The political instability sparked by 
the 2011 revolution, in addition to the upheavals in Libya and Egypt, have dampened 
tourism and spooked investors in mining, oil and gas industries. Shortly after Tunisian 
activists won the Nobel Peace prize in 2015, the country suffered a spate of Islamic-State 
sponsored terrorist attacks. In March of that year, militants killed 17 and hospitalized 26 
after an attack at the Bardo Museum in Tunis. Three months later, 38 were killed and 39 
wounded after an attack on a beach-side resort in Sousse. And the winding down of the 
war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria may be of little boon to Tunisia, where as 
many as 7,000 citizens have left to join IS as foreign fighters, the most of any country.474   
In addition, there have been periods of heightened concern over the military’s role 
in politics. At the same time as the military combatted the internal security apparatus, it 
consolidated control over the Tunisian security sector. In April 2011, Ammar cemented 
his control over the military by appointing himself as chief of staff of the armed forces, 
reviving a position that Ben Ali had abandoned and “acquiring near hegemony of military 
decisions, reportedly consulting no one.”475 Military officers were appointed to assume 
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475 For more detailed account of these events, see Grawal, “A Quiet Revolution.”  
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command of the nation’s top posts in customs and the Ministry of the Interior, and were 
also appointed to provincial governorships for the first time since 1991.  
These tensions were worsened by the structure of the troika government, a 
coalition between the Islamist party Ennahda and two secular parties, the Congress for 
the Republic (CPR) and Ettakol, who ruled the country between December 2011 and 
February 2014. Under the arrangement, the CPR’s Moncef Marzouki assumed the 
presidency and Ennahda’s Hamadi Jebali became the prime minister, and the two offices 
shared responsibility for defense matters. Though the president was named commander-
in-chief, the prime-minister was responsible for forming the cabinet and the two offices 
were jointly responsible for nominating senior defense officials.476 
This arrangement created animosity between Marzouki’s camp, who felt cut out 
of most defense decisions and were wary of Ammar’s ties to the former regime. Prime 
Minister Jebali and the Defense Minister Abdelkarim Zbidi preferred to keep the military 
leadership of the old regime intact, leading Ammar to side with them and restrict 
Marzouki’s access to information on defense issues.  According to former presidential 
spokesmen and cabinet director Adnen Mansour: 
From the beginning, we had very little confidence in Zbidi, Ammar and 
Zebali, and we knew they felt likewise. For Marzouki, the real revolution 
lay in removing the main elements of the old regime, and it wasn’t the 
institutions so much as the personal networks that mattered. These 
networks were symbolized by Ammar. Zebali, despite his background in 
Ennahda, had allies in the old regime and felt they were needed in order 
                                                          




to succeed. They counted on the popularity of the army, and in particular 
the personal popularity of Rachid al Ammar.477 
In an attempt to circumvent the authority of Ammar, Marzouki appointed Major Colonel 
Brahim Ouechtati, who was outside of Ammar’s personal networks, as his military 
advisor in 2012. He also began to chair monthly National Security Council meetings, 
which included a broader array of civilian officials and generals. 
The most uncertain period for Tunisia’s democracy came in mid-2013, with the 
assassination of the left-leaning politician Chokri Belaid. The assassination, combined 
with tensions between the troika and the Tunisian military over how to deal with the 
Islamist group Ansar al-Sharia, led relations between the military and Marzouki to reach 
a nadir. In early July, a coup undertaken by the Egyptian military ousted Mohamed Morsi 
– the Islamist leaning prime minster of Egypt. Weeks later, the assassination of a second 
politician prompted the Tunisian opposition to abandon the constitution-making process 
and instead take to the streets, calling for an Egypt-like scenario in Tunisia.  
Despite the open calls by opposition forces for a coup, the response of Marzouki 
and his allies were measured, and the political turbulence actually served to reinforce the 
principal of civilian control over Tunisia’s armed forces. For one, though officials close 
to Marzouki were fearful of an attempt to remove the troika government from power, 
they did not fear a military coup. According to Tarek Kahlawi, Director of the Tunisian 
Center for Strategic Studies and former advisor to Marzouki, the troika government 
intercepted phone calls from leftist movements to officials in the army and the police. 
                                                          




Representatives from these movements asked security officials to remain neutral during 
an August 6th attempt to storm parliament, declare a state of emergency, and force the 
troika government to step down. The appeals fell on deaf ears: security forces thwarted 
the effort, in addition to a back-up plan to occupy other public offices around the country. 
“Within the military itself,” Kahlawi added, “we were convinced that there was no desire 
for a coup, even if we believed the troika government had only tepid support within the 
armed forces. Any thought of a coup by political forces aligned with the old regime was 
wishful thinking.”478 
In fact, Marzouki and his allies capitalized on the tensions that erupted in 2013 in 
order to reinforce civilian control over the army. After Boulaid’s assassination, Jebali was 
forced to resign, and was replaced by Ali Laarayedh as prime minister. Marzouki had a 
much better working relationship with Laarayedh, who approved of efforts to marginalize 
and retire holdovers in the military from Ben Ali’s days.479 Together, Marzouki worked 
with Laarayedh to replace the Defense Minister Zbidi in a cabinet re-shuffle. With his 
two top allies in the regime gone, and increasingly isolated General Ammar resigned 
shortly thereafter. Marzouki and his allies took Ammar’s resignation as an opportunity to 
reshape the military’s leadership. Ammar’s position as the chief of staff of the armed 
forces was not replaced, and civilian officials selected Salah Hamdi of Sidi Bouzid, a 
general outside of Ben Ali and Ammar’s networks, as chief of staff of the land army. The 
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other top service chiefs were also replaced by officers with no connection to the old 
regime.  
Most soldiers interviewed expressed support of these reforms while insisting that 
any fears of a military coup in the aftermath of the revolution and during the Troika 
government were overblown. “There was a lot of tension between the army and the troika 
government,” observes Nasser, “but most of it was based on needless fear and a 
misunderstanding by civilians of how the military saw its role. The appointment of 
military governors to certain provinces was taken as a precaution to stabilize areas where 
civilian governors had been threatened or attacked, and it was only for a limited amount 
of time. The governors left after elections were conducted, and only one remains in the 
south, on the border with Libya, as a result of the obvious security concerns.”480 
According to Colonel Bouazzy: 
During the transitional government from 2011 to 2014, the army was a 
victim of intrigue between the CPR, Enhada and Ettakol. The central 
problem was that both the head of parliament and the chief of 
government had shared authority over defense matters. The tension 
between Jebali and Marzouki was played out in the army. Now, with the 
Defense Minister reporting directly to the head of state, the lines of 
authority and communication are far clearer.”  
 
As Bouazzy indicates, the conflicting lines of authority promulgated during the interim 
government have been ameliorated with the Tunisian constitution of 2014, which 
concentrates more power in the hands of the president by making the President 
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responsible for cabinet appointments, presiding over the National Security Council, and 
setting defense and national security policy.  
Moreover, despite the widespread popularity of Ammar in Tunisian society at 
large, many officers saw him and his cohort as far too close to the former regime.481 
Though there are no genuine ethnic divides within the Tunisian military, Ben Ali and 
Bourguiba before him had politicized the upper echelons of Tunisia’s officer corps by 
appointing former colleagues and wealthier officers from the coasts over those from the 
poorer interior regions, who made up much of the rank and file.  Though soldiers in the 
middle and lower ranks never blatantly acted on it, these perceived imbalances, as well as 
their senior officers’ complicity in the aftermath of the Baraket Essahel affair, 
engendered considerable discontent among lower ranks with their leadership. Yet after 
the appointment of Hamdi in 2013, “competence became rewarded,” in words of Major 
Colonel Bouazzi.482 
Reinforcement of civilian control at the top of the armed forces was accompanied 
by reforms to offer members of the Tunisian military greater freedoms, and, for some, a 
sense of transitional justice. No longer is “La Grande Muette” an apt characterization of 
the military’s relation to the public sphere. Under democracy, soldiers have rights to 
association and assembly. They have created a number of such associations, including the 
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Association of Former Military Officers, the Association for Retired Soldiers, and the 
Association of Justice for Military Veterans, to organize social gatherings, serve as an 
intermediary between serving soldiers and the public sphere, and advocate for their 
rights.483 The Association of Justice for Military Veterans, for example, was crucial in 
fighting for the recognition and re-instatement of the rights of soldiers caught up in the 
Barraket Essahel affair. In 2012, the state issued an official apology for its involvement, 
and in 2014 promoting each two or three ranks and rewarding them with pensions. And in 
2016, soldiers were given the right to vote in local and municipal elections, a change that 
many soldiers actually worry will politicize the institution and create divisions within the 
ranks.484 The cumulative effect of these actions, in the words of Major Colonel Kolsi, 
“gave us back our rights.”485 
Finally, democracy has also served the military’s fiduciary interests. Though the 
military budget remains somewhat below the budget of the Ministry of the Interior, it has 
risen considerably. Since 2011, the defense budget has risen from about half to close to 
three quarters of the budget of the Interior Ministry, more in line with what it was during 
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the Bourguiba administration.486 In absolute terms, overall military spending in Tunisia 
has nearly doubled since 2011, rising from 1.5 to 2.3 percent of GDP. With the overall 
number of soldiers remaining more or less the same, spending per soldier has likewise 
experienced substantial increases. Some of this increase was also spent on raising salaries 
to be more equal with their counterparts in Tunisia’s civilian administration; during the 
authoritarian era, it was half.487 The military budget increases have been in part driven by 
necessity, including popular unrest and the return of foreign fighters and instability on 
Tunisia’s borders. 
Nevertheless, it is premature to call Tunisia’s democratic experiment a resounding 
success. Though military and paramilitary forces are exceedingly unlikely to undertake a 
coup or support any blatant attempt at authoritarian reversion, many of those associated 
with the former regime have begun to creep back by more subtle means. With Beji Caid 
Essebsi’s assumption of the presidency in December 2014, some top national security 
officials with closer links to the old regime have regained their posts, including the re-
appointment of Abdelkarim Zbidi as Defense Minister in September 2017. At the same 
time, the police and intelligence services have capitalized on an environment of 
insecurity and unrest to form powerful unions, which have fought hard to resist security 
sector reforms and bolster the Interior Ministry’s image. These unions were the 
motivating force behind the 2016 decision to grant security forces to grant the right to 
vote, and have pushed hard for the passage of a law decried by human rights groups that 
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punish speech denigrating the police and exempt security forces from liability if they use 
excessive force.488 Moreover, though intelligence sharing between the Ministry of 
Interior and the Ministry of Defense has improved, old animosities linger. “There still 
remains a considerable amount of mistrust, particularly among senior military officers 
and members of the Ministry of Defense,” observed a source at an organization 
responsible for working with both ministries. “Mid-ranking and lower level officers tend 
to be more open to cross ministry collaboration and do not hold the same grudges. Still, I 
think it is going to take a long time for the relationship between the two ministries to get 
better.”489 
Likewise, Tunsia’s economic ills, insecurity, and slow return of the old regime 
have created a sense of disillusionment with the fruits of the revolution among civilians 
and soldiers alike. “Honestly, I now would have preferred it if there had never been a 
revolution,” said a student present in Tunis during the Arab Spring. “Though I am 
grateful that we now have our political freedoms, under Ben Ali we lived as secure, 
inexpensive, peaceful life. Now there is much less security and far more inequality.”490  
Two members of the Association for Retired Soldiers shared this sentiment:  
During and after the revolution, we were proud of our rule and hopeful for 
the future of the country. Now, like much of the rest of the country, we are 
disappointed with the results of the revolution. Income inequality has 
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increased, and if things continue as they are, we’ll have one million 
unemployed 2020.491 
 
Nevertheless, Tunisian civil-military relations after the revolution largely confirm 
the argument that the absence of ethnic or political cleavages in regimes with 
representative civil-military relations tend to result in more stable democracies. By 
seeking to marginalize the military and instill in it a politically neutral corporate ethos, 
both Bourguiba and Ben Ali created military institutions ideally suited to democratic 
control. Free of substantial political divisions, despised by the internal security apparatus, 
but with limited ability or interest in repressing the population, the army stood to gain 
much as a result of democracy but did not have the will to seize power for itself. As a 
result, the Tunisian military only had minimal ties to the previous authoritarian regime, 
and has been a mostly willing partner in efforts to institutionalize civilian control of the 
armed forces by redressing the last vestiges of personalism. Moreover, the military’s role 
in the revolution and expanding mandate over the country’s security after years of silence 
have only reinforced the loyalty of Tunisia’s soldiers to the country’s democracy and 
enhanced the respect of Tunisia’s citizens for men and women in uniform. 
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7.7: Tracing the Mechanisms: Tunisia’s Representative Civil-Military Relations and 
Democratic Stability 
 Tunisia, the final case considered in this dissertation, confirms the theory’s 
arguments linking representative civil-military relations to democratic stability. In the 
empirical chapter, it was established that civilian led authoritarian regimes that do not 
practice ethnic stacking transition to democracy at 50 percent greater rates than those that 
do not, and that democracies that succeed such regimes last about twice as long. I argued 
that it is the lack of political or ethnic cleavages that drives these outcomes by making 
regimes with representative civil-military relations less likely to support the dictator in 
the face of pressure to liberalize.  The causal logic supporting my argument is reproduced 


















The analysis of Tunisia provides evidence that confirms this argument. Following 
a series of early coup attempts and the spread of military rule across the region, 
Bourguiba decided to limit the material and political power of the military. He banned the 
military from political participation of any kind, subordinated it to a civilian Defense 
Minister, and counterbalanced it with investments in Tunisia’s internal security 
apparatus. Ben Ali followed essentially the same policy, despite his military background 
subjecting the army to even more stringent monitoring by the police.  Without ethnic 
divisions to exploit, these decisions forged representative civil-military relations.   
The resulting cleavages were distinct from most other nations in the region. On 
the one hand, the military’s marginalization succeeded in rendering it uninterested and 
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incapable of seizing power. After Bourguiba’s reforms, Tunisia experienced only one 
coup attempt that was devised and implemented the internal security apparatus to replace 
the nation’s ailing leader. Moreover, the military’s marginalization did not preclude its 
willing participation in the relatively few instances in which it was called upon to assist 
the internal security services to maintain order. Yet, by investing so heavily in the police 
and intelligence services to serve the regime’s central coercive functions, the Defense 
Ministry became riven by institutional and personal rivalries with the Interior Ministry, 
and, by extension, the regime. The cleavages between the army and the rest of the 
authoritarian coercive apparatus were particularly acute during the Ben Ali regime in the 
aftermath of Barraket Essahel affair.  
These cleavages proved the Ben Ali regime’s downfall. At precisely the moment 
when a crackdown by the military on civilian protestors might have saved the regime, the 
Tunisian armed forces found itself unwilling, uncapable and ultimately uninterested in 
turning its guns on the opposition. Unlike previous episodes of political unrest, the 2010 
and 2011 uprisings were unprecedented in their scope, scale, and explicit demands for the 
end of the dictatorship. The Tunisian military did not disobey direct orders to shoot on 
protestors, but it did stand idly by as their colleagues in the internal security apparatus 
were attacked, protected protestors from being attacked, and, when it was clear the 
regime was crumbling, engaged the remaining elements of the police forces that 
remained loyal.  
The Tunisian military’s lack of willingness to oppress demonstrators was crucial 
in ending the authoritarian regime, and led to the country’s transition to democracy. After 
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Ben Ali’s flight, the Tunisian military emerged as the hero of the revolution. Yet its 
previous political marginalization and ethos of corporate neutrality rendered it 
uninterested in seizing power for itself despite some calls to do so. A transitional council 
made up entirely of civilians was put into place, who guided the country into a multiparty 
democracy in which the military remained politically neutral and subordinate to civilian 
control. With neither ethnic nor political ties to the authoritarian elite, the military had 
little to lose from the transition and, by elevating its status next to the internal security 
apparatus, much to gain.  
 Finally, the same lack factors that inhibited the military from intervening during 
its authoritarian days have contributed to Tunisia’s democratic stability. Despite a poor 
economy and a fragile security environment, the Tunisian military resisted calls by 
members of the old elite for a coup, helping to ensure that the country did not meet the 
same fate as Egypt. Moreover, the replacement of the old guard, the easing of restrictions 
of freedoms of speech, increased budgets, and transitional justice for members of the 
army that were caught up in the Barraket Essahel affair have reinforced the principals of 
civilian control and served the army’s institutional interests.  
 Like the regimes of Nigeria and Sudan, the Tunisian case confirms the degree to 
which present security institutions are shaped by decisions of the past. Tunisia’s dictators 
did not have the stability of Tunisia’s democratic institutions in mind when they made 
decisions to politically marginalize the armed forces. Nevertheless, the same ethos of 
corporate neutrality, lack of use as an instrument of authoritarian repression, and 
counterbalancing that prevented the Tunisian armed forces from threatening their rule 
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have also rendered the army an ideal democratic civil servant.  Most countries in Africa 
have not been so fortunate.   
It is evident that the cases confirm this project’s argument concerning how 
democratic outcomes are shaped by how dictators choose to manage their armies.  
Though each chapter has served principally to illustrate that the causal mechanisms 
internal to each case is constituent with the causal logic of the theory, the analysis 
presented here can benefit from a more systematic comparison between all three cases. It 





Transforming Authoritarian Armies into Democratic Ones: 
Conclusions, Recommendations, and Further Questions 
  
So far, the quantitative and qualitative evidence in favor of this project’s 
argument has been mostly presented separately. The quantitative empirical chapter 
demonstrated support for the argument that military regimes, dictatorships with ethnic 
civil-military relations and those with representative civil-military relations tend to 
transition in and out of democratic rule through different pathways. The cases treated in 
far greater detail the causal mechanisms through which these varying outcomes are 
achieved, but only compared divergent outcomes and causal mechanisms in passing. The 
first task of this final chapter will be to briefly present the evidence used in this 
dissertation in a comparative fashion in order to arrive at a more integrated understanding 
of this project’s theory.  
 Next, this chapter discusses the policy recommendations. Four main insights are 
discussed. First, I follow a long line of Africanist scholarship in arguing that investments 
in military capabilities have little bearing on democratization outcomes. Second, I argue 
for an approach to foster democratization tailored to the types of challenges, repressive 
capacities, and institutional histories of each civil-military relations identified in this 
dissertation. Third, I observe that due to the principally domestic and sensitive nature of 
these civil-military relation types, the ability of international actors to foster constructive 
change is limited. Nevertheless, I argue, fourth, that the international community could be 
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doing far more to give African nations positive incentives to foster more meritocratic 
security institutions.  
 The final section meditates on this project’s shortcomings. Though providing 
strong evidence that military regimes and ethnic stacking have had significant influence 
on political transitions over the past fifty years, the project does not consider how this 
influence might have changed over time. The decline of military rule and the 
democratization of most authoritarian regimes with representative armies means that 
ethnic stacking remains perhaps the principal source of resistance to democratization 
within Africa’s armies. Future research should more closely investigate cases where 
civilian-led authoritarian regimes with ethnically stacked armies democratize, as well as 
how differences in ethnic representation along lines of rank and within parallel military 
institutions affect transitional politics. An additional topic worthy of further investigation 
concerns how the civil-military relations considered in this dissertation affect the length 
and resilience of authoritarian rule. 
  
8.1: Comparative Conclusions 
 
 This project began its argument with the observation that authoritarian leaders in 
Africa have made varying choices concerning how to manage their armies. The 
authoritarian civil-military relations of Nigeria, Sudan, and Tunisia each represent very 
different series of choices that in turn led to divergent transitional pathways. Here, I 
compare how authoritarian civil-military relationships in each country created different 
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cleavages within the army and between the army and the state, and how these cleavages 
generated or precluded opportunities for political transition.  
In Nigeria, the choice made by military officers who seized power was military 
rule. This choice was in part a product of the political experience and ambitions officers 
had gained during Nigeria’s previous military regime, which ruled the country from 1966 
until 1979.  In 1983, a clique of officers surrounding General Ibrahim Babangida took 
Nigeria’s struggles with civilian rule as an opportunity to act on their political aspirations. 
During Nigeria’s second period of military rule which lasted until 1999, a new generation 
of officers ruled, served as ministers, governed states and maintained effective veto 
power over key policy decisions. The problem of how to concentrate power and control 
violence was solved by an attempt at fusion between the army and the state. 
Sudan likewise inherited a history of previous military rule when Colonel Omar 
al-Bashir seized power in 1989. However, the 1989 coup was not just the work of 
ambitious military officers, but of an Islamist political party that had infiltrated the 
military and sought deeper reforms of state institutions. The military junta was disbanded 
shortly after the coup, and Bashir was appointed as party leader and civilian president. 
Ultimately, Bashir leveraged his status as both head of party and military officer to 
cultivate a system of personalized dictatorship. Bashir relies on a tight-knit group of 
Northern riverine Arab co-ethnics to run the army and also directly controls a 
constellation of predominantly Arab militias and other parallel security institutions. The 
choice of authoritarian leaders in Sudan was thus to create a civilian-led government with 
an ethnic army.   
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In Tunisia, both Habib Bourguiba and Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali also cultivated 
personalist dictatorships in which each ruled as a civilian head of state. Yet, due to 
Tunisia’s status as an overwhelmingly Arab nation, they did not practice ethnic stacking. 
Instead, both dictators politically marginalized the army by subordinating it to a civilian 
defense minister and forbade soldiers from voting, party membership, or political 
association.  In lieu of the regular army, the Tunisian regime invested heavily in police, 
intelligence, and paramilitary forces to serve as the regime’s main instruments of 
coercion. The choice of authoritarian leaders in Tunisia was a civilian led regime with a 
representative army.   
The result of these choices was to foster different civil-military cleavages, both 
within the army itself and between the army and the regime. In Nigeria, military rule 
created cleavages between the ruling class of officers from the country’s North and 
Middle Belt and the rest of the officer corps serving in more traditional capacities. Most 
members of this ruling class sought and competed against one another for power, with 
little regard to how the wealth they accumulated and the steps they took assure their rule 
affected the military’s corporate unity. As a result of frequent purges and the steady 
deterioration of the Nigerian army’s institutional integrity, their actions were resented by 
more traditional officers and soldiers serving in subaltern roles. The divide between 
traditional and praetorian officers Nigeria experienced under military rule is consistent 
with this project’s argument concerning the principal cleavages in military regimes.   
Like other civilian-ruled dictatorships with ethnically stacked armies, the 
principal civil-military cleavages in Sudan fell along ethnic lines. Unlike in Nigeria, there 
332 
 
existed no praetorian class of soldiers who harbored political ambitions and served in 
extensive political roles. Instead, soldiers were more focused on the traditional military 
mandate of maintaining external defense and internal order, as so defined by the 
authoritarian leadership. In Sudan, the conflicts between the center and the periphery 
meant that security institutions were structured, and the military’s mandate defined, along 
principally ethnic lines. While Sudan’s Arab-dominated regular army worked with ethnic 
militia groups to wage war first in the South and then in the West, an even smaller sub-
group of riverine Arab elite maintained an overwhelming grip on Sudan’s state 
institutions, including top military posts.  The Sudanese case likewise confirms this 
project’s argument that the principal civil-military cleavage in regimes with ethnic civil-
military relations is between co-ethnic and non-ethnic soldiers and regime elites.  
In Tunisia, the principal civil-military cleavage that emerged was between the 
authoritarian regime and the army. As a result of the Tunisian military’s political 
marginalization and lack of incorporation into Tunisia’s internal security apparatus, the 
army adopted a neutral corporate identity apart from the regime. Institutionally forbidden 
from political roles of any kind and unbound through ties of co-ethnicity to authoritarian 
elites, Tunisia’s soldiers defined their loyalty to state institutions and Tunisian citizens 
above all else. The Tunisian case confirms this dissertation’s argument that the principal 
cleavages in authoritarian regimes with representative militaries fall along neither 
political nor ethnic lines.     
These cleavages, in turn, were crucial to shaping military responses at critical 
junctures, when the regimes under which they served came under pressure to foster 
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democratic reforms. In Nigeria, a stagnant economy, calls for liberalization from 
international actors in the aftermath of the Cold War, and opposition from a resurgent 
civil society placed considerable pressure on military rulers to allow democratization in 
the early 1990s. The military fractured in response to this pressure. Much of the officer 
corps serving in traditional roles favored democratization, while opinions were more 
divided among the ruling class of officers who governed the country. Some believed a 
transition to democracy best served the military’s corporate interests. Others were 
opposed to a transition at any cost, or viewed the political instability caused by the 
pressure to liberalize as a potential opportunity to seize power for themselves.  
As a result, Nigeria experienced divergent transition outcomes. The annulment of 
the 1993 election results forced Babangida’s resignation because he was caught between 
pro-democracy officers who were furious with him and anti-democratization officers who 
smelled opportunity. After forcing Babangida’s resignation, Sani Abacha and other 
praetorian officers launched a coup to seize control of Nigeria’s state institutions from an 
interim government after the pro-democracy officers proved unwilling to organize a coup 
of their own. The result was a blocked democratic transition. However, upon Abacha’s 
death in 1998, Nigeria’s pro-democracy officers gained the upper hand. Either because 
Abacha was poisoned or because he died of natural causes, by 1999 military rule had so 
devastated the military as an institution that it was clear there was little appetite to stay in 
power. Nigeria’s remaining senior officers engineered a swift transition to democracy.   
In Sudan, ongoing civil war meant that the opposition was more internally 
divided, yet its government nevertheless faced intense pressure to liberalize from other 
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political parties, protests, and calls for a peaceful solution as the north-south conflict 
became increasingly unwinnable. The external pressures for Sudanese liberalization were 
particularly acute in the aftermath of the conflict in Darfur and the imposition of 
international sanctions. Nevertheless, the bulk of Sudan’s regular military and parallel 
armed forces remained supportive of continued authoritarian rule and loyal to Bashir. For 
the regular army, the prospect of political liberalization was a threat to the continued 
domination of Arab elite within its ranks.  For parallel security institutions, ethnic 
conflict in peripheral regions has become the principal means through which soldiers gain 
access to patronage and resources.   
As a result, authoritarianism has endured in Sudan even as much of the rest of 
Africa has democratized. Despite losing half the country to southern separatists, 
international sanctions, and indictment by the International Criminal Court for war 
crimes, Sudan’s army has remained steadfast in their support of Bashir. Bashir’s policy of 
using Sudan’s ethnically stacked security institutions to oppress the country’s peripheral 
regions in order to keep the riverine elite’s monopoly on power and resources intact has 
led him to become the longest-serving dictator in Sudan’s history.    
 For Tunisia, the critical juncture came nearly entirely from internally organized 
opposition, as the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi led to millions into the streets 
on a scale the country had never seen. Though the international community eventually 
rallied behind the protestors, analysts and policymakers in capitals across the world were 
caught off guard and had not been actively pressing for reform. The scale of the protests 
and their demands for the end of Ben Ali’s regime placed the Tunisian military in a 
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situation in which it had never been before. Faced with a choice of repressing the 
protestors or remaining neutral during increasingly tense confrontations between 
protestors and police, Tunisian soldiers stuck mostly to their mandate of protecting public 
buildings, allowed demonstrations to unfold, and even attacked police and paramilitary 
institutions loyal to the regime who were attempting repress protestors.  
After Ben Ali fled the country, the army, who had become the country’s central 
power broker, emphatically declared itself in support of the revolution and stood by as a 
civilian-led interim government transitioned the country to democracy. The Tunisian 
military’s lack of interference in the creation of an interim government and in the process 
which led to elections is not surprising given the military’s institutional history of 
political neutrality and solidarity with protestors and opposition groups. With neither the 
will to repress demonstrators nor the desire to rule, a transition to democracy was the 
overwhelming preference of Tunisian soldiers. 
The outcomes in Nigeria, Sudan and Tunisia therefore confirm the causal 
mechanisms laid out in the argument section and the central tendencies observed in the 
empirical analysis. Like other countries who have experienced military rule, divisions 
between and among Nigeria’s ruling class of officers and the rest of the army led to 
ambivalence in the face of popular protest and inconsistent democratization outcomes.  
Like the four fifths of countries with ethnic armies led by a civilian or personalist 
dictator, Sudan’s armies and parallel military institutions have been more unified in their 
support for authoritarian rule, more ruthless in their willingness to fight wars and repress 
civilians, and have therefore effectively vetoed the possibility of a democratic transition. 
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And like the four-fifths of countries with civilian dictators and representative armies, the 
Tunisian military defected from the dictator in a case in which the widespread repression 
of mass protest would likely have been the only action that could possibly have saved the 
regime.  
Finally, the historical legacy of each authoritarian army and how leaders 
confronted these legacies have impacted the quality and the length of the democratic 
regimes that followed, if they followed. The length of Nigerian democracy, having lasted 
nearly two decades, is an exception to the rule that democracies that succeed military 
regimes tend not to consolidate. Yet a close reading of the Nigerian case also suggests 
reasons that the Nigerian democratic experiment has not yet ended in failure at the hands 
of a military coup for reasons that are largely consistent with this project’s argument. 
Unlike Nigeria’s brief transition to democracy in 1979, the 1999 transition changed not 
only the fundamental character of the state, but also that of the army. The politicized 
class of officers, who had been responsible for every successful coup in Nigeria’s history 
dating back to 1966 were voluntarily or involuntarily retired, many having themselves 
gone into careers in government or the private sector; the top levels of the army were re-
balanced to reflect a more even geographic representation of the country; and Nigeria’s 
first post-democracy president himself was a widely respected former military head of 
state. Though the issue demands further investigation, it is unlikely that most armies in 
Africa have undergone such radical change in the aftermath of military rule.  
For Sudan, enduring authoritarianism means that it is only possible to speculate 
on the kind of democratic settlement that could emerge. For the moment, Bashir’s 
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personalist control over Sudan’s political system and the continued dominance of Sudan 
by the Arab, riverine elite in Sudan’s government and in her armed forces make 
democratization unlikely save as a result of outside intervention or internecine conflict. 
Bashir’s exile, death, or other event that ruptures Sudan’s current civil-military 
configuration is likely Sudan’s best hope at democratic transition and consolidation. 
Ironically, a democratic transition would have been a more probable outcome had Hassan 
al-Turabi emerged as Sudan’s undisputed leader after his confrontation with Bashir. 
Turabi’s vision of an Islamist state that included non-riverine and non-Arab groups might 
have laid the foundation for democracy, particularly after the secession of the South from 
Sudan in 2011. Whether or not a democratic Sudan would follow this dissertation’s 
predictions that democracies that follow autocracies with ethnic armies are moderately 
likely to last and most likely to die from coups by co-ethnic officers affiliated with the 
former regime is probable but impossible to verify.  
Though Tunisia’s democracy is still young, the country’s experience nevertheless 
confirms this project’s argument that democracies that succeed authoritarian regimes with 
representative armies are likely to last far longer than average. Having never tasted power 
and with close to fifty years since soldiers last attempted a coup, the Tunisian military 
chose not to play an active role in the transition process. Absent political ties, ethnic 
loyalties to the former authoritarian regime or the will to repress Tunisia’s population, the 
Tunisian military has little incentive to intervene to upend the country’s democracy. Like 
some representative armies, the Tunisian military actively gained due to its role in the 
revolution, becoming the country’s most well-respected security institution and receiving 
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increases in salaries and equipment. The restoration of the army’s status relative to the 
much-feared internal security apparatus further dampens the possibility that security 
forces will attempt or succeed in overturning Tunisia’s nascent democratic institutions.  
Tunisia’s civil-military institutions are essential to understanding why Tunisia remains 
the only country to have consolidated its democracy in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, 
despite the poor economic growth and simmering conflict that continues to buffet the 
region.  
  Both the qualitative and quantitative evidence, then, supports the argument of 
this dissertation. Authoritarian civil-military relations, by defining the cleavages that exist 
between the army and the state and within the army itself, profoundly influence 
democratization outcomes. When armies seize power for themselves, soldiers who serve 
as rulers compete amongst themselves for control of the state, in opposition to traditional 
soldiers who serve as subjects and are torn between their desire to respect the chain of 
command and desire to leave power to protect the military’s institutional integrity. 
Historically, these cleavages have given military rulers a reasonable likelihood of 
transitioning to democracy but a poor likelihood of sustaining it. When civilian or 
personalist dictators stack their armed forces with co-ethnic clients, their privileges, 
benefits and even status as soldiers depends upon the continuation of authoritarian rule. 
Under these circumstances, armies become much more likely to be willingly used as 
instruments of oppression and veto the possibility of democratization. Civilian-led 
authoritarian regimes who do not stack their armies with co-ethnics tend to be stable, but 
at the cost of the military’s will to repress. In the face of mass popular protest, the 
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defection of the military from these regimes most often leads to democracies that are 
uncommonly robust and durable.  
 
8.2: Policy Recommendations 
 
The argument presented here is not just meant to inform the historical 
understanding of African civil-military relations. Despite the fact that this study 
concludes that civil-military institutions have an important, path dependent influence on 
processes of political transition and change, the findings do not necessarily privilege 
structure over agency. If anything, this dissertation has equally sought to highlight the 
importance of choices made by individuals, be they authoritarian elites considering how 
to structure their relations with their armies or citizens choosing to organize for the sake 
of political freedom. This dissertation’s findings from Nigeria, where officials from 
inside and outside the military helped break the military’s cycle of intervention by 
forcing changes in military recruitment, leadership, and incentive structure, is illustrative 
of the fact that the past does not always predict the future and that probability is not 
destiny.   
In fact, one of the central motivations behind this study was to contribute to 
contemporary policy debates concerning how to foster security institutions supportive of 
democratic transitions and that refrain from political interference in emerging 
democracies. The pivotal role that Africa’s military institutions play in this process has 
historically been and continues to be woefully understudied. Without a better 
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understanding of the historical origins and political incentives faced by the continent’s 
men and women in uniform, efforts to make Africa’s armies more loyal to the states that 
they serve and better able to fulfill their mission will fall short. Here, then, are four 
practical implications of this project for armies and governments in Africa and for their 
partners across the world: 
1) Improving military capacity will not foster democracy. This study finds, along 
with a long tradition of Africanist scholarship, that efforts to improve military 
professionalization via enhancing the capacity of the armed forces to commit 
and manage violence is unlikely to pay democratic dividends. The mission of 
the U.S. and other international partners to train, equip, and supply partner 
militaries in Africa and elsewhere may have sound strategic logic and may 
help partners manage domestic threats. But it is abundantly clear from this 
study that these missions will do little to foster political stability by preventing 
military seizures of power or authoritarian elites from using soldiers and other 
security forces as tools for repression and political violence. Too often it is 
assumed, mostly by policymakers and military officers but also at times by 
scholars, that efforts to improve the capacity of the armed forces under the 
general rubric of “professionalism” will somehow reduce a soldier’s appetite 
for power or lessen her willingness to kill civilians on behalf of the regime. 
Because professionalism has long led scholars and policymakers to conflate 
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powerful armies with loyal ones, it is past time to heed Peter Feaver’s advice 
and cast the concept aside.492 
 
2) Democratic reformers need to vary their approach depending on the nature of 
a country’s civil-military relations. An understanding of African military 
history and politics can help foster the kind of democratic reform to which 
policymakers often pay lip service. One of the central findings of this study is 
that the institutional legacies of African militaries are not all the same, and in 
fact have quite striking effects on a country’s probabilities, prospects and 
pathways to consolidated democracy. The analysis presented here therefore 
suggests that the variation of institutional legacies within African armies 
merits a variation in approaches to those interested in fostering peaceful 
democratic change. The approach that elites, protestors, the international 
community, and democracy advocates take towards getting the military to 
support democracy ought to vary depending on whether the military ruled or 
did not, and whether the armed forces experienced ethnic stacking or not.  
 
For authoritarian regimes with representative armies, reformers can be 
reasonably assured that mass protest will place sufficient pressure on military 
leaders to lead to democracy. A lack of ethnic ties or political role leads such 
armies to define themselves apart from the regime, lessening their will to 
                                                          




repress on its behalf. Provided that protests are sufficiently widespread that 
they cannot be contained by non-military or paramilitary forces, the result will 
usually be that the army chooses to defect, or at least that the army is 
unwilling to deploy the level of violence necessary to sustain the regime. 
Moreover, representative armies are accustomed to their roles as civil servants 
tend to not maintain ties to political elites and, as we saw in Tunisia, can stand 
to benefit in terms of institutional resources and social prestige that result 
from their role in leading to democratic change. Therefore, once democracy 
occurs, it is likely to consolidate. 
 
As a result, a bottom-up approach to democratization is likely to be effective. 
Local opposition groups should attempt to organize coalitions that peacefully 
protest for greater political freedoms, and the U.S. and its regional and 
international partners should support such groups. They also ought to view 
their country’s army as an ally, and not an opponent, in achieving their goals 
of democratic reform. Though the widespread claims that army chief of staff 
Rachid al-Ammar refused orders to fire on protestors were false, they may 
have helped reinforce the solidarity between Tunisia’s armies and her citizens 
at a critical moment during the revolution.  
 
For military rulers, internal and external pressure will place pressure on the 
regime to reform, but is not in and of itself sufficient to lead to democratic 
consolidation. Mass protest and international sanction are also effective tools 
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against military regimes. Military rulers tend to become divided at critical 
junctures, and more often than not these divisions create incentives for 
democratic reform. The central challenge reformers face in confronting 
military regimes lies not so much in forcing the regime to cede power, but in 
ensuring that soldiers refrain from political interference after they have 
returned to the barracks.  Historically, the prospects for survival of a 
democracy succeeding military rule are dim. For military regimes, internal 
and external pressure is best characterized as a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for lasting democratic reform. 
 
Fortunately, the divisions between the traditional and the ruling class of 
soldiers that characterize military regimes, as well as the Nigerian case, 
suggest a potential strategy that opposition forces ought to adopt in 
confronting military regimes. The strategy involves working with officers in 
the army who favor democratization to marginalize their praetorian 
colleagues. Reformers must realize that they are not negotiating with a unified 
body, and that the key obstacle to lasting democratization is not the majority 
of soldiers who serve in traditional roles, but the faction of the army that seeks 
and covets power. In negotiating the terms of the transition, reformers will be 
best served by undertaking a strategy that increases the influence of the 
traditional faction and disadvantages the praetorian faction. As experience 
from the Nigerian case indicates, reforms that the ruling class of soldiers 
might appear violently opposed to – such as the mass retirement of officers 
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serving in previous political roles and efforts to even the regional and ethnic 
balance of the armed forces – are actually likely to be welcomed by most 
soldiers. Democratic reformers may therefore have more leverage in 
negotiating with military regimes than they often realize, particularly in the 
aftermath of a political transition.  
 
Authoritarian regimes with ethnically-stacked armies are unlikely to be 
responsive to external pressure and will most often meet mass protest with 
repression. For ethnically stacked armies led by civilian dictators, the 
response to political pressure is to unite behind the authoritarian regime. As 
clients who owe their livelihoods to the dictators they serve and who are often 
used as instruments of violence, soldiers in ethnic armies stand to lose the 
most as a result of a transition and so are more likely to support the status quo 
at whatever cost. This means that not only might external pressure and 
popular resistance fail to force the army to support regime change, but could 
even provoke a violent response that means the state becomes more repressive 
and leads to widespread, intractable conflict. Because they are likely to be met 
with violence, bottom up protests against civilian dictatorships with ethnically 
stacked armies is risky.  
 
Thus, would-be reformers are caught between Scylla of empty engagement 
with the regime and Charybdis of an often-non-credible threat of hard 
intervention. Sudan’s experience here is instructive. Despite the enforcement 
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of international sanctions, Sudan’s territory is too large and its politics too 
unstable for the international community to seriously contemplate military 
options that might cause Sudan’s armies to rethink their support of the regime. 
Reformers are thus left with few good options, and the best opportunity for 
democratization is likely to come only once Bashir leaves power.   
 
3) The international community’s ability to foster democratic change by working 
through or with military institutions in other countries is limited. The analysis 
presented in this dissertation suggests that democratic reform of political and 
military institutions is rarely externally driven, but is led internally, by 
coalitions of moderates within authoritarian regimes and by civilians willing 
to risk fire and fury for a more democratic future. Most often these actors, and 
not outside forces, negotiate the terms of a transition and determine the nature 
of a country’s political institutions, organizations, and parties. The centrality 
and sensitivity of the army’s mission as the guarantor of the state’s monopoly 
on violence means that the leverage of outside actors is likely to be limited 
except in the most extreme of circumstances, such as cases where 
international actors can credibly threaten military intervention or the military 
is dependent on U.S. military assistance for a substantial portion of its budget 
and cannot seek another great power patron.  
 
Cases such as Sudan make abundantly clear the constraints the U.S. and the 
international community’s face in trying to impose democracy from above. 
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Policies of military intervention or covert action may succeed in toppling 
authoritarian regimes, but substantive democracy is effectively impossible 
without the right political conditions. For now, the best the United States and 
allied countries can do is continue with the present policy and perhaps attempt 
to encourage the Sudanese government to adopt more meritocratic recruitment 
practices, under the argument that the adoption of such policies is likely to be 
stabilizing, both for the dictatorship but also, over the long term, for a future 
democracy.  
 
4) The U.S. and the international community could be doing far more to foster 
meritocratic security institutions that embrace democratic norms. The U.S. 
cannot foster change where the conditions for it do not exist, but it can and 
should do more to nudge its partner militaries to undertake more meritocratic 
recruitment practices and assist armies who already adopt such practices. Like 
U.S. development aid, much of U.S. military assistance relations are products 
of longstanding strategic relationships, such as that between the United States 
and Israel, or ad-hoc responses to immediate crises, such as U.S. military 
cooperation with Niger to confront terrorism in the Sahel. Nothing is going to 
change the fact that most of U.S. security assistance relationships serve 
strategic purposes. 
Nevertheless, U.S. security assistance partners, such as armies in Senegal and 
Tunisia, receive little recognition for the apolitical role of their armies, 
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whereas repressive strategic allies such as the armies of Egypt and Ethiopia 
are rewarded with lavish security assistance contracts. Though Leahy laws 
exist in practice to prevent the U.S. from lending military hardware to regimes 
that engage in human rights abuse, these laws are frequently bypassed and 
ignored.  
One modest way to address these perverse incentives would be to actively 
reward countries who foster meritocratic security institutions that are 
apolitical and nationally representative. A program like the U.S. Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, which provides development assistance to countries 
who meet minimum criteria of governance, could be set up to acknowledge 
developing countries or other strategic partners with meritocratic security 
institutions. The program could reward such countries with military hardware, 
budget support, or specialized training programs suited to the country’s needs, 
or even be used for non-military purposes.  
 
 
8.3: Implications for Future Inquiry 
 
The goal of this project was to provide an answer to the question of why soldiers 
in Africa are so fickle in their support of democratic change. Though it is my hope that 
the analysis presented in this dissertation succeeds in providing novel insight, the process 
of conducting the research for this project has rendered me painfully aware of this study’s 
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limits. Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn is that there remain many 
unanswered questions and thus, many topics at the nexus of African armies and African 
politics that merit further investigation. I end with a meditation on five of this study’s 
more serious shortcomings and suggestions for further research.  
First, the study provides strong evidence that between 1960 and 2015, the nature 
of authoritarian civil-military relations impact democratic transition outcomes and 
consolidation possibilities. However, an extensive investigation of whether these effects 
have changed substantially within the time frame analyzed is beyond this project’s scope. 
As Figure 1 indicates, the overall number of authoritarian regimes have declined since the 
early 1990s, the civilian led regimes with ethnic stacking appear most resilient. These 
declines illustrate the importance of changes in both the international and domestic 
political context, and suggest that factors other than the study variables have contributed 
to this decline. More work is needed to examine interactions between these factors and 










Figure 8.1: Democratization Outcomes of African Armed Forces Under Authoritarianism, 1960-2015 
 
Sources: Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, “Polity IV Project”; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, “Authoritarian 
Breakdown.”  
 
Second, with the decline of military regimes and the successful democratization 
of most regimes with representative armed forces, perhaps the most pressing unexplored 
implication of this dissertation is the need to better understand how to confront regimes 
with ethnically stacked armies. Non-military led authoritarian regimes that practice ethnic 
stacking are now the most common form of authoritarian civil-military relation in Africa, 
in no small part because they have proven so resilient to pressures to democratize. More 
research is needed to understand if and when there are circumstances under which 




reform. The analysis most suited for such a project would be single case studies or 
structured comparisons including the few countries with civilian led authoritarian regimes 
who have successfully democratized. In Africa, the only such countries are Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Kenya and Comoros, meaning large-n analysis would be fruitless with 
such a small sample size.  
Third, there is an additional need to understand more about the nature of ethnic 
stacking and how it influences civil-military relations. The data used for this dissertation 
draws on previous work to define ethnic stacking as either present or absent depending on 
whether the regime leadership recruits co-ethnics into the officer corps or other parallel 
military institutions. In reality, it is probable that there exists substantial variation in 
transitional outcomes dependent not just on the practice of ethnic stacking itself, but on 
other differences in the nature of ethnic representation within a country’s security forces. 
Future work should seek to examine these differences on outcomes such as military 
intervention, democratization, authoritarian durability, and military willingness to 
oppress conditional on 1) variance in ethnic representation within security institutions, 
either as a percentage of over or under-representation of various ethnic groups or 
differentiating between cases where certain ethnic groups are completely excluded or 
merely marginalized; 2) cases where ethnic stacking or imbalances are present either in 
the army, parallel military institutions, or both - the results here may be particularly 
revealing in light of recent research suggesting that parallel military institutions improve 
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authoritarian resilience;493 and 3) differences in ethnic representation between the officer 
corps and rank-and-file soldiers. These differences may be particularly critical, because 
there is considerable qualitative evidence to support the idea that generational cleavages 
between high and low-ranking officers and between officers and enlisted men influence 
military responses to external pressures and propensities to intervene.494  So far, such 
efforts have been hampered by a lack of available data. 
Fourth, ethnic stacking is not the only type of authoritarian civil-military relation 
in need of further investigation. In the words of a recent article, “our knowledge of 
military regimes is much less coherent than often thought.”495 This study has provided 
some clarity, providing additional evidence that regimes where the military rules as an 
institution, and not those ruled by a personalist military strongman, appear to have 
distinct and complex patterns of democratization. More research is needed to investigate 
whether military regimes, particularly in Africa, experience additional outcomes that 
significantly differ from other kinds of authoritarian regimes, such as conflict, economic 
growth and equality, and authoritarian durability. Especially valuable would be a more 
systematic attempt to explain the variation in democratic transition outcomes among 
military regimes. The evidence from Nigeria tentatively suggests that democratic 
                                                          
493 Erica De Bruin, “Preventing Coups d’état: How Counterbalancing Works,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution (2017), 0022002717692652. 
494 See, for example, Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military a Sociological Analysis of Authority & Revolt 
1960-1967 (CUP Archive, 1971). 
495 Nam Kyu Kim and Alex M. Kroeger. "Regime and leader instability under two forms of military 
rule." Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 1 (2017), pp. 3-37. 
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transitions in military regimes depends on whether praetorian or traditional officers exert 
greater control over the junta at critical junctures.  
Finally, the scope of this dissertation was limited to the role of authoritarian civil-
military relations on the probability of democratic transition and the duration of emerging 
democratic regimes. It did not examine the equally important and timely topic of the role 
of civil-military relations on authoritarian durability. Table 1, culled from this 
dissertation’s dataset, suggests that the typology advanced by this project is also an 
important factor in predicting the length of authoritarian rule. Unsurprisingly, military 
regimes appear to be the least durable civil-military relation type, with the splits between 
and among praetorian and non-praetorian officers fairly quickly leading to democracy or 
other forms of authoritarian civil-military relations. Non-military led regimes with ethnic 
stacking appear to last around an average length of time, likely a function of the tendency 
of ethnic competition for control of the state and the state’s coercive apparatus. Finally, at 
an average of thirty-five years, authoritarian regimes with representative military 
institutions last the longest, highlighting the potential trade-off between authoritarian 
stability and stable democratic consolidation. These are potentially important theoretical 
insights with practical implications here that deserve far more detailed examination than 







Table 8.1: Average Duration of Authoritarian Regime by Civil-Military Relation Type 










Above all, this study reinforces the Clausewitzian notion that militaries are 
political entities. The objective control so idolized by Huntington is not birthed 
organically, but comes about as a result of choices made by military officials and senior 
policymakers to pursue strategies that limit military interference and maximize 
authoritarian control over a country’s means of violence.  By understanding something of 
how the political allegiances of Africans in uniform are influenced by these choices, the 
veil shrouding the face of the military Janus is lifted.  Instead of wondering at the 
mercurial decisiveness of military action in favor or against democracy, we find that 
these actions are comprehensible, predictable, and profoundly influenced by the 
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